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ABSTRACT 
 
INTERNAL CONTROL QUALITY AND INFORMATION ASYMMETRY IN 
THE SECONDARY LOAN MARKET 
 
By:  Dina F. El-Mahdy, Ph.D. 
 
A Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy in Business at Virginia Commonwealth University  
 
 
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2011 
 
 
Chair: Dr. Myung Seok Park  
Associate Professor of Accounting   
 
 
There are four primary objectives of this study. First, it examines the association between 
the disclosure of the Internal Control Deficiencies (ICDs), as a proxy for the internal control 
quality, and information asymmetry (IA) in the secondary loan market. Second, it identifies 
which types of ICDs exacerbate conditions of information asymmetry in the secondary loan 
market. Third, it investigates whether firms that remediate or take corrective actions to address 
ICDs lead to a reduction in information asymmetry in the market. Finally, it examines the effect 
of the loan specific characteristics such as debt covenants, credit rating and number of lenders 
(syndication) in the secondary loan market on the association between ICDs and IA. 
Results suggest that firms that disclose ICDs have significant positive association with IA 
and that ICDs reported under section 302 have significant positive association with IA. Although 
results on the association between the severity rank of ICDs by using Internal Control Material 
Weaknesses (ICMWs) as a proxy and IA are not supported, the use of Company Level (CL) 
x 
 
internal control as a proxy for the severity rank of ICDs shows a significant positive association 
with IA. Overall, firms that remediate their ICDs have significant negative association with IA.  
Overall, there is a statistical negative association between the interaction term of ICDs 
and number of lenders (syndication) and IA. Same negative significant association is 
documented between the interaction term of ICDs and credit rating, and IA and the interaction 
term of ICDs and debt covenants and IA. The latter result suggests that the secondary loan 
market unique characteristics mitigate the negative consequences of the disclosure of ICDs and 
reduce the information asymmetry between lender and multiple arrangers. My results are 
consistent  with prior studies’ (Bryan and Lilien, 2005; Ge and McVay, 2005; Doyle, Ge and 
McVay 2007 a,b; Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and Kinney, 2007, Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, 
Kinney, and LaFond, 2008), which suggest that firms with reported ICDs are generally small, 
poor performing, financially weaker, and characterized by higher market risk than firms with 
effective internal control system.   
 
 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Numerous studies document an association between characteristics of the firm’s 
informational environment and information asymmetry among managers and investors in the 
equity market (Richardson, 2000; Frankel and Li, 2004; Schrand and Verrecchia, 2005; Bharath, 
Pasquariello, and Wu, 2008). For example, Frankel and Li (2004) find an association between 
the firm’s future profitability measures (e.g., the informativeness of financial statements, analyst 
following, and news) and information asymmetry. In the same vein, Schrand and Verrecchia 
(2005) argue that the greater frequency of disclosure in the pre-Initial Public Offering (IPO) 
period is a tool that reduces adverse selection associated with the IPO issuance. However, few 
studies investigate the association, if any, between characteristics of the firm’s informational 
environment and information asymmetry in the debt market, especially in the secondary loan 
market.1 
Moreover, little research examines the impact of the quality of accounting information on 
the secondary loan market (Ball, Bushman, and Vasvari 2008; Yu 2007; Gaul and Uysal, 2009; 
Moerman, 2008). However, none of these existing studies examine the impact of the disclosure 
of Internal Control (hereafter IC) quality on information asymmetry in the secondary loan 
market. My study fills this gap in the literature by examining the association between the 
disclosure of IC effectiveness and information asymmetry in the secondary loan market.  
IC is the cornerstone of business success. It assesses whether managers are receiving the 
relevant and correct information for decision making, assets are protected, and internal 
procedural laws and policies are followed by employees (Kinney, 2000). Additionally, the 
                                                          
1
 Secondary or syndicated loan market is relatively new in the US market. It is the place where the initial loan is sold 
by the primary lender (lead arranger) to multiple lenders (multiple arrangers). 
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quality of a firm’s IC system is a key element on the informativeness of the auditor’s reported 
financial statements (Pae and Yoo, 2001). Internal control has, no doubt, a direct effect on the 
quality of financial reporting (Doyle, Ge and McVay, 2007b; Feng, Li and McVay, 2009). An 
ineffective internal control is thus a sign that information provided to management for its 
decision-making process contains errors and that assets are not protected. Considering that assets 
are the collateral in any loan agreement, if these assets are not protected, then collateral will be 
viewed by creditors as overvalued assets. Therefore, to the extent that assets are not protected in 
a firm, creditors must account for the high risk associated with their investment in such firms by 
increasing the cost of borrowing. Likewise, credit rating agencies might lower the credit rating of 
such risky firms.  
The primary objective of this study is to examine the association between IC quality,2 as 
a proxy for the firm’s informational environment, and information asymmetry in the secondary 
loan market. An effective IC system is defined as a quality system, whereas an ineffective 
system lacks quality. I examine the association between IC quality and information asymmetry 
for a sample of firms that extends from the Sarbanes – Oxley Act 2002 (hereafter SOX 2002) 
enactment date to the post section 404 reporting period. I then trace IC quality under SOX 2002 
– section 404 (section 302) which represents the disclosure of audited (unaudited) IC 
weaknesses, and subsequent Auditing Standards provisions, such as Auditing Standard No.2 
(hereafter AS2), which was amended later by Auditing Standard No. 5 (hereafter AS5).3 
Additionally, I divide IC weaknesses into component elements to shed some light on the 
                                                          
2
 Quality of IC is disclosed under Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 – IC related provisions to public registrants 
accompanying footnotes in various statutory filings such as: Item 9A of the Form 10-K, Item 4 of the Form 10-Q, 
and 8-K forms (Irving, 2006).  
 
3
 Auditing Standard No. 5 was released to replace Auditing Standard No. 2 which was released to guide auditors in 
complying with SOX 2002 section 404. My sample period does not extend to the enactment date of AS5 (The fiscal 
years ending on or after November 15, 2007) and hence the analysis will be restricted to AS2.  
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differential effects on information asymmetry in the secondary loan market. For example, IC 
weaknesses could occur on the company or account-specific level. IC weaknesses are also 
divided into three categories according to Auditing Standard No. 2. These three components are 
ordered in ranks of severity as: control deficiency, significant deficiency and material 
weaknesses.   
Taken together, there are four primary objectives of this study. First, it examines the 
association between the disclosure of the Internal Control Deficiencies (ICDs), as a proxy for the 
internal control quality, and information asymmetry (IA) in the secondary loan market. Second, 
it identifies which types of ICDs exacerbate conditions of information asymmetry in the 
secondary loan market. Third, it investigates whether firms that remediate or take corrective 
actions to address ICDs lead to a reduction in information asymmetry in the market. Finally, it 
examines the effect of the loan specific characteristics such as debt covenants, credit rating and 
number of lenders (syndication) in the secondary loan market on the association between ICDs 
and IA. 
I am motivated to study the association between IC quality and information asymmetry in  
the secondary loan market for a number of reasons. First, the secondary loan market is a vital and 
unique sector in the US economy. It offers unique information (e.g., the reputation of the 
syndication arranger, various types of loans with different maturities, purposes, and 
characteristics) not traditionally offered by the equity market (Moerman, 2008). More 
importantly, there are two types of traders in the secondary loan market, informed and 
uninformed traders. The informed traders usually have more information than that possessed by 
uninformed traders, potentially creating an adverse selection problem associated with such 
information asymmetry among traders. Information asymmetry therefore affects total demand 
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and supply of information in the market, indicating an imperfect market (Angbazo, Mei and 
Saunders 1998; Richardson, 2000; Kim and Park, 2009).  Moreover, the secondary loan market 
is a fast-growing and important sector in the US economy. It has been argued that the secondary 
loan market resulted in a revolution in the US market and lessened the impact of the recent 
financial crisis of 2007-2008 on the US economy.4 According to the Reuters Loan Pricing 
Corporation (LPC), the volume of the secondary loan market in the US grew from $8 billion in 
1991 and to $340 billion in the second quarter of 2009.5 
Second, IC disclosures, unlike other types of disclosures, exist in complex settings under 
the IC provisions of SOX 2002. In general, the IC related provisions have been sharply criticized 
for being uniform across firms of different sizes, industries and complexities (Irving, 2006). 
Chief executives argue that the cost of compliance with SOX 404 has hindered IT installations, 
hiring, and product launches, as well as delayed strategic alliances (Irving, 2006). In 2003, the 
SEC estimated the cost of compliance per registrant at $91,000; however, the actual compliance 
cost ranges from $5 million for large firms to $1 million for small firms (De Franco, Guan, and 
Lu, 2005). Additionally, IC disclosure under SOX 2002 – IC related provisions provides both 
unaudited-voluntary (section 302) and audited-mandatory (section 404) disclosure, each with its 
own unique structure related to varying degrees of uncertainty in the market.  
Additionally, research on whether IC disclosure under these provisions adds value to the 
market is inconclusive. Moreover, sections 302 and 404 differ significantly in their requirements, 
as well as their impacts on the business environment.6 The cost (e.g., audit fees and SEC filing 
                                                          
4
  Press Release, Business Wire, November 4, 2004. 
 
5
 LPC web page: http://www.loanpricing.com/analytics/pricing_service_volume1.htm 
 
6
 Section 302 requires firms with internal control deficiencies to voluntary disclosure these deficiencies in their 
financial statement, while section 404 requires firms with material weakness to mandatory disclose these material 
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that entails time and cost) associated with section 404 is far more than that of section 302. 
Hence, the investors’ beliefs regarding the impact of IC provisions related to SOX 2002 are 
predicted to differ dramatically based on the two provisions. My study is motivated by this 
complex disclosure environment along with the mixed evidence on the usefulness of SOX 2002 
– IC related provisions to the US market, especially in the secondary loan market. In an attempt 
to measure the net economic benefits of SOX 2002 –IC related provisions to the market, I use the 
bid-ask spread as a net measure of the economic benefits of SOX 2002 in a new paradigm that 
tests the association between the quality of Internal Control over Financial Reporting (hereafter 
ICFR) and information asymmetry in the secondary loan market.  
Third, I am motivated by the mixed evidence on the association between disclosure as a 
proxy for information asymmetry and its effect on the cost of capital. Studies on the determinants 
of internal control material weakness show that firms with material weaknesses are more likely 
to be small, financially weak, still growing or young, have poor earnings quality such as 
abnormal accruals, high cost of equity capital, complex operations, and/or are undergoing 
restructuring such as mergers and acquisitions (Doyle, Ge and McVay 2007 a, b; Ashbaugh-
Skaife, Collins, and Kinney, 2007, Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and LaFond, 2008). 
Nevertheless, research on the impact of the quality of internal control on the cost of capital 
provides mixed results. For example, Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and LaFond (2009) find 
a positive association between the cost of capital and disclosure of material weaknesses under 
sections 302 and section 404. In the same vein, Ogneva, Subramanyam, and Raghunandan 
(2007) found no association under section 404. Botosan (1997) also finds no relation between 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
weaknesses in their financial statements. Additionally, section 404 requires an external auditor’s attestation on the 
management assessment of the material weaknesses disclosed and discovered. Moreover, Bedard (2006) finds that 
the magnitude of earnings manipulations reported under section 302 is double that reported under section 404.  
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disclosure and the cost of capital in the pre-SOX 2002 period. One possible interpretation of 
these mixed results is that the cost of capital does not always synchronize with the welfare of 
current or prospective investors (Gao, 2010). The cost of capital has varying impacts on different 
types of traders, and this impact is conditional on investor’s risk attitude and adjustment costs of 
new investments (Gao, 2010).7 The disclosure of Internal Control Deficiencies increases the 
level of risk that traders are willing to assume. Disclosed weaknesses increase the level of 
uncertainty regarding the firm’s operations as well as the confidence in the reliability of financial 
statements and hence collateral. Therefore, traders increase the interest rate for firms with 
Internal Control Deficiencies relative to their counterparts without evident weaknesses in the IC.   
Fourth, I am motivated by the negative contagious effects8 of IC weaknesses on rival 
firms. Although the market value of firms with reported material weaknesses is only 1.28% of 
the market value of S&P 500 firms (Bryan and Lilien, 2005), their effects, both negative and 
positive are more significant than they may seem at first. Potentially, the consequences of a 
deficient internal control system to the economy are immeasurable. For example, earnings 
restatements9 due to the presence of severe IC errors convey bad news about the restated and 
non-restated (rival) firms to the market and cause a decline in share prices of rival, non-restating 
firms (Gleason, Jenkins, and Johnson, 2008). Moreover, restating firms experience reputational 
penalties to the extent that 60% of the restating firms have experienced top management turnover 
(either Chairman, CEO or president) within two years of the announcement of the restatements 
                                                          
7
 Adjustment costs of new investment can be defined as the decrease in the stock returns due to the instantaneous 
initiation of new investments.  
 
8
 The contagious effect is the negative consequences of a firm on other rival firms in the industry.  
 
9
 Earnings restatement and corporate fraud have increased dramatically over the last three decades (Desai, Hogan, 
and Wilkins, 2006) to the extent that the continuous increase in the accounting restatement triggers the issuance of 
reforms and business regulations such as Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 (SOX 2002 hereafter) and the establishment of 
institutions such as Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).   
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(Desai, Hogan, and Wilkins, 2006). On the other hand, the expected impact of the quality of 
internal controls to the U.S. market is a reduction in the cost of capital and better access to a 
capital market (Bryan and Lilien, 2005). In a related study, Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, 
and Lafond (2008) find that firms that improved internal control, as evidenced by going from 
adverse to unqualified SOX 404 opinions, show a significant increase in accrual quality, and 
hence an improvement in the quality of their financial statements.  
In summary, I am motivated by the importance of SOX 2002 - section 302 and section 
404 in addition to AS2 and AS5. SOX 2002 – section 404 is one of the most puzzling, yet 
important provisions in the capital market. I am also motivated by the fast growth of the U.S. 
secondary loan market in a relatively short period of time and the implications of information 
asymmetry that has an invariable negative impact on market efficiency (Richardson, 2000; Kim 
and Park, 2009).  
Verrecchia (2001) argues that information asymmetry is a decreasing function of a 
comprehensive theory of disclosure. Additionally, anecdotal evidence suggests that high 
disclosure quality increases the firm’s visibility, reduces the cost of processing public 
information and, thus, increases the trading volume by uninformed traders (Brown and 
Hillegiest, 2007). Expectedly, increased trading by uninformed traders reduces information 
asymmetry between informed and uninformed traders.  In the same vein, Leuz and Verrecchia 
(2000) argue that more disclosure, most likely voluntary, diminishes the portion of information 
asymmetry related to the firm’s cost of capital.  
My study contributes to literature on internal controls over financial reporting as well as 
on information asymmetry in the secondary loan market. First, I build on the ongoing, yet 
unresolved, debate on the usefulness of SOX 2002 to the firm and business environment in a 
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number of ways. To the best of my knowledge, my study is the first to integrate the quality of IC 
and information asymmetry in the secondary loan market into one paradigm. For example, my 
study differs from and extends the study by Beneish, Billings and Hodder (2008). I use 
contemporaneous analysis that is based on testing the disclosure of weaknesses and information 
asymmetry after controlling for firm, lender, and loan characteristics. Hence, one of the 
contributions of this study is the use of association studies relative to event study methodology 
used by Beneish, Billings and Hodder (2008). My study extends the limited research on the 
association between internal control quality and cost of equity by focusing on the cost of 
borrowing as a component of the cost of capital.  
Second, my study also extends research on audit quality (DeAngelo, 1981, Teoh and 
Wong, 1993, Krishnan, 2005) because I compare two SOX 2002 provisions, section 302 
(unaudited disclosure of Internal Control Deficiencies) and section 404 (audited disclosure). I 
would expect auditing to have a positive influence on the secondary loan market. My study also 
extends the study made by Moerman (2008) who found that timely loss recognition, as a measure 
of financial reporting quality, decreases information asymmetry in the secondary loan market. 
Furthermore, my study extends the work by Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and Lafond 
(2009), which argues that firms that failed to remediate their Internal Control Deficiencies 
(ICDs)10 receive an adverse SOX 404 opinion for the period after the ICDs disclosure and 
consequently experienced a higher cost of equity capital. Moreover, my study contributes to 
resolving the mixed evidence on the association between disclosure of material weaknesses and 
the cost of capital. For example, Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and LaFond (2009) find a 
positive association between the cost of capital and disclosure of material weaknesses under 
                                                          
10
 Significant deficiencies and material weaknesses are referred to as Internal Control Deficiencies (ICDs) in prior 
literature (Leone, 2007). 
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sections 302 and section 404. However, Ogneva, Subramanyam, and Raghunandan (2007) do not 
find such an association under section 404.  
Third, I examine the relationship between the severity of internal control and information 
asymmetry in the secondary loan market. Raghunandan and Rama (2006), Doyle, Ge and McVay 
(2007b), and Hoitash, Hoitash, and Bedard (2009) stratify internal control problems into general 
and account specific. General internal control problems include (control environment, employee 
competence/triaging, and period-end procedures). Account-specific control issues are those that 
affect a narrow activity in the internal control system, such as account specific balances (e.g., 
inventory, accounts payable, accounts receivable). Raghunandan and Rama (2006) did not find a 
significant association between the severity of Internal Control Deficiencies and audit fees. 
However, Doyle, Ge and McVay (2007b) find a significant association between severity of 
internal control (general problems) and accrual quality.  
In building my theoretical hypotheses, I focus on four main predictions: (1) the 
association between IC disclosure and information asymmetry, (2) types of IC weaknesses and 
information asymmetry, (3) IC remediation and information asymmetry, and (4) the effect of the 
interaction term between loan-sp=ecific characteristics and IC weaknesses on information 
asymmetry. Throughout these predictions, I compare effects across section 302 (voluntary 
disclosure of IC) and section 404 (mandatory disclosure of IC). Prior research documents many 
benefits from providing more disclosure to various stakeholders. For example, disclosure results 
in lower information asymmetry and estimation risk (Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Welker, 1995; 
Schrand and Verrecchia, 2005), lower underpricing (Schrand and Verrecchia, 2005), lower cost 
of private debt (Mazumdar and Sengupta, 2005), and lower cost of capital (Botosan 1997; 
Sengupta 1998; Botosan and Plumlee 2002). Moreover, Easley and O’Hara (2004) suggest that 
10 
 
the composition of information (private versus public information) affects the cost of capital. 
They argue that private information increases the cost of capital because private information 
triggers more demand on stock returns. Based on prior research, I first predict that disclosure of 
bad news such as the Internal Control Deficiencies will increase information asymmetry.  Having 
two types of disclosure, mandatory versus voluntary, under SOX 2002, I predict that information 
asymmetry will be lower under section 404 than under section 302 due to the uncertainty 
surrounding the IC disclosure under section 302 (Beneish, Billings and Hodder 2008).  
Moreover, disclosure of IC quality is dependent on the internal systems of the firm. 
Hammersley, Myers, and Shakespeare (2008) find that the information content of the disclosure 
of Internal Control Deficiencies depends on the severity of the Internal Control Deficiencies. 
Disclosure of IC quality signals to the market on the corporate governance and oversight roles of 
the Board of Directors (Krishnan, 2005). Moreover, Irving (2006) argues that “An effective 
system of internal controls protects the integrity of transactions recorded as inputs to the 
financial reporting system and aggregated into financial reports.” Disclosure of ineffective ICs 
affects past, present and future financial reporting (Irving, 2006) providing information to 
internal managers and market-wide participants for decision-making purposes such as buying 
and selling decisions, ratings by credit agencies, loan decisions, and rating firm creditworthiness. 
When a weakness in the internal control system is disclosed to the public, it increases 
uncertainty about the firm’s internal operations and activities (Beneish, Billings and Hodder 
2008). Weakness is symptomatic of increased business risk (Ogneva, Subramanyam, and 
Raghunandan, 2007). Additionally, uncertainty increases the demand for risk-taking actions by 
investors and traders. Hence, informed traders in the secondary loan market will demand more 
private information about unsecured collateral and increase the cost of borrowing to the firm 
11 
 
relative to that cost demanded by informed traders.  Uninformed traders might withdraw totally 
from the market in the presence of high uncertainty, or when the cost of acquiring information is 
very high (Lev, 1988).  
Taken together, severe information asymmetry increases the demand for information by 
informed traders and the possibility that uninformed traders will leave the market. The disclosure 
of material weaknesses (as a severe type of IC weaknesses) may also lead banks and short-term 
lenders to discount the collateral potential of the borrowing firms’ financial assets (Gupta and 
Nayar, 2006) and trigger a lower debt rating, thus increasing the probability of default and/or 
higher borrowing costs (Moody’s Investor Service, 2004; Fitch Rating, 2005), and increase 
market uncertainty (Beneish, Billings and Hodder 2008; Kim and Park 2009).  I expect various 
types of IC weaknesses to have varying impacts on information asymmetry in the secondary loan 
market. I will stratify IC weaknesses by type and investigate their relationship to information 
asymmetry in the secondary loan market. Doyle, Ge and McVay (2007a) suggest that the 
determinants of material Internal Control Deficiencies vary according to the reasons for those 
weaknesses.  
In other words, each firm has its own unique set of internal control features. Also, results 
suggest that firms that report account-specific weaknesses tend to be larger, older, financially 
healthier, have more complex and diversified business operations and are growing more rapidly 
than firms that report company-level weaknesses. Likewise, firms with company-wide problems 
do not have either the resources or the experience to maintain a good control system. Moreover, 
the type of material weaknesses differs in terms of audit delay (Ettredge, Li and Sun, 2006). For 
example, internal control general weaknesses in personnel, processes, and procedures are 
associated with longer audit delays than those related to account-specific weaknesses. Therefore, 
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I expect to find higher information asymmetry in the presence of more severe weaknesses 
relative to that associated with less severe IC weaknesses.  
Effective internal controls enhance the quality of financial reporting and reduce agency 
cost (Haron, Ibrahim, Jeyaraman, and Chye, 2010). Moreover, effective internal control provides 
the “quality assurance” expected by management and various stakeholders to assure that firm 
objectives are being achieved (Kinney, 2000). Therefore, the disclosure of effective internal 
control is assumed to reduce stakeholder’s uncertainty. Likewise, disclosure of remediation 
actions taken by the management to correct IC weaknesses is expected to reduce information 
asymmetry.  
 Low quality internal control, as measured by ineffective IC, increases information 
asymmetry for lenders and between borrowers and lenders and creates an adverse selection 
problem, the inability of traders to differentiate among the quality of loans.  I measure ineffective 
internal control by the presence of Internal Control Material Weaknesses (hereafter ICMWs) 
post-section 404 and Internal Control Deficiency (hereafter ICD) pre-section 404 and post-
section 302. I measure ineffective IC using both level and change (remediation) in IC 
weaknesses.  The level of ineffective IC will be operationalized by the different types of IC 
weaknesses in terms of severity (e.g., control deficiency, significant deficiency or material 
weaknesses or company-level versus account-specific weaknesses). The change in IC 
weaknesses will be measured by whether firms took remediation actions to correct these 
weaknesses.  
I predict different levels of information asymmetry as a result of the disclosure of IC 
weaknesses under different SOX 2002 – IC related provisions. For example, section 302, unlike 
section 404, does not require the auditing attestation on the management assessment of IC. 
13 
 
Additionally, AS2 does not provide clear guidelines on the amount and extent of ineffective IC 
that should be disclosed. Therefore, I conjecture that disclosure of IC weaknesses under section 
302 is characterized by higher uncertainty than that associated with those under section 404. 
Moreover, higher uncertainty under section 302 triggers more demand from informed traders for 
private information and hence, higher information asymmetry is expected under section 302 than 
that under section 404. Finally, I use the unique characteristics of the secondary loan market such 
as debt covenants, credit rating and number of lenders to explain the hypothesized relationship 
between the information asymmetry and the disclosure of Internal Control Deficiencies.  
 The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. In chapter two, I introduce an 
institutional background on internal controls and financial reporting as well as the secondary 
loan market. I discuss the literature on the disclosure of internal controls and information 
asymmetry in the secondary loan market in chapter three. I develop the hypotheses and present 
the research methodology in chapters four and five, respectively. I discuss the findings and 
empirical evidence is chapter six. In chapter seven, I summarize the results of this study.  
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CHAPTER 2 
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
2.1 Internal Control and Sarbanes - Oxley ACT of 2002 
2.1.1 Internal Control over Financial Reporting 
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO 1992) 
defines internal control as: “a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management 
and other personnel designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of 
objectives in the following categories: effectiveness and efficiency of operations,  reliability of 
financial information,  and compliance with the applicable laws and regulations.” The main 
purpose of maintaining internal control systems is thus to prevent, detect, and eliminate 
irregularities and fraud in financial reporting (Yu and Neter, 1973). Hence, the internal control 
system is the proactive method by which a firm can detect fraud and intentional and 
unintentional errors. By definition, there is no alternative method to prevent material errors and 
fraud other than maintaining an effective internal control system. Thus, failure to detect material 
weaknesses in internal controls can affect many users of financial reporting including, but not 
limited to, employees, regulators, investors, and creditors. Hence, such failures could result in 
misleading the market-wide participants or market imperfection.  
Evaluating the effectiveness of internal control systems has always been part of audit 
tasks. Auditors, according to the AICPA, are required to evaluate the reliability of internal 
control in order to determine the scope and nature of audit processes. In the pre- SOX 2002 era, 
there were no specific objective guidelines for auditors to follow in evaluating the reliability of 
internal control systems. Traditionally, while evaluating the effectiveness of internal control 
systems, auditors were making a trade-off between sample size and precision limits. Most 
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methods used were subjective and qualitative such as flowcharts (Yu and Neter, 1973). 
Moreover, the evaluation of internal control systems was characterized as biased and inaccurate. 
Further, these evaluations were described as lacking uniformity and consistency (Corless, 1972).  
The history of IC systems shows that government regulations required companies to 
establish systems of internal control as early as 1977 (Byington and Christensen, 2005; Ge and 
McVay, 2005). However, statutory regulations that govern the disclosure of internal controls 
over financial reporting have not been clear to SEC registrants and in most cases were not “cost 
effective” in terms of the net benefit of these statutory regulations to the U.S. firm. The Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977 was the first law which required internal control 
disclosure. The FCPA required public firms to disclose internal control deficiencies when 
announcing a change in auditors (Irving, 2006). It also required firms to maintain “cost effective” 
systems of internal controls over financial reporting. However, the term “cost effective” was 
quite vague to registrants and subject to interpretation.  
2.1.2 SOX 2002 - Section 302: Voluntary Disclosure of ICDs 
Corporate governance failures by the onset of the 1990s reinvigorated the need for 
corporate reforms to address fraud. Therefore, SOX 2002 was enacted on July 30, 2002 to curb 
business fraud and corruption. SOX 2002 was named after Senator Paul Sarbanes (a Democratic 
senator from Maryland) and Representative Michael Oxley (a Republican congressman from 
Ohio). One of the key elements to blame for corporate fraud is the internal control deficiencies 
that failed to detect those frauds. Therefore, SOX 2002 – section 302 was issued followed by 
section 404, AS2,11 and AS5.12 The main purpose of the SOX 2002 – IC related provisions is to 
                                                          
11
 The PCAOB issued the Auditing Standard No. 2: “An Audit of Internal Control over Financial Reporting 
Performed in Conjunction with an Audit of Financial Statements”. Auditing Standard No. 2 was issued following 
the issuance of SOX 2002 – section 404 to assist auditors in issuing an opinion on the effectiveness of their public 
company clients’ internal control. Over 200 pages, Auditing Standard No. 2 provides new detailed responsibilities 
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inform investors and various stakeholders about weaknesses in the IC structure of the firm. Prior 
to IC disclosures (section 302 and section 404) related to SOX 2002, disclosure of internal 
control was only required when changing auditors (Haron, Ibrahim, Jeyaraman, and Chye, 2010).    
SOX 2002 - Section 302 requires the CEO and CFO to certify that the financial reports 
are free from material errors and weaknesses. Section 302 became effective on August 29, 2002. 
SOX 2002 - Section 906 “White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements” further stipulates the 
criminal penalties against firms’ financial officers who knowingly certify incorrect financial 
statements. Section 302 requires voluntary disclosure of ICDs as well as management evaluation 
of the effectiveness of controls and procedures. However, section 302 was not clear to either 
management or auditors. Management could not find clear guidelines on how to evaluate the 
effectiveness of internal controls. Auditors were confused regarding whether to report the 
assessment of internal control systems to shareholders and/or management. Also, under section 
302, no independent audit evaluation of a firm’s internal controls was required. Therefore, 
managers had more discretion to disclose ICD pre-SOX 404.   
There is a significant difference between voluntary and mandatory disclosures. To the 
extent that managers may be hesitant to report material weaknesses under section 302 due to the 
proprietary costs associated with full disclosure, I argue that section 302 is associated with 
discretionary managerial behavior, while section 404 is associated with intentional or 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and extensive procedures on both auditors and their clients (public firms). It further differentiates between the 
external auditors’ and management’s responsibilities regarding evaluating and reporting internal control material 
weaknesses.  
 
12
 In almost 118 pages and following the unintended cost and consequences of section 404 to the U.S. firm, the 
PCAOB released Auditing Standard No. 5: “An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting That Is 
Integrated with An Audit of Financial Statements, as well as an independence rule and conforming amendments to 
the Board's auditing standards” to amend the previously issued Auditing Standard No. 2. Auditing Standard No. 5 is 
issued to provide additional clarity, direct the external auditors’ focus on the most important matters in auditing the 
internal control over financial reporting, and further eliminate unnecessary audit work previously stipulated by 
Auditing Standard No. 2.  
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unintentional errors caused by inherent internal control risk. Additionally, voluntary disclosure 
might be seen as general disclosure that would exceed the minimum required disclosure (Haron, 
Ibrahim, Jeyaraman, and Chye, 2010).  
However, mandatory disclosure can be seen as the minimum required disclosure. 
Intuitively, voluntary or general disclosure may or may not reduce uncertainty, but in all cases it 
is an indication of the company’s willingness to reduce information asymmetry. Conversely, 
mandatory or minimum disclosure is, to some extent, more credible than voluntary disclosure. 
Mandatory disclosure is assumed to reduce uncertainty about the firm’s internal operations and 
controls more than that associated with voluntary disclosure.  
Business firms, once again, faced the same confusion they faced under FCPA 1977 with 
regard to the issuance and enactment of section 302. Under section 302, the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (hereafter PCAOB) requires firms to report on the effectiveness of 
internal control over financial reporting. However, section 302 did not give clear guidelines to 
either management or external auditors on what, how, and when to report the internal control 
material weaknesses.  
2.1.3 SOX 2002 - Section 404: Mandatory Disclosure of ICMWs 
Preliminary discussions about Section 404 were initially raised by the Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) of the Treadway Commission in 1992 that recommended 
public firms report on the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting in their annual 
reports. Section 404 became effective on or after November 15, 2004 for only accelerated filers 
and domestic firms with a market capitalization of $75 million or greater. Under section 404, 
auditors are required to opine on the management assessment of internal control over financial 
reporting and further disclose the material weaknesses and issue an adverse opinion even if s/he 
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finds material Internal Control Deficiencies. SOX 404 requires public firms to file forms 10-K 
and 10-Q containing an evaluation by management of its internal control. It also requires the 
external auditors to provide an opinion regarding the management assessment of the internal 
control on an annual basis.  
An excerpt of KRISPY KREME DOUGHNUTS INC13 Annual Report on Form 10-K 
Filing discloses the status of the firm’s IC weaknesses as follows: 
“The Company believes that, because of the number and magnitude of the 
restatement adjustments identified to date, it is highly likely that it will conclude that there 
were one or more material weaknesses in the Company's internal control over financial 
reporting at January 30, 2005. If the Company's management concludes that one or more 
material weaknesses existed, it will be unable to conclude that the Company maintained 
effective internal control over financial reporting as of January 30, 2005. Also, if one or 
more material weaknesses existed, the Company's independent registered public accounting 
firm will issue an adverse opinion with respect to the effectiveness of the Company's internal 
control over financial reporting as of January 30, 2005”. 
 
Section 404 was different from section 302 in terms of its consequences to the firm. 
Engel, Hayes, and Wang (2007) find that section 404 has increased the frequency with which 
firms are going private to avoid the costly consequences of being a public firm. Following the 
issuance of section 404, the SEC established PCAOB to provide oversight for the 
implementation of section 404. Subsequently, the PCAOB issued AS2 followed by AS5: “An 
Audit of Internal Control over Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction with an Audit of 
Financial Statements” establishing the rules for auditor attestation of firms’ internal controls.  
Therefore, SOX 404 imposes a burden on SEC registrants and carries costs and benefits 
to the U.S. firm. Section 404 has thus been named the section of unintended consequences 
(Gupta and Nayar, 2006). Opponents of section 404 argue that it does not benefit smaller firms. 
                                                          
13
 This excerpt is available at the company’s web page: 
http://investor.krispykreme.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=339854 
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Therefore, the SEC in 2006 made recommendations to the PCAOB to exempt micro-cap firms 
(firms with market cap below $128 million) from section 404 and small-cap firms (firms with 
market cap between $128 and $787 million) from the external auditor attestation on the 
management’s decision on the quality of internal control (Ettredge, Li and Sun, 2006). 
Moreover, section 404 imposes substantial cost to large-size firms. In 2003, the initial estimation 
by the SEC of the financial burden associated with section 404 was approximately ($91,000) per 
firm (Bedard, 2006). However, the actual financial burden of implementing section 404 during 
its first year was $1,241,000 ($8,510,000) for firms with market capitalization between $75 and 
$700 million (more than $700 million).  
Therefore, section 404 was one of the most controversial, yet important, provisions under 
SOX 2002. Section 404 also includes the cost of gaining the attention of top management to 
make a decision regarding an internal operational activity such as internal control effectiveness 
(Bryan and Lilien, 2005). Section 404 constitutes a challenge to external auditors; therefore, 
Byington and Christensen (2005) provide checklists of tasks to make the auditor attestation and 
management assertions on the effectiveness of internal control under section 404 easier. The 
framework of suggested checklists includes management considerations and auditing 
considerations, in addition to considerations related to the use of spreadsheets, outsourcing and 
computer security.  
In summary, voluntary disclosure of internal control quality under section 302 provides 
more detailed information than that provided by mandatory disclosure under section 404. Under 
section 302, firms disclose ICD which incorporates both material weaknesses and significant 
deficiencies. However, under section 404, firms disclose only material weaknesses.  
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There could be some incremental value of disclosing ICD over only disclosing material 
weaknesses. ICD include both material weaknesses and significant deficiencies. Disclosing a 
significant deficiency causes heterogeneity in stakeholders’ beliefs in two ways.  First, 
stakeholders might perceive a significant deficiency as negative, since it may develop into a 
material weakness in the future. Second, stakeholders might perceive a significant deficiency as 
positive and expect firms to take remediation actions in the future. Therefore, ICD may signal to 
the market the prospective risk associated with investing in ICD firms. I predict that disclosure of 
internal control quality under SOX 302 is incomplete due to the voluntary disclosure associated 
with it. Incomplete disclosure hence leads investors and creditors to search for private 
information in an effort to reduce information asymmetry.  Also, voluntary disclosure is often 
less credible than mandated disclosure. The vagueness associated with voluntary disclosures 
helps in creating and increasing information asymmetry.   
2.2 The Secondary Loan Market 
In the Secondary loan market, initial loans are sold to multiple lenders by primary 
lenders. All lenders maintain a copy of the documentation of the borrower because each 
syndicate lender has a separate claim on the loan although there is only one loan contract. The 
basic structure of the syndicated loan contains the borrower (e.g., corporation), lead banks or 
lead arrangers, and the follower. 
The historical development of syndicated lending can be divided into three phases 
(Gadanecz, 2004). The first phase features the emergence of syndicate lending in the 1970s as an 
autonomous business that replaced bilateral lending. Phase two started in the 1980s and was 
characterized by financial difficulties by many emerging market borrowers. Phase two triggered 
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a restructuring of syndicate lending into bond financing. Phase three began in the 1990s and it 
was characterized by the revival of syndicated loans as an important sector in the US economy.  
The two types of underwriting that are used in the syndicated lending are best efforts and 
firm commitment. Under best efforts, the lead bank does not guarantee the entire loan, and the 
borrower and lead bank can cancel the loan at anytime. This type of underwriting is used by less 
active banks. In contrast, under the firm commitment type of underwriting, the lead bank 
guarantees the entire loan, and it can be used in active markets in which mergers and acquisitions 
are more frequent.  
In the secondary market for syndicated loans, loans are syndicated as an assignment or 
participation loan. The key difference between assignment and participation can be summarized 
as follows. In the secondary market assignment, the contract is between the borrower and the 
loan buyer. In the secondary market participation, the contract is between the original lender and 
loan buyer. Stated differently, for participation, the buyer participates in the existing loan’s 
commitment, but the original lender remains the primary holder of the loan (Moerman, 2008). In 
the secondary market assignment, the sale is between two syndicate members or between one 
syndicate member and a bank outside the syndicate, while in secondary market participation, the 
borrower is a participant in the loan and, hence the contract does not change.  
Syndicated lending benefits both the lenders and the borrowers. For borrowers, 
syndicated loans give them access to capital and are more flexible than borrowing from one 
lender. Syndicated lending is cheaper for borrowers. Lenders benefit because they can easily 
transfer the risk of the loan by syndicating it to multiple lenders. Syndicated loans are also 
attractive to junior lenders because they can easily syndicate the loans to senior lenders 
(Gadanecz, 2004).  
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Syndicated loans in the secondary loan market are an important and unique sector in the 
US economy. Syndicated loans diversify credit risk and facilitate geographic and institutional 
sharing of risk for banks or multiple lenders (Gadanecz, 2004). Syndicated lending avoids the 
costs associated with bonds issuance, disclosure and marketing fees. The syndicated loan market 
is growing rapidly. In 2004, a study by the New Milken Institute states that: “The development of 
the syndicated loan market has led to a "quiet revolution" in America's capital market and has 
allowed the U.S. economy to avoid a damaging credit crunch during the last recession.”14  
According to the trading survey of Reuters Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC), the volume of the 
secondary loan market in the U.S. grew from $8 billion in 1991 to $340 billion in the second 
quarter of 2009.15 Hence, information asymmetry arising in the secondary loan market is 
expected to impact a wide sector of the U.S. economy.  Almost $1 trillion in syndicated loans are 
contracted annually (Sufi, 2007). Syndicated lending offers a wide array of information (e.g., the 
reputation of the arranger of the syndication, various types of loans with different maturities, 
purposes, and characteristics) not traditionally offered in the equity market (Moerman, 2008).  
The secondary loan market features two types of traders: informed and uninformed 
traders. The informed traders usually have more information than that possessed by uninformed 
traders, creating an adverse selection problem. Adverse selection is a situation where buyers and 
sellers have different information about the same product. Stated differently, information 
asymmetry arises mainly from private information held only by informed traders. Managers 
might have a news release of private information (e.g., production/investment decisions) from 
which they hope to profit as they know something uninformed traders cannot know. For 
                                                          
14
 Press Release, Business Wire, November 4, 2004. 
 
15
   LPC web page: http://www.loanpricing.com/analytics/pricing_service_volume1.htm 
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example, Aboody and Lev (2000) contend that R&D investments create information asymmetry. 
They find that insiders with knowledge of their firm’s R&D expenditures may profit from this 
private information.   
Information asymmetry in the syndicated loan market arises from the differential 
information accessed by lead arrangers versus other multiple lenders. To the extent that the loan 
is risky, the lead arranger will retain a small portion of the loan and syndicate the remainder in 
the secondary loan market, thereby reducing their exposure to the risk. The information 
asymmetry in the secondary loan market thereby affects the total demand and supply of loans in 
the market. Prior research indicates this evident information asymmetry is a sign of market 
imperfection (Richardson, 2000; Kim and Park, 2009; Angbazo, Mei and Saunders 1998).   
Syndicated loans are also subject to numerous financial restrictions including financial 
debt covenants that stipulate certain restrictions on the management. Moreover, informed traders 
in the secondary loan market such as lead arrangers and syndicate participants usually have 
access to specific borrower information such as monthly disclosure, covenant compliance, 
financial projections and future plans (mergers and acquisitions). The lead arranger also has 
superior privilege over other syndicate arrangers such as: a priority to other claims on the firms’ 
assets, and imposed restrictive covenants on the firm (Moerman, 2008; Allen and Gottesman 
2006). Information asymmetry of this nature affects the loan value, interest rates, maturities, 
covenants and other aspects of the contract. Moreover, high information asymmetry, as measured 
by the bid-ask spread, is an indication of market imperfection (Angbazo, Mei and Saunders 
1998).  
There is little limited research that directly tests the association between information 
asymmetry and accounting information in the secondary loan market. For example, Ball, 
24 
 
Bushman, and Vasvari (2008) argue that the proportion of the loan that is held by the lead 
arranger is dependent on the increasing adverse selection and moral hazard problems created by 
the information asymmetry. They hypothesize that the content of the financial information in the 
financial statements mitigates the information asymmetry, thus minimizing the adverse selection 
and moral hazard problems. Therefore, they conclude that the lead arranger may choose to hold a 
larger proportion of the loan.  
Likewise, Yu (2007) argues that concurrent research streams on the informational 
advantage of banks lack the direct test of banks’ ex ante information advantage before loans are 
granted. Therefore, he tests the informational advantage of banks in the initiation stage of loans 
and investigates whether banks incorporate future earnings in evaluating the borrowers’ financial 
situation. He finds that loan spreads are more sensitive to negative unexpected earnings than to 
positive unexpected earnings. This result is consistent with the contention that banks incorporate 
future earnings in valuing the borrowers’ financial situation. Moreover, Yu finds that loan 
spreads are less sensitive to unexpected earnings for firms with high analyst followings and 
secured loans. He also finds that loan spreads are more sensitive to unexpected earnings for firms 
with income-increasing abnormal accruals and after the Regulations Fair Disclosure. My study 
extends this research by investigating the disclosure of IC quality and information asymmetry in 
the secondary loan market.  
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Disclosure of ICFR 
One of the difficulties of researching IC is its broad definition due to the complexities of 
the internal control process (Kinney, 2000). This makes operationalizing the quality of internal 
controls as a research construct difficult. Moreover, internal controls are processes that are 
dissimilar across firms, industries, regulatory regimes, cultures, and time. Additionally, the 
auditing process in terms of time, effort, and expertise affects the quality of internal control. The 
“tone at the top” or the management’s philosophy towards internal controls might also 
exacerbate incidents of poor financial quality over internal control (Ogneva, Subramanyam, and 
Raghunandan, 2007). All of these dynamic factors mediate internal control quality and thus limit 
the generalizability of research in this area.  
The quality of internal control systems has been operationalized in prior research using 
many proxies such as: internal audit quality, quality assurance and oversight (Haron, Ibrahim, 
Jeyaraman, and Chye, 2010), owners’ investments in internal control (Pae and Yoo, 2001), and 
disclosure of material weaknesses versus effective internal control (Feng, Li and McVay, 2009; 
Doyle, Ge, and McVay, 2007a,b; Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and LaFond, 2008). 
Owner’s investment in internal controls is part of the agency costs incurred to align the interests 
of management and shareholders. Failure to maintain an effective internal control system is thus 
an expropriating of the shareholder’s wealth in a firm.  
A material weakness in ICFR is defined by the PCAOB (2004) as: “one or more 
deficiencies that results in more than a remote likelihood that a material misstatement of the 
annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected.” Material restatements 
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occur when: (1) an inherent risk leads to the occurrence of material errors/misstatements, GAAP 
violations or internal audit failure; (2) no one was able to prevent or detect these material 
restatements before the release of audited financial statements; (3) the audited financial 
statements are released and the auditor, by default, did not discover the presence of material 
misstatements; and (4) someone (e.g., internal auditor, external auditor, an employee, top 
management, Board of Directors) detects material misstatements and hence corrected financial 
statements must be issued with the discoverable material restatements (Eilifsen and Messier, 
2000).  
Higher levels of disclosure can either suppress the informed trader’s search for private 
information or motivate uninformed investors to actively engage in trading activities. In either 
case, the result of disclosure is reduced information asymmetry. The main purpose of the 
disclosure of material Internal Control Deficiencies is to resolve financial reporting uncertainty 
about the firm (Beneish, Billings and Hodder, 2008). Hence, such disclosure should reduce 
asymmetric information in the market because uninformed investors receive additional 
information that might reduce their level of motivation to search for private information. 
However, Beneish et al. (2008) argue that internal control disclosures might increase information 
asymmetry (uncertainty) because the disclosure of Internal Control Deficiencies signals 
increased risk to the market. Beneish et al. (2008) find that SOX 302 might have a negative 
impact on stock returns especially with the presence of IC material weaknesses. They also 
examined the market reaction to SOX 404 and did not document an association between the 
disclosure of ICMW and stock returns.  
There are three types of IC weaknesses including: control deficiencies, significant 
deficiencies, and material weaknesses (Hammersley, Myers, and Shakespeare, 2008; Bryan and 
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Lilien, 2005). Significant deficiencies and material weaknesses are referred to as Internal Control 
Deficiencies (ICDs) in the prior literature (Leone, 2007). Prior research focuses mainly on 
material weakness, because it has the most severe consequences on the firm and must be 
disclosed under SOX 2002 provisions. Hammersley, Myers, and Shakespeare (2008) find that 
the market reacts to the disclosure of significant deficiencies and material weaknesses, but they 
did not detect a similar reaction to the disclosure of control deficiencies. Stated differently, firms 
with disclosed material weaknesses are characterized as high-risk, in which investors, mostly 
uninformed investors, ask for a higher risk premium to offset the perceived increased risk of such 
firms. Material weaknesses are also a signal to the market that the disclosing firm has poor 
financial reporting quality. Poor financial reporting quality can thus exacerbate information 
asymmetry (Ogneva, Subramanyam, and Raghunandan, 2007). However, some Internal Control 
Deficiencies might not reduce uncertainty, but rather infuse uncertainty in the market and hence 
increase information asymmetry (Beneish, Billings and Hodder, 2008; Kim and Park, 2009). 
A key element of the literature on disclosure of ICFR is that it contains two types of 
disclosure: mandatory disclosure under section 404 and voluntary disclosure under section 302. 
Researchers try to avoid providing biased estimates based on introducing variables related to 
voluntary (e.g., control deficiencies, significant deficiencies) versus mandatory (e.g., material 
weakness) disclosure. Lam and Du (2004) hypothesize that mandatory disclosure is expected to 
be associated with low cross-sectional estimation risk. They find a significant negative 
relationship between voluntary disclosure that is certified by the audit firm and risk-adjusted 
returns in the secondary equity market. However, they find no such association between the 
quantity of private information and risk-adjusted returns. They also find no association between 
the information environment and the risk-adjusted return in the primary market. 
28 
 
Research on SOX 2002 – IC related provisions extends from pre-SOX 2002 to post-SOX 
2002 - section 404 periods (Beneish, Billings and Hodder, 2008). Tables 1-7 summarize a 
sample of studies on this line of research. In summary, I classify this research into three main 
categories: determinants, characteristics, and consequences of SOX 2002 – IC related provisions.   
  
 
 
TABLE 1 
Research on the Association between Disclosure of IC Quality and Cost of Capital pre SOX 2002 
 Study Sample Period Dependent Variable  Independent Variable (s) Findings 
Botosan (1997)  1990 Cost of equity capital Self-constructed measure of 
voluntary disclosure level 
(1) For firms with low analysts following, a negative 
association between disclosure level and cost of 
capital is documented.  
(2) For firms with high analysts following, no such 
association is reported.  
Francis, LaFond, 
Olsson, and 
Schipper (2004) 
1975-2001 Cost of equity Earnings attribute: (1) 
accounting-based attributes 
such as: accrual quality, 
persistence, predictability, and 
smoothness. (2) market-based 
attribute such as: value 
relevance, timeliness, and 
conservatism.  
High earnings attributes, individually, are associated with 
low cost of equity.  
Francis, LaFond, 
Olsson, and 
Schipper (2005) 
1988-1999 Cost of capital and 
cost of debt 
Earnings quality measures Firms with good earnings quality enjoys lower cost of 
capital and cost of debt relative to firms with poor earnings 
quality 
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TABLE 2 
Research on the Disclosure of IC Quality post SOX 2002 - Section 302 
 Study Sample 
Period 
Dependent Variable  Independent Variable (s) Findings 
De Franco, Guan, and 
Lu (2005) 
November 1, 
2003 to  
December 
31, 2004 
Wealth change and 
redistribution effects of section 
404 
Internal control material 
weaknesses 
Disclosure of ICMW is associated with negative 
significant abnormal returns.  
Ge and McVay 
(2005) 
August 2002 
to November 
2004 
Disclosure of material 
weaknesses 
Resources invested in internal 
control system by management 
Firms that disclosed material weakness have poor 
internal control as characterized by poor revenue 
recognition policies, poor segregation of duties, 
errors in the end of period process and 
deficiencies in polices related to it, and errors in 
accounting reconciliation.  
Gupta and Nayar 
(2006) 
November 
2003 – July 
2004 
Stock price Voluntary disclosure of IC 
weaknesses 
(1)  IC weaknesses are associated with negative 
stock price reaction.  
(2) This negative reaction is lessened when the 
management discloses remediation actions 
taken to mitigate IC weaknesses.  
(3) The stock price reaction to IC weaknesses is 
less negative also for firms that are audited by 
Bid-4 auditing firms.  
(4) Moreover, the disclosure of IC weaknesses 
affect the short-term default risk because the 
stock price negative reaction to the disclosure 
of IC weaknesses is more negative for firms 
with higher current liabilities relative to total 
assets.   
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TABLE 2 (Concluded) 
Research on the Disclosure of IC Quality post SOX 2002 - Section 302 
 Study Sample 
Period 
Dependent Variable  Independent Variable (s) Findings 
Doyle, Ge and 
McVay, 2007a 
August 2002 
to 2005 
Firm size, financial condition, 
complexity, growth, and 
restructuring  
Internal control material 
weakness 
Firms with internal control material weaknesses 
tend to be smaller, financially poor, more 
complex, younger, growing fast, and undergoing 
restructuring.  
Doyle, Ge and 
McVay (2007b)16 
August 2002 
to November 
2005 
Accrual quality Internal control material 
weakness disclosure (company 
level versus account specific 
weaknesses) 
(1) Firms with Internal Control Deficiencies are 
associated with low quality of accruals.  
(2) The above association exists for firms with 
company-level Internal Control Deficiencies 
and does not exist for firms with account-
specific weaknesses.  
Ashbaugh-Skaife, 
Collins, and Kinney 
(2007) 
November 
2003 to 
December 31, 
2004 
Economic factors for the 
presence of internal control 
deficiencies and management 
incentives to report these 
deficiencies.  
Internal control deficiencies 
(ICDs) 
Firms that disclosed ICDs have more complex 
operations, experiencing major restructuring; 
have greater risk, have more auditor resignation 
and fewer resources invested in internal control 
systems.  
Ashbaugh-Skaife, 
Collins, Kinney, and 
LaFond  (2008) 
2003 to 2005 Accrual quality ICDs and their remediation  (1) Firms with ICDs have low accruals quality 
and large positive and negative abnormal 
accruals.  
(2) Firms that remediated their internal control 
experienced an increase in their accrual 
quality 
 
  
                                                          
16
 Doyle, Ge and McVay (2007b) also investigate the association between the accruals quality and ICMWs under section 404.   
 
 
32 
 
TABLE 2 (Concluded) 
Research on the Disclosure of IC Quality post SOX 2002 - Section 302 
 Study Sample 
Period 
Dependent Variable  Independent Variable (s) Findings 
Hammersley, Myers, 
and Shakespeare 
(2008) 
3 days 
windows 
around the 
disclosure on 
Internal 
Control 
Deficiencies 
under section 
302 
Stock pries Disclosure of Internal Control 
Deficiencies under section 302 
(1) The information content of the disclosure of 
Internal Control Deficiencies depends on the 
severity of the Internal Control Deficiencies.  
(2) Overall, they document  negative stock price 
reaction to the disclosure of IC weaknesses 
and material weaknesses 
Ashbaugh-Skaife, 
Collins, Kinney, and 
LaFond  (2009) 
November 
2003 to 
September 
2005 
Firm risk and cost of capital  ICDs Firms with ICDs have significantly higher 
idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk and cost of 
equity.  
Kim and Park (2009) 2004 Abnormal stock returns Market uncertainty associated 
with the disclosure of internal 
control deficiencies under 
section 302 
Abnormal stock returns are negatively associated 
with market uncertainty when the firm discloses 
internal control deficiencies.  
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TABLE 3 
Research on the Disclosure of IC Quality post SOX 2002 - Section 404 
 Study Sample Period Dependent Variable  Independent Variable (s) Findings 
Bryan and Lilien ( 
2005) 
Two days before 
and one day after 
the 
announcement 
date of ICMWs.  
Stock returns, firm size, 
financial performance, 
and firm beta 
Internal Control Material 
Weaknesses (ICMWs) reported 
under section 404 
(1)  Firms with ICMWs are financially weaker, 
smaller and have higher market betas than those for 
firms without ICMWs. 
(2) They further document a negative stock price 
reaction on the date of the announcement of 
ICMWs.  
Ettredge, Li and 
Sun  (2006) 
January 2005 – 
June 2005 
Audit delay ICMWs under section 404 ICMWs are associated with audit delay. 
General-ICMWs are associated with longer delays 
than that in account specific-ICMWs.   
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TABLE 4 
Research on the Disclosure of IC Quality on both Section 302 and Section 404 
  Study Sample 
Period 
Dependent Variable  Independent Variable (s) Findings 
Bedard (2006) September 
2002 to  
November 15, 
2004 
Earnings quality as 
measured by accounting 
accruals 
IC weaknesses under both 
section 302 and section 404 
The year of IC weaknesses disclosure synchronizes 
with higher earnings quality, implying that either 
management or auditors requests increasing the 
quality of accounting information prior to the 
disclosure of IC weaknesses. 
  
Doyle, Ge and 
McVay (2007a) 
August 2002 
to 2005 
Firm size, financial 
condition, complexity, 
growth, and restructuring  
Internal control material 
weakness 
Firms with internal control material weaknesses tend 
to be smaller, financially poor, more complex, 
younger, growing fast, and undergoing restructuring.  
Beneish, Billings 
and Hodder (2008) 
30, 45, 90, and 
180 days 
before and 
after the 
disclosure of 
ICMW under 
both sections 
302 and 404 
Stock returns ICMW under both sections 302 
and 404 
Disclosure of ICMW under section 302 is associated 
with negative abnormal stock returns, but such 
association does not exist under section 404.   
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TABLE 5 
Research on the Disclosure of IC Quality Post Section 404 
 Study Sample Period Dependent Variable  Independent Variable (s) Findings 
Ogneva, 
Subramanyam, and 
Raghunandan 
(2007) 
June 2004 and 
June 2006 
Cost of equity ICMWs under section 404 (1) Firms with ICMWs are associated with 
higher implied cost of equity.  
(2) This higher cost of equity is mitigated 
when they control for analyst forecast 
bias and firm-specific characteristics 
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 3.1.1 Determinants of ICFR 
In their influential work, Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and Kinney (2007) study the 
determinants of ICDs prior to SOX 404 and develop expectations of internal control problems.  
They introduce a theoretical model of the economic factors that contribute to ICD (a control 
deficiency, a significant deficiency, and a material weakness) as internal control risk factors and 
management’s incentives to disclose and report ICDs, prior to SOX 404 and after section 302. 
This internal control risk is operationalized in the model by the following factors: the complexity 
and scope of the firm’s operations, change in the firm’s organizational structure, accounting 
measurement application risk, lack of firm resources devoted to internal control, and whether the 
auditor resigned in 2003. Factors that affect management’s incentives to report and disclose ICD 
include: auditor dominance, prior accounting restatement, the dominance of institutional 
investors, and litigation risk.  
In related research, Doyle, Ge and McVay (2007a) examine one dimension of internal 
control, material weakness, in the pre-SOX 302 and post-SOX 404 periods. They use a sample of 
accelerated filers and examine whether the severity of material weaknesses vary based on the 
reason for the weakness. There are two types of the severity of material weakness, account-
specific material weaknesses (less severe in terms of affecting the reliability of financial 
statements) and, company-level material weaknesses (more severe). The determinants of IC 
weakness are classified in Doyle, Ge and McVay (2007a) as a result of staffing, complexity, or 
general factors.  
Leone (2007) refutes claims by Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and Kinney (2007) that 
suggests evidence on the positive association between big-4 audit firm and management 
incentives to disclose ICD. They argue that Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and Kinney (2007) results 
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are driven by small firms. The fact that smaller firms are more likely to report material 
weaknesses under section 404 suggests that compliance with section 404 requires additional 
resources and investment in internal control structure in order to make it an effective system. Ge 
and McVay (2005) find that disclosing material weaknesses is negatively associated with firm 
size (market capitalization). Furthermore, Ge and McVay (2005) suggest that insufficient 
resources in internal controls lead to deficiencies in those internal controls related to revenue 
recognition, segregation of duties, the closing process, and accounting reconciliation.  
3.1.2 Characteristics of ICFR 
Following the enactment of SOX 2002 – IC related provisions, a stream of research (Ge 
and McVay, 2005; Bryan and Lilien, 2005; Ettredge, Li and Sun, 2006; Bedard, 2006; Feng, Li 
and McVay, 2009) emerges that characterize firms with effective versus ineffective IC systems. 
Ge and McVay (2005) maintain that firms disclosing material weaknesses under section 302 find 
material weakness are positively associated with business complexity (e.g., number of reported 
operating segments and foreign currency translation) and being audited by large firms and 
negatively associated with firm size and profitability. Similarly, Bryan and Lilien (2005) 
characterize firms with internal control material weaknesses under section 404, finding that firms 
with disclosed material weaknesses are generally small, poorer performers, financially weaker, 
and with higher market risk. They also find that the market reacts negatively to the 
announcement of material weaknesses, but the documented negative stock returns are 
statistically insignificant. Similarly, Bedard (2006) further explains the improvements in earnings 
quality reported under section 404 as a result of the formal internal control process performed 
under this section, either by the internal control system or the external auditor.  
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Ettredge, Li and Sun (2006) find that the compliance with section 404 is associated with 
auditor delay. It is worthwhile to note that the audit delay documented in Ettredge, Li and Sun 
(2006) is attributed to section 404 and not SOX 2002 itself. The audit delays associated with 
section 404 can be explained by the insufficiency of internal control procedures in firms with 
ICMWs and the inadequacy and/or ambiguity associated with extended internal control auditing 
(inquiries, observations, inspections, and evaluation of internal control) as was initially required 
under AS2 and then amended by AS5 by the PCAOB.  
Bedard (2006) investigates whether the requirements of sections 302 and 404 have 
increased the quality of earnings. She finds that management, whether voluntarily or based on a 
request from the external auditor, reversed the accrual they made in prior years to the disclosure 
of internal control material weaknesses. However, the magnitude of earnings manipulations 
reported under section 302 was more than that reported under SOX 404, implying that there are 
significant differences in the consequences of implementing section 302 versus section 404.  
Feng, Li and McVay (2009) test the relationship between internal control quality and 
accuracy of management guidance. They find that relying on an ineffective internal control 
system results in less accurate management guidance. Accurate management guidance decreases 
information asymmetry through enhancing the transparency and credibility of their financial 
reporting.  Moreover, the negative impact of ineffective internal control is higher when the 
weaknesses in internal control are related to revenues and cost of goods sold. Overall, they argue 
that the quality of internal control has a significant effect on management decisions.  
3.1.3 Consequences of ICFR   
Research on the consequences of the disclosure of IC weaknesses was triggered by the 
seminal work of Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and Kinney (2007) and Doyle, Ge and McVay 
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(2007a), which set the determinants for disclosing ICDs. However, the consequences of IC 
weaknesses on the firm are not clear. Research on the consequences of IC weaknesses has shown 
mixed results. For example, Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and Kinney (2009) find a positive 
association between the cost of capital and disclosure of material weaknesses under sections 302 
and section 404. Ogneva, Subramanyam, and Raghunandan (2007) do not find the same relation 
under section 404. Beneish, Billings and Hodder (2008) analyze whether the disclosure of 
material Internal Control Deficiencies under SOX 302 and SOX 404 is related to investor belief 
revision.17 They find that the unaudited disclosure of ICMWs under SOX 302 causes an 
abnormal increase in the equity cost of capital and negative abnormal returns. 
In the same domain, De Franco, Guan, and Lu (2005) discuss the wealth change and 
redistribution effects of SOX internal control disclosure. They argue that the benefits of SOX 
404 are obscure or non-existent. They observed a significant change of wealth in the three days 
surrounding the disclosure of internal control deficiencies, suggesting that the disclosure of an 
internal control deficiency is new information in the market and investors incorporate this news 
in their investment decision. They find cumulative average abnormal returns of -1.8% during the 
three days surrounding the disclosure of internal control deficiencies. They also argue that the 
net selling of small investors explain these negative returns. This result implies that SOX 404 
causes redistribution of wealth from large (sophisticated) to small investors because large 
investors react indifferently to the disclosure of significant deficiencies while small investors sell 
their stock in response to the disclosure of those deficiencies. In other words, small investors 
benefit more from material Internal Control Deficiencies or significant deficiencies disclosures. 
Overall, their findings support the conjecture that investors factor the disclosure of internal 
                                                          
17
 Belief revision can be defined as the act of continuously changing beliefs due to the arrival of new information to 
the market.  
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control deficiencies (a piece of information that is assumed to be unknown by investors until it is 
disclosed) into their decision making.  
Irving (2006) finds that the disclosure of material weakness has information content as 
measured by stock return volatility and trading volume. Moreover, he provides empirical 
evidence on the incremental information content of section 404 over section 302. Likewise, 
Haron, Ibrahim, Jeyaraman, and Chye (2010) investigate the relationship between IC disclosure 
and firm performance. They used proxies to measure IC disclosure such as: internal audit quality, 
quality assurance and oversight. Firm performance is measured by return on asset (ROA) and 
return on equity (ROE). Overall, their findings suggest that well-performing companies 
voluntarily disclose internal control effectiveness in their financial reports.   
3.2 Information Asymmetry in the Secondary Loan Market 
Information asymmetry in the secondary loan market can be visualized as the ex ante 
quality and quantity of differential information between borrowers and lenders or among lenders 
themselves. Similarly, Verrecchia (2001) defines information asymmetry as “the difference in 
the cost of capital in the presence versus absence of an adverse selection problem that arises 
from information asymmetry (p. 171).” Hence, decomposing information asymmetry into its 
components is important to effectively measure the impact of poor quality financial reporting on 
information asymmetry.  
Information asymmetry that is affected by certain loan characteristics is presumably a 
long-term phenomenon because loan characteristics are set at the beginning of the loan contract 
and arrangements are usually made over a longer time period. Information asymmetry is also 
affected by private information held by insiders. An apparent example of this private information 
is research and development costs (R&D).  Some sectors in the economy are considered R&D-
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intensive firms such as high growth firms, investment firms, and intangible-intensive industries. 
Aboody and Lev (2000) find that information asymmetry is higher for R&D-intensive firms and 
lower for firms with lower or no R&D activities. They argue that R&D is an inside (private) 
source of information leading to information asymmetry and insider gains.  
Disclosure quality affects the ex ante distribution of the firm’s cash flow; this effect 
depends on investors’ perceptions of the disclosure signal. Gao (2010) argues that disclosure 
quality could increase the cost of capital under two conditions. First, if the disclosure increases 
the variance of the firm’s cash flow as a proxy for investment effect. Second, if the investment 
effect is growing more than the increase in the stock price due to the disclosure quality.  Taken 
together, as disclosure quality increases, the cost of capital does not necessarily decrease.  
I use the bid-ask spread as a proxy for information asymmetry. The bid-ask spread has 
been used extensively in prior studies that examine information asymmetry in the secondary loan 
market. Moerman (2008) suggests that the use of the bid-ask spread might be problematic 
because it includes an adverse selection component and a transitory component. The adverse 
selection component is the asymmetric information, and the transitory component is the 
inventory and order processing costs of market makers that can be measured by the number of 
market makers and could be endogenously associated with the IA. Information asymmetry is the 
adverse selection component in the bid-ask spread.  
The bid-ask spread consists of three components: order processing, inventory, and 
adverse selection (Bharath, Pasquariello, and Wu, 2008). The adverse selection component can 
be extracted from either the serial covariance properties of the time series of observed asset 
returns, the interaction between trading volume and asset returns, or the arrival of information-
based trades from the estimates of structural equation modeling.  
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Various measures in the market microstructure literature have been used to capture the 
adverse selection components caused by information asymmetry such as: analyst coverage, 
dispersion of analysts’ forecasts, magnitude of earnings surprises, residual stock return volatility, 
or trading volume. Among these measures are the bid-ask spreads, transaction costs, trades, 
quotes, or even an index such as that in Bharath, Pasquariello, and Wu (2008).  
Bharath, Pasquariello, and Wu (2008) use an innovative measure to capture the adverse 
selection components in information asymmetry between management and shareholders. They 
create an index for information asymmetry composed of four measures of information 
asymmetry: 1. the adverse selection component of both quoted, 2. effective bid-ask spreads, 3. 
the probability of informed trading, and 4. the interaction between daily trading volume and asset 
returns. They also incorporate three measures of market liquidity (the liquidity ratio, the 
illiquidity ratio, and the reversal coefficient) in their analysis.  
As a robustness check, Frankel and Li (2004) document a negative association between 
analyst following and bid-ask spread. Overall, the results using the bid-ask spread as a proxy for 
information asymmetry are consistent with those using profitability and intensity of insider 
trading as proxies for information asymmetry (Frankel and Li, 2004). 
Information asymmetry, as measured by high bid-ask spreads, exists between borrowers 
and lenders or among lenders themselves (Ball, Bushman, and Vasvari 2008). This information 
asymmetry can affect the loan value, interest rate, maturity, covenants or other aspects of formal 
contractual features. Moreover, high spreads are an indication of market imperfection (Angbazo, 
Mei and Saunders, 1998). Ball, Bushman, and Vasvari (2008) argue that the proportion of the 
loan that is held by the lead arranger is dependent on the increasing adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems created by information asymmetry. Bharath, Pasquariello, and Wu (2008) argue 
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that information asymmetry is a key determinant of corporate capital structure. They provide 
support to the pecking order theory, which contends that the market penalizes the issuance of 
securities when managers retain more private information (well informed traders) than that 
retained by investors (less informed traders). Therefore, when adverse selection is high (high 
information asymmetry exists), firms are more likely to use other sources of financing such as 
internal cash, or public or private debt.  
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CHAPTER 4 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
4.1 Disclosure of IC Quality and Information Asymmetry 
Verrecchia (2001) suggests that information asymmetry is a decreasing function of a 
comprehensive theory of disclosure. He describes the reduction in information asymmetry as 
“the vehicle to integrate the efficiency of disclosure choice, the incentives to disclose and the 
endogeneity of the capital market process as it involves the interactions among individual and 
diverse investors (p. 97-98).” Verrecchia (2001) argues that there are two schools of thought that 
attempt to explain the association between disclosure and information asymmetry; a positive 
school suggesting a positive association and a negative school suggesting a negative association 
between disclosure and information asymmetry. The positive perspective argues that the firm 
might reach a position in which it uses a combination of the liquidity premia and less than full 
disclosure to offset the proprietary costs resulting from a reduction of information asymmetry. In 
this case, the firm discloses more information to the extent that it mitigates the adverse selection 
problem reducing information asymmetry. In the second perspective, a negative association 
between disclosure and information asymmetry suggests that full disclosure resolves the 
asymmetric information in the market.  
Of particular relevance to my study are studies that: (1) examine the association between 
disclosure, both mandatory and voluntary, and information asymmetry, and (2) investigate the 
relationship between disclosure quality and cost of capital as a proxy for information asymmetry. 
Studies that examine the association between mandatory and voluntary disclosures and 
information asymmetry include Brown and Hillegiest (2007) and Ogneva, Subramanyam, and 
Raghunandan (2007). Brown and Hillegiest (2007) argue that disclosure quality reduces the 
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likelihood that investors will trade based on private information, hence reducing the information 
asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors. In other words, quality disclosures 
obviate the incentives of informed traders to search for private information. They further 
investigate whether three areas of disclosure quality are associated with information asymmetry. 
The three types of disclosure quality examined are: the annual report, the quarterly reports, and 
investor relations activities. Their findings suggest that the quality of disclosure associated with 
the annual reports and investor relations activities are negatively associated with information 
asymmetry. However, the disclosure quality of the quarterly reports is positively associated with 
information asymmetry. They explain that the negative association between annual disclosure 
and information asymmetry in annual reports is high in credibility, is audited, is precise and 
more detailed, and is subject to litigation.  
The disclosure of investor relations is voluntary and is more timely compared to annual 
reports. However, the negative relationship between quarterly reports and information 
asymmetry suggests that quarterly reports are less credible. Additionally, Brown and Hillegiest 
(2007) find that information asymmetry varies across firms and industry-years.  
In testing the construct validity of their study, Ogneva, Subramanyam, and Raghunandan 
(2007) examine the association between Internal Control Deficiencies and information 
asymmetry (as a proxy for the cost of capital) in the equity market. They use the probability of 
informed trading (PIN) and market risk measures as a proxy for information asymmetry. Overall, 
they find no direct relationship between Internal Control Deficiencies and information 
asymmetry after controlling for firm-specific characteristics.  
Ogneva, Subramanyam, and Raghunandan (2007) conclude that firms with Internal 
Control Deficiencies post-SOX 404 and prior to AS5 have higher costs of equity capital. 
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Nevertheless, the positive effect between the reporting of material weakness and cost of equity 
capital dissipates after controlling for firm specific-characteristics and analysts’ forecasts bias, 
implying an indirect association between the disclosure of material weaknesses and cost of 
equity capital.  
Bushee, Core, Guay, and Hamm (2010) find that the business press is an information 
intermediary that results in greater depth of coverage hence reducing information asymmetry as 
measured by the bid-ask spread around earnings announcements. They argue that the business 
press provides a broader impact and depth than that provided by the non-business press 
generated information.  
Studies that investigate the relationship between disclosure quality and cost of capital are 
numerous and extend from pre-SOX 2002 (Botosan, 1997; Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and 
Schipper, 2004 and 2005) to post-section 404 (Ogneva, Subramanyam, and Raghunandan, 2007). 
The primary purpose of this stream of research is to serve as an intermediate step towards 
understanding the ex ante impact of disclosure quality on investor’s welfare and hence the 
economy (Gao, 2010).  
Theoretically, a reduction in the cost of capital might be a signal on the positive impact of 
disclosure quality on investor welfare. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that the disclosure 
environment exists in complex settings. Among the complex variables, which interact with 
disclosure are investor risk-taking characteristics (e.g., risk-averse current investors are more 
likely to get the benefit of quality disclosure) and adjustment cost of new investment (Gao, 
2010). Under these complex settings, a reduction in the cost of capital may not represent an 
increase in wealth for both current and prospective investors. According to Gao(2010), the cost 
of capital captures the impact of disclosure quality on investor welfare only under certain 
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circumstances such as: the availability of elastic new investments, conditions that reduce the 
welfare of current and new investors, and the directional relationship between cost of capital and 
welfare of current and new investors. For example, high disclosure quality decreases current 
investors’ welfare if they are risk-averse relative to new investors while the cost of new 
investment is high.  Gao (2010) argues that “disclosure quality makes new investors better off 
only in a production economy. New investors gain a surplus from trading by contributing their 
risk tolerance to the market (P. 3).” Gao (2010) concludes that disclosure reduces new investors’ 
wealth, if and only if, the level of existing investment and the adjustment cost of new investment 
are both high.  
Beneish, Billings and Hodder (2008) analyze whether the disclosure of audited (SOX 
302) and unaudited (under SOX 404) internal control material weakness is related to investor 
belief revision. They find that the unaudited disclosure of material weakness causes an abnormal 
increase in the equity cost of capital and negative abnormal returns. However, audited disclosure 
of material weakness has no impact on either stock returns or cost of equity. Hence, they 
conclude that the disclosure of material Internal Control Deficiencies under SOX 302 is 
informative because it reduces pre-disclosure uncertainty for firms, while SOX 404 audited 
disclosure does not. In the same vein, Kim and Park (2009) examine the stock market reactions 
to the disclosure of material weaknesses under section 302. They find that abnormal stock 
returns are negatively associated with changes in market uncertainty when the firm discloses 
internal control deficiencies. They further find that the impact of internal control disclosure on 
market uncertainty is conditional on many factors including, the types of disclosure and the 
firm’s past history of providing credible financial reporting.  Overall, when the disclosure of 
Internal Control Deficiencies reduces the uncertainty in the market, the negative impact on the 
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contemporaneous stock returns of the disclosing firm is lessened. They also find voluntary 
disclosure of non-material weaknesses under section 302 reduces market uncertainty. 
Gupta and Nayar (2006) suggest that disclosure of material weaknesses may lead banks 
and short-term lenders to devalue the collateral potential of the borrowing firms’ financial assets. 
Moody’s Investor Service (2004) and Fitch Rating (2005) also point out that material 
weaknesses might trigger debt rating changes which in turn increase the probability of default as 
well as borrowing costs.  
Disclosure of Internal Control Deficiencies should compensate traders for the uncertainty 
surrounding the reporting quality by causing belief revisions regarding the firm’s internal control 
risk. Therefore, uninformed investors are more likely to benefit from this weakness disclosure 
and less likely to face an adverse selection problem (Beneish, Billings and Hodder, 2008). 
Moreover, uninformed traders, small investors or unsophisticated investors are more likely to 
alter their trading behavior or leave the market (Frankel and Li 2004; De Franco, Guan, and Lu, 
2005).  
Theoretically, disclosure of IC weaknesses should provide more information and hence 
reduce information asymmetry to the extent that it alleviates prior uncertainties surrounding the 
firm. Voluntary disclosure of internal control quality under SOX 302 presumably provides more 
information than that provided by mandatory disclosure under SOX 404. That is because under 
section 302, firms disclose ICDs which incorporate both material weaknesses and significant 
deficiencies. However, under section 404, firms disclose only material weaknesses.  Therefore, 
the quantity of disclosed information under section 302 is more than that disclosed under section 
404.   
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Additionally, proponents of section 302 might argue that it results in incremental value 
because it discloses Internal Control Deficiencies (ICDs) which includes both material 
weaknesses and significant deficiencies. Nevertheless, I argue that disclosing significant 
deficiencies causes variability in stakeholders’ beliefs in two ways.  First, stakeholders might 
perceive a reported significant deficiency as negative, as it might become a material weakness in 
the future. Second, stakeholders might also perceive a significant deficiency as positive, as it 
bears low risk and they expect the firm to take remedial action to mitigate the deficiency in the 
near future. Therefore, in this latter case, ICDs signal to the market a lower prospective risk 
associated with investment in ICD firms. I base my prediction on prior research reporting that IC 
disclosure under section 302 increases market uncertainty (Kim and Park 2009; Beneish et al. 
2008).18  I predict that disclosure of internal control quality under section 302 is incomplete due 
to the nature of voluntary disclosures associated with it. Incomplete disclosure therefore 
stimulates investors and creditors to search for private information in an effort to reduce 
perceived information asymmetry.   
Moreover, voluntary disclosure is often perceived as less credible than mandatory, well-
regulated disclosure. Another point to consider is endogeneity.19 Endogeneity between 
information asymmetry and the source of information is likely to be more pronounced in the case 
of voluntary disclosure by firms (Frankel and Li 2004). This latter premise suggests a higher 
level of uncertainty associated with SOX 302 relative to that associated with section 404. I also 
predict that disclosure quality of internal control reported under section 302 differs from that 
under section 404. Disclosure quality can be measured using many metrics including: quantity of 
                                                          
18
 Kim and Park (2009), however, predict that some types of ICDs help reduce market uncertainty. 
 
19 Endogeneity is a statistical problem caused by omitted variables or measurement error in the Multivariate Analysis 
Regression Model.  
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value-relevant information of internal control disclosures, timeliness of disclosures, precision of 
reported weaknesses, and the credibility of the reports. I conjecture that not all disclosed 
information is of equal value to stakeholders, even if some disclosures contain more voluntary 
information than other disclosures. Traders are interested in information that is relatively more 
persuasive, strategic, verifiable “audited”, timely, accurate, and relevant. I also propose that 
uncertainty in internal control disclosures is a key determinant of internal control disclosure 
quality20.  Greater uncertainty is an indication of the presence of private information; hence lower 
information asymmetry offsets higher uncertainties.   
Taken together, I predict that disclosure of Internal Control Deficiencies (low internal 
control quality) will result in increasing the cost of processing information and create the need 
for private information to reduce information asymmetry. Likewise, high disclosure quality of 
Internal Control Deficiencies reduces the need to search for private information as information 
asymmetry is reduced by the high quality of the disclosure.  I base my suppositions on the 
argument that the firm’s commitment to a higher level of IC quality results in reduced 
information asymmetry in the market. In my first hypothesis, I am focusing on IC quality under 
SOX 2002, section 302 versus section 404 because of the significant differences between the 
market responses to section 302 versus those to section 40421.  
                                                          
20 Uncertainty can be captured by dispersion of analyst forecasts as measured by: ln[(standard deviation of forecast 
earnings per share in the 4th month of the fiscal year/stock price) + 0.001] (Brown and Hillegiest 2007).   
 
21
 I do have the ‘deal active date’ in the secondary loan market database and I was able to clearly identify firms that 
reported ICDs under section 302 versus section 404. For example, facilities that are traded after the enactment date 
of Section 404, on or after November 15, 2004, are classified among the group of firms that belong to post section 
302 period (section 404). While this classification may end up with more than one disclosure for a specific firm for 
the year 2004, some of these disclosures belong to section 302 and the other belongs to section 404, there is no 
redundancy in the disclosure or overlap. Also, the two sections disclosures are controlled in the model by an 
indicator variable for section 302 and section 404. Removing observations for firms that reported twice in 2004 
under section 302 and section 404 will eliminate a large number of observations from my sample and hinder the 
statistical analyses. 
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Therefore, one would expect a high level of disclosure under section 404 to be associated 
with more reduction in information asymmetry than that documented under section 302, if any. 
For example, prior research concludes that ICDs reported under section 302 are associated with 
negative stock returns (Gupta and Nayar 2006; Beneish, Billings and Hodder 2008) and higher 
cost of capital (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and LaFond, 2009). Based on the findings of 
Beneish, Billings and Hodder (2008), there is no information content in the disclosure of section 
404.  Doyle, Ge and McVay (2007b) show no association between section 404 and low earnings 
quality as measured by abnormal accruals. Additionally, Ogneva, Subramanyam, and 
Raghunandan (2007) find that section 404 has no effect on the cost of equity capital. Hence, I 
hypothesize that section 404 will be associated with lower information asymmetry than that 
associated with section 302. Based on the preceding argument, I hypothesize the following 
relationships: 
H1a: In the secondary loan market, the disclosure of Internal Control 
Deficiencies is positively associated with information asymmetry post SOX 2002. 
 
H1b: In the secondary loan market, firms with Internal Control Deficiencies 
reported under section 302 have significantly higher information asymmetry than 
firms with Internal Control Deficiencies reported under section 404.  
 
4.2 Types of IC Weaknesses and Information Asymmetry  
Surprisingly, AS2 does not provide clear guidance on the types of IC weaknesses that 
should be disclosed. As a result, I use two main classifications of Internal Control Deficiencies 
from prior literature: (1) material weaknesses, significant deficiencies, and control deficiencies; 
(2) company-level and account-specific weaknesses. 
The first classification of IC weakness was discussed in AS2. Underlying this 
classification, De Franco, Guan, and Lu (2005) stratify internal control deficiencies into three 
categories in order of severity: material weaknesses, significant deficiencies, and unspecified or 
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control deficiencies. Unspecified or control deficiencies have been defined by AS2 as those 
deficiencies resulting from a lack of operational control that hinders management or employees 
from preventing or detecting misstatements in a timely manner. A significant deficiency is one or 
more combinations of a control deficiency that negatively affects the firm’s ability to accurately 
initiate, record, and process external financial data according to GAAP. A significant deficiency 
indicates that there is a remote likelihood that a more than inconsequential misstatement of the 
firm’s financial statement will not be either detected or prevented.  If there is more than a remote 
likelihood that a material misstatement will not be prevented or detected, then the significant 
deficiency is classified as a material weakness. Similarly, Hammersley, Myers, and Shakespeare 
(2008) find that the market reacts to the disclosure of significant deficiencies and material 
weaknesses, but they did not detect the same reaction to the disclosure of control deficiencies.  
The second classification has been a main topic of discussion by both academicians and 
practitioners. Underlying this classification, Ettredge, Li and Sun (2006), PCAOB, AS2, and 
Moody’s (2004) categorize internal control systems into company-level and specific-account 
internal control issues. Company-level internal control issues are those weaknesses in internal 
control that impact a wide range of general control issues such as: the audit committee, risk 
assessment, revenue recognition, and the internal audit function. Specific control issues are those 
that affect a narrow activity inside the internal control system such as account-specific balances 
(e.g., inventory, accounts payable, accounts receivable).  Moody’s Investor Services stated in 
October 2004 that they are less concerned about material weaknesses that relate to specific 
accounts or transaction-level processes.  Moody’s Investor Services also stated that they will not 
consider such weaknesses in their rating evaluations. However, material weaknesses that relate to 
company-level controls may trigger rating actions by Moody’s.  
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Another classification of internal control material weaknesses (ICMW), I am not using in 
my analysis, is based on the Committee of Sponsoring Organization’s (COSO) framework. There 
are eight types of ICMW according to the COSO (1992) classification including personnel, 
processes and procedures, documentation, segregation of duties, information systems processes, 
risk assessment/control design, closing processes, and the control environment. Little research 
has examined the consequences of material weaknesses under the COSO classification due to the 
lack of supporting theory (Ettredge, Li and Sun 2006.)  Feng, Li and McVay (2009) argue that 
not all material weaknesses result in uncertainties.  They further claim that material weaknesses 
related to segment disclosure, balance sheet classification, or cash flow classification do not 
negatively affect the input quality for financial reporting. In this study, I use two classifications 
for IC weaknesses: (1) material weaknesses, significant deficiencies, and control deficiencies, 
and (2) company-level and account-specific weaknesses. I do not use the COSO classification as 
it is difficult to define the severity of Internal Control Deficiencies based on that classification. 
However, AS 2 and company versus account-specific weaknesses consist of validated measures 
for the severity of internal control deficiencies and can be used as reliable measures in my 
models.  
In summary, prior research suggests that different types of IC weaknesses result in 
varying degrees of uncertainty. Overall, the more severe the IC weakness, the more likely 
investors will perceive higher information asymmetry. In this case, the disclosure of these IC 
weaknesses will be perceived by uninformed traders as requiring them to seek more private 
information to reduce that asymmetry. Conversely, this will induce informed traders to lessen 
their trading activities. The overall effect is more information asymmetry between lenders and 
participant lenders. Based on this conjecture, my second hypothesis is: 
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H2a: In the secondary loan market, firms with Internal Control Material Weaknesses 
have significantly higher information asymmetry than those with Significant and/or 
Control Deficiencies post SOX 2002. 
 
H2b: In the secondary loan market, firms with company-level weaknesses have 
significantly higher information asymmetry than those with account-specific weaknesses 
post SOX 2002. 
 
4.3 Remediation of IC Weaknesses and Information Asymmetry 
To mitigate the problem of omitted correlated variables, I follow Feng et al. (2009) by 
performing both level (the type of severity of material weaknesses) and change analysis (the 
change in internal control material weakness). I then test how information asymmetry changes as 
the quality of internal control changes. The change in ICMWs can be measured as the difference 
between the indicator variable in year t-1 and the indicator variable in year t as suggested by 
(Feng et al. 2009.) Another method to measure the change in IC weakness is to trace the ICDs 
reported under section 302 and their subsequent remediation (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, 
and LaFond 2008).  IC remediation is measured by section 404 audit opinions, where an 
unqualified opinion indicates remediation, and an adverse opinion indicates persistence of IC 
weaknesses and problems. I expect a negative association between the remediation of IC 
weaknesses and information asymmetry. In other words, firms that take corrective actions to fix 
internal weaknesses are more likely to reduce uncertainty among uninformed traders and resolve 
asymmetric information regarding IC weaknesses.      
Gupta and Nayar (2006) examine whether the voluntary disclosure of material weakness 
(post-SOX 2002 and prior to section 404) by SEC registrants convey value-relevant information 
to the U.S. equity market. They find that the voluntary disclosure of material weakness is 
associated with a negative stock price reaction and this reaction is mitigated when the disclosing 
firms also report remediation action to resolve the disclosed material weaknesses. Surprisingly, 
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they find that the voluntary disclosure of material weaknesses indeed convey value relevant 
information.  
In a related study, Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and Lafond (2008) find that firms 
that improved internal control, by going from adverse to unqualified SOX 404 opinions, show a 
significant increase in accrual quality and hence an improvement in the quality of financial 
statements. I am interested in studying the impact of the remediation of IC weaknesses under 
section 302 and section 404. Remediation of IC weaknesses under section 302 will be measured 
by remediating action to eliminate ICD. Under section 404, remediation will be measured by 
SOX 404 opinions. Based on these arguments, my third hypothesis is: 
H3: In the secondary loan market, firms that remediate their Internal Control 
Deficiencies have significantly lower information asymmetry than firms that did not 
remediate their Internal Control Deficiencies post SOX 2002. 
 
4.4 The Moderating Effect of the Secondary Loan Market Characteristics on the 
Association between Information Asymmetry and ICDs  
 
I also test the moderating effect of loan specific characteristics on the association 
between internal control deficiencies and information asymmetry. Among the loan specific 
characteristics of interest to my study are the number of lenders or syndication, the availability of 
either firm and/or loan credit rating and the existence of debt covenants. I focus on testing the 
association between the interaction term of the existence of internal control deficiencies and the 
three loan specific characteristics and information asymmetry based on the documented evidence 
in prior research.  More specifically, recent studies find that these three loan-specific 
characteristics have a negative statistical association with information asymmetry (Sufi, 2007; 
Moerman, 2008; Ball, Bushman, and Vasvari, 2008; Lee and Mullineaux, 2004).  
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Syndication 
Syndication is the process of reselling the loan to multiple lenders. The main reason 
beyond syndication is diversification (Simons, 1993.) However, there are some rules that govern 
syndication. More specifically, Sufi (2007) finds that the lead arranger retains a larger share of 
the loan when the borrower needs thorough monitoring and due diligence. Moreover, when 
information asymmetry between lender and lead arranger is high, the lead arranger and 
participant lenders try to be as close as possible from the borrower. Stated differently, 
syndication is more likely to be concentrated when the information available about the borrower 
is very poor (Lee and Mullineaux, 2004.) The documented evidence in prior literature suggests 
that higher information asymmetry creates less loan syndication and higher cost of capital.  
I expect that the number of lenders is a decreasing function of information asymmetry. 
Ball, Bushman, and Vasvari (2008) argue that the proportion of the loan that is held by the lead 
arranger is dependent on the increasing adverse selection and moral hazard problems created by 
information asymmetry. Therefore, the higher the information asymmetry, the more likely the 
majority of the loan will be held by the lead arranger and the loan will be less syndicated. 
Likewise, the lower the information asymmetry, the more likely the lead arranger will sell the 
loan to multiple arrangers.  In summary, I would expect a significant negative association 
between the interaction term between ICDs and syndication and information asymmetry.  
Credit Rating 
Independent credit rating agencies provide credible information about the company 
performance and thus help reduce the asymmetric information between lead arranger and 
borrower (Ball, Bushman, and Vasvari, 2008). Credit ratings also signal the default probability. 
When firms have high default probability, the loan is more concentrated and less syndicated (Lee 
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and Mullineaux, 2004.) Ball, Bushman, and Vasvari (2008) document that the availability of 
credit rating moderates the effect of Debt Contracting Value on the loan retained by lead 
arranger. In the same vein, Moerman (2008) provides clear evidence that loans with an available 
credit rating are associated with lower bid-ask spreads. Moerman (2008) argues that “The 
availability of firm-specific and/or loan-specific credit ratings also decreases information costs 
in the loan trade, P.242.” Additionally, Sufi (2007) argues that when the borrower has no credit 
rating, participant lenders try to be geographically closer to the borrower. Participant lenders 
might also make their syndication decision based on previous relationships with the lender. To 
sum up, I would expect a significant negative association between the interaction term between 
ICDs and the existence of credit rating and information asymmetry.  
Financial Debt Covenants 
While almost all loans have debt covenants in general, not all loans have financial debt 
covenants. 60% of the full sample of the secondary loan market data that is available to me 
(14781 firm-years facilities) from 1987-2005 are loans with no financial debt covenants. Some 
studies such as Moerman (2008) examined the effect of the existence of various types of debt 
covenants on the firm’s cost of capital, assuming that debt covenants always exist but some 
studies such as Bradley and Roberts (2004) examine the effect of the existence versus the 
absence of financial debt covenants on the loan structure. I am following Bradley and Roberts 
(2004) in incorporating the existence of financial debt covenants into my analyses.  
Theoretically, the financial debt covenants should mitigate the asymmetric information 
between lead arranger and participant lenders because they restrict the earnings manipulation and 
hence provide reliable and quality financial reporting, which decreases the asymmetric 
information.  However, Bradley and Robert (2004) suggest that bond yield is lower when there 
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are debt covenants in the loan contract. They also suggest that high growth firms are more likely 
to include covenants to restrict their use of funds. Moreover, Dichev and Skinner (2002) provide 
evidence on the debt covenant hypothesis, which contends that management is more likely to 
manipulate earnings when they are about to violate debt covenants. In conclusion, there is mixed 
evidence on the association between the existence of debt covenants and information asymmetry. 
However, I will expect a significant negative association between the interaction term of debt 
covenants and internal control deficiencies and information asymmetry. My predication is based 
on the premise that the interaction term would lessen, but not eliminate, the information 
asymmetry in the secondary loan market. Based on the preceding argument, I hypothesize the 
following relationships: 
H4: In the secondary loan market, loan-specific characteristics, namely, credit 
rating, debt covenants, and syndication mitigate the positive association between 
Internal Control Deficiencies and information asymmetry.  
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CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Research Model 
I use multivariate analysis regression to examine the association between internal control 
quality and information asymmetry in the secondary loan market. The dependent variable in my 
models is information asymmetry as measured by the bid-ask spread and the independent 
variables are various measures of the quality of Internal Control over Financial Reporting (ICFR) 
in addition to a set of control variables. I also classify Internal Control Deficiencies into different 
types of weaknesses, in terms of severity and examine the impact of the remediation of IC 
weaknesses on information asymmetry. Taken together, I measure ineffective internal control by 
the presence of Internal Control Deficiencies (ICDs) under sections 302 and 404 I measure 
ineffective IC using both the level of severity of a deficiency and the remediation actions to 
address disclosed IC weaknesses. The level of ineffective IC will be operationalized by different 
types of IC weaknesses in terms of severity (e.g., company-level versus account-specific 
weaknesses). The change in IC weaknesses will be measured by whether firms took remediation 
actions to correct these weaknesses. 
5.1.1 Dependent Variable 
My dependent variable in all tested models is information asymmetry (IA)22. I use the 
bid-ask spread as one important microstructure measure of information asymmetry that has been 
used extensively in prior literature as a proxy for information asymmetry in the secondary loan 
market (Moerman, 2008; Frankel and Li, 2004; Sufi, 2007; Bharath, Pasquariello, and Wu, 
2008.) The bid-ask spread consists of three primary components: order processing, inventory, 
                                                          
22
 I use the log transformation of the bid-ask spread to correct for skewness. 
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and adverse selection (Bharath, Pasquariello, and Wu, 2008). The market microstructure 
measures of information asymmetry capture the adverse selection between informed and 
uninformed traders. The adverse selection component of information asymmetry affects the price 
formation because, by definition, the presence of adverse selection implies that informed traders 
possess more information than that possessed by uninformed traders.  
Moerman (2008) suggests that the use of the bid-ask spread might be problematic 
because it includes an adverse selection component and a transitory component. The adverse 
selection component is the asymmetric information, and the transitory component is the 
inventory and order processing costs of market makers that can be measured by the number of 
market makers and could be endogenously associated with the IA. Information asymmetry is the 
adverse selection component in the bid-ask spread.  
While controlling for the temporary component in the bid-ask spread was not feasible, I 
made every effort to try to fully explain the permanent components, which cause the adverse 
selection and asymmetric information portion in the bid-ask spread by adding a large pool of 
loan-specific characteristics to the regression models. I use the loan-specific characteristics to 
proxy for the permanent components in the bid-ask spread because loan characteristics are set at 
the beginning of the loan contract and arrangements are usually made over a longer time period. 
The unexplained portion in the bid-ask spread should be attributed to the temporary components, 
the inventory and order processing costs of market makers. 
5.1.2 Independent Variable 
The independent variable in model 1 and 2 is the disclosure of the quality of ICFR. In 
model 1, I measure the quality of IC by an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm 
discloses Internal Control Deficiencies (ICDs) and 0 otherwise (H1a, model 1). I also test the 
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association between the disclosure of only ICDs under provisions, section 302 and section 404, 
and information asymmetry (H1b, model 2). I then measure the effect of the severity of IC 
weaknesses, as measured by the disclosure of ICMWs (H2a, model 3) and information 
asymmetry. In model 4, I measure the effect of the severity of Internal Control Deficiencies as 
measured by the disclosure of Company Level (CL) IC weaknesses and information asymmetry 
(H2b, model 4). I finally test the impact of IC remediation23, change in ICDs, on information 
asymmetry (H3, model 5). The mediating effect of the loan-specific characteristics on the 
association between ICDs and IA is presented in model 6 (H4, model 6).  
5.1.3 Control variables 
Recall that the disclosure of IC quality is a selective disclosure that is disseminated to 
market-wide participants. I then expect that a set of control variables might have significant 
positive or negative impact on information asymmetry. Therefore, I control for these potential 
explanatory variables in my model to avoid having omitted correlated variables in my model, to 
increase the validity of my results, and to be able to generalize my results.  Additionally, I use a 
set of control variables from prior research that explain some of the variations in information 
asymmetry. For example, I control for firm-specific characteristics (e.g., ROA, loss, profitability, 
firm size, growth, industry), loan-specific characteristics (e.g., types of loans, maturity, loan 
credit rating, identity of lenders, loan size, debt covenants, purpose of loans), regulations (e.g., 
                                                          
23
 Remediation can be captured by SOX section 404 unqualified opinion or (Goh, 2009; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 
2008), the difference in the indicator variable in year t+1 or t-1 and the indicator variable in year t as suggested by 
(Feng, Li and McVay, 2009), or remediation actions by the management (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and 
LaFond, 2008).  I followed Feng et al. (2009) in identifying firms that took remediation actions to correct their 
internal control deficiencies. I only include firms that took serious steps to correct their internal control deficiencies. 
For example, in period t-1, a firm might disclose internal control deficiencies related to competency of their human 
resources, merger and acquisition and foreign-related issues. In period t, the same firm might disclose internal 
control deficiencies related to only merger and acquisition. In this latter case, the firm partially remediated their 
internal control deficiencies and I considered this case “remediation”. Alternatively, in period t, the firm might 
disclose effective internal control system and in this case, the firm fully remediated their internal control deficiencies 
and I considered this case “remediation”. Although there could be some firms in the process of remediating their 
internal control deficiencies and firms include such statements in their financial statements to outsiders, I considered 
this disclosure as if firms did not take any remediating actions yet to correct the internal control deficiencies. 
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SOX 2002 – IC related provisions, regulated industries), financial reporting quality (e.g., 
accounting accruals, Big 624 audit firms, auditor change “resignation and dismissal”), 
determinants of the bid-ask spread (e.g.,  liquidity as measured by amount or volume of stock 
traded, and volatility or market risk).  
I use Big 6 audit firms instead of Big 4 because after the passage of SOX 2002, big audit 
firms are continuously calling for more protection to reduce their litigation risk. This call is not 
only restricted to Big 4 audit firms, namely, KPMG, Deloitte, Ernst & Young, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, but also extends to other non-Big 4 firms such as the second-tier audit 
firms  such as: BDO Seidman and Grant Thornton (Blokdijk, Drieenhuizen, Simunic, and Stein, 
2006). Additionally, It is argued that the second-tier audit firm have become more conservative 
and non-tolerant to earnings management post SOX 2002 (Krishnan, Park, and Vijayakumar, 
2008). Big 4 audit firms rejected risky firms post SOX 2002 and these risky firms selected the 
next two largest audit firms (Turner, 2010). Overall, the second-tier audit firms are of increased 
value post SOX 2002 because they probably provide quality services and lower cost relative to 
Big 4 firms. Therefore, I use the Big 6 audit firms (Big 4 and second tier audit firms) instead of 
the Big 4 audit firms because of the systematic evidence in the literature that audit quality differs 
significantly between Big and non-Big audit firms (Blokdijk, Drieenhuizen, Simunic, and Stein, 
2006) as well as the increased quality of second tier audit firms post SOX 2002.   
 
 
                                                          
24
 The Big-6 audit firms include: Deloitte, KPMG, Ernst & Young, PricewaterhouseCoopers, BDO Seidman and 
Grant Thornton.  
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Firm-Specific Characteristics 
The pecking order theory of capital structure of Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf 
(1984) predicts that information asymmetry associated with stock issuance is higher than that 
associated with bank or public debt. Firm specific characteristics include firm size, market-to-
book ‘growth ratio’, debt covenants, and R&D. Firms with debt are characterized by fewer 
growth opportunities (as measured by Tobin’s Q), as implied by the pecking order theory 
(Bharath, Pasquariello, and Wu, 2008). Brown and Hillegiest (2007) find the effect of disclosure 
quality on information asymmetry varies across firms, industries and even within firms 
(quarterly versus annual reports). Among the factors that directly affect the quality of internal 
control is corporate governance (Haron, Ibrahim, Jeyaraman, and Chye, 2010) but I did not have 
access to related corporate governance data to my study sample period.     
Loan-Specific Characteristics 
Moerman (2008) and Sufi (2007) find that loans of profit, public firms, with available 
credit ratings, or syndicated by reputable arrangers are traded at low bid-ask spreads. Likewise, 
Moerman (2008) finds that distressed loans and revolvers loans and loans issued by institutional 
investors are traded at high bid-ask spread. While I do not have access to the reputation of the 
arranger, I include other available variables such as: credit rating, syndication, loan types and 
identity of lenders among others, as control variables in my regression model.  
Among the set of control variables that might affect the information asymmetry in the 
secondary loan market are: private versus public traders (borrowers), loan-specific credit rating, 
loan size, revolving versus term loans, profitable versus loss firms, and the arrangers’ reputation. 
Sufi (2007) finds that borrower and lead bank reputation mitigates, but does not eliminate, 
information asymmetry in the secondary loan market.  
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Measures of the arranger’s reputation include: 1) an estimation of the arranger’s market 
share in the primary market, and 2) an estimation that accounts for the total market share of all 
the arrangers involved in the loan (in the case of multiple arrangers). I could not have access to 
the reputation of the arranger but I added a variable to represent the identity of the lender, 
whether it is a bank or financial institution. I also control for various types and purposes of loan.  
Financial Reporting Quality 
Moerman (2008) finds that timely loss recognition reduces information asymmetry in the 
secondary loan market. In other words, timely loss recognition increases debt contracting 
efficiency and reduces the agency cost through underestimating the net asset value and hence 
facilitating  monitoring by debt holders. The market response to IC quality is also dependent on 
audit quality (Gupta and Nayar, 2006; Beneish et al., 2008). Therefore, a measure of financial 
reporting quality is added to the model. I use accounting accruals as a measure of financial 
reporting quality.   
Determinants of the bid-ask spread 
Determinants of the bid-ask spread are liquidity (amount or volume of stock traded), and 
volatility or market risk.  Liquidity is argued to be negatively associated with information 
asymmetry and the cost of capital (Botosan, 1997; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Healy, 
Hutton, and Palepu, 1999; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002). Therefore, I 
control for liquidity in my model. 
5.1.4 Empirical Models and Tests for Hypothesis 
In this section, I describe my research models, which are used to test my hypothesized 
relationships. My first hypothesis deals with the relationship between the disclosure of Internal 
Control Deficiencies (ICDs) and information asymmetry (IA) in the secondary loan market. I use 
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two models (models 1 and 2) to test my first hypothesis. In model 1, I use ICDs (firms that 
disclosed significant deficiency, control deficiency, and/or MWs under section 302) and ICMWs 
(firms that disclosed MWs under section 404) as proxies for IC weaknesses as the independent 
variable, and information asymmetry as the dependent variable. In all models, I also use a set of 
control variables that explain information asymmetry as described in the previous section. 
Models 1and 2 are described below:  
Ln_IA
 it = β0 + β1 ICDsit + ∑
=
j
i 1
 αj δ it + εt                     (Model 1) 
 Where 
   
Ln_IA
 it = is natural logarithm of information asymmetry as measured by the bid-ask spread in the 
secondary loan market. 
ICDsit =  is an indicator variable equals 1 if the firm disclosed any types of Internal Control Deficiencies, 
zero otherwise.  
δ
 it = is a set of control variables that explain the variation in IA in prior research.   
 
In model 2, I compare the effect of the disclosure of ICDs under section 302 versus 
section 404 on IA. Therefore, I use an indicator variable as my independent variable in model 2. 
This indicator variable=1 if the firm has ICDs reported under section 302, zero for the presence 
of ICDs reported under section 404. I also add a set of control variables that explain information 
asymmetry. Model 2 is described below: 
Ln_IA
 it = β0 + β1 ICDs_302it + ∑
=
j
i 1
 αj δ it + εt                     (Model 2) 
 Where 
   
Ln_IA
 it = is natural logarithm of information asymmetry as measured by the bid-ask spread in the 
secondary loan market. 
ICDs_302it =  is an indicator variable equals 1 if the firm disclosed Internal Control Defectiveness (ICDs) 
under section 302, zero otherwise.  
δ
 it = is a set of control variables that explain the variation in IA in prior research.   
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I use model 3, and 4 to test my second hypothesis. In these models, I classify IC 
weaknesses into its components in terms of severity. I use two classifications of IC weaknesses 
severity, AS 2 (material weaknesses versus other deficiency) and company-level versus 
accounting-specific. In an extended analysis, I test the effect of the interaction term of loan-
specific characteristics (syndication, credit rating and covenants) and ICDs on the association 
between ICDs and IA. I use IA as my dependent variable in all models and I use the set of 
control variables, firm and loan specific characteristics, previously discussed as my independent 
variables.  
I use the AS 2 classification of the severity of ICMWs; therefore, I use ICMWs reported 
under both section 302 and section 404 as my variable of interest. Model 3 is described below.  
Ln_IA
 it = β0 + β1 ICMWit +∑
=
j
i 1
 αj δ it + εt                     (Model 3) 
Ln_IA
 it = is natural logarithm of information asymmetry as measured by the bid-ask spread in the 
secondary loan market. 
ICMWs
 it =  is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm disclosed ICMWs under section 302 or 
section 404, zero otherwise. 
δ
 it = is a set of control variables that explain the variation in IA in prior research.   
 
I hence use company-level versus account-specific classification of the severity of IC 
weakness. I, therefore, use an indicator variable that equals 1 if the IC weaknesses affect the 
company level and zero otherwise. My dependent variable is information asymmetry measured 
by the bid-ask spread. A set of control variables are also added to model 4.  
Ln_IA
 it = β0 + β1 CL it +∑
=
j
i 1
 αj δ it + εt                     (Model 4) 
To mitigate the problem of omitted correlated variables, I follow Feng et al. (2009) by 
doing both level and change analysis and further conducting a cross-section analysis based on the 
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types of ineffective internal control quality. I then test for changes in the quality of internal 
control (Hypothesis 3) due to the management and/or auditors remediation actions.  
I use model 5 to test my third hypothesis, which predicts a significant negative 
association between the disclosure of the remediation of Internal Control Deficiencies and the 
average bid-ask spread.  
The change in IC weaknesses can be measured as the difference in the indicator variable 
in year t+1 or t-1 and the indicator variable in year t as suggested by (Feng, Li and McVay, 
2009), or by auditor opinion, an adverse audit opinion is an indication of negative change in IC 
weaknesses and an unqualified opinion is an indication of positive change in IC weaknesses or 
remediation actions by the management (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and LaFond, 2008).  
I use model 5 to test my third hypothesis. The dependent variable is IA and the independent 
variables are the change in material weaknesses or remediation (REM) as a proxy for 
remediation as well as the set of control variables. The change in material weaknesses is 
measured as an indicator variable = 1 if the firm remediated part or all the disclosed IC 
weaknesses in the year t-1, zero otherwise. I also use the set of control variables I previously 
discussed. In model 5, I expect a negative significant association from the regression of changes 
in IC weakness  (remediation) on information asymmetry.  Model 5 is described below:  
Ln_IA
 it = β0 + β1 REMit +  ∑
=
j
i 1
 αj δ it + εt                     (Model 5) 
Where  
Ln_IA
 it = is natural logarithm of information asymmetry as measured by the bid-ask spread in the 
secondary loan market. 
REMit = is an indicator variable equal 1 if the firm remediated part or all the disclosed IC weaknesses in 
the year t-1, zero otherwise. 
 δ
 it = is a set of control variables that explain the variation in IA in prior research.   
In model 6, I test the effect of the secondary loan market unique characteristics on 
mitigating the positive hypothesized relationship between the disclosure of ICDs and IA. I then 
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test the interaction term between ICDs and syndication, credit rating, and covenants and IA. I 
will run three regression models to test H4 based on model 3 by using syndication, credit rating 
and covenants as interaction term with ICDs. I also add a set of control variables that explain 
information asymmetry. Model 3 is described below: 
Ln_IA
 it = β0 + β1 ICDsit + β2 LS_CHARit + β3 ICDs*LS_CHARit +∑
=
j
i 1
 αj δ it + εt                     (Model 6) 
 Where 
   
Ln_IA
 it = is natural logarithm of information asymmetry as measured by the bid-ask spread in the 
secondary loan market. 
ICDsit =  is an indicator variable equals 1 if the firm disclosed any types of Internal Control Deficiencies, 
zero otherwise.  
LS_CHARit = syndication or number of lenders, the availability of credit rating and the existence of debt 
covenants.25 
 
ICDs*LS_CHARit = the interaction term between LS_CHARit and ICDs*LS_CHARit. 
δ
 it = is a set of control variables that explain the variation in IA in prior research.   
  
                                                          
25
 I use three separate regression model to test the interaction effect of the loan specific characteristics and ICDs on 
the association between the ICDs and information asymmetry 
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CHAPTER 6 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
6.1 Sample Size and Selection 
I tested the sample period post SOX 2002 – IC provisions. I started with and used a 
sample of available secondary loan market data from 2002-2005. Secondary loan market data 
post 2005 is not accessible to me. While data after 2005 is not possible to obtain, future research 
might extend my study by extending my sample period. The sample is then restricted to only 
four years because of limited access to the secondary loan market data post 2005.   
I obtained data for firms with effective versus deficient internal control and other proxies 
for the quality of internal control over financial statement (e.g., significant deficiency, and 
remediation of Internal Control Deficiencies) from AUDIT ANALYSTCIS (AA).  I relied solely 
on AA to get internal control data due to the reliability of AA and its wide use by prominent 
researchers, relative to the limited use of the Compliance Week. Additionally, Irving (2006) 
points out to the potential selection bias and external validity issues associated with Compliance 
Week because it does not represent the population of firms with ICMWs. I used my proxies for 
information asymmetry (Bid-Ask Spread) and loan-specific characteristics from DealScan or 
Loanware database26.  I used COMPUSTAT to get my control variables that represent the firm-
specific characteristics such as: ROA, Assets, and Liquidity, Discretionary Accruals, MTB, and 
Loss firms.  
I started with 3971 firm-year facilities27 or observations of the secondary loan data that 
covered the period from 2004-2005. I removed 341 firm-year observations belonging to 
                                                          
26
 Professor Kenneth Daniels, a professor of finance at Virginia Commonwealth University has shared the DealScan 
or Loanware database with me.  
 
27
 Facility is a loan granted to a firm. A firm might have a number of facilities during one accounting period.  
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international firms. The remaining sample is 3630 firm-year observations for U.S. firms post-
SOX 2002 to 2005. I manually inserted the key identifiers such as: CUSIP and CIK to the 
secondary loan market data to merge it with other databases such as COMPUSTAT and AA. I 
obtained discretionary accrual data from COMPUSTAT and estimated the discretionary accrual 
according to Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995), I further winzorized my discretionary accrual 
data at 10%.  I then merged the discretionary accrual data with the secondary loan market data 
after replacing some missing firm-years observations for discretionary accrual data with the 
mean of the available accruals data (estimated to be 0.05) and I merged the two datasets based on 
the GVKEY and fiscal year (FYEAR). The sample after the merge is 3630 firm-years 
observations.  
 I obtained the internal control data such as material weaknesses, significant deficiencies, 
and effective internal control from the AA database for 2002-2005. I searched AA for disclosure 
control data for accelerated filers firms (firms with more than $75 million market capitalization.) 
The internal control sample is 16383 firm-year observations. I obtained the audit characteristics 
information for the same sample period, such as auditor name, auditor resignation and/or 
dismissal from AA database. The audit characteristics sample is 13041 firm-year observations. I 
also obtained the control variables such as: ROA, MTB, ASSETS28, and LOSSES firms from 
COMPUSTAT database. The sample of the control variable is 5384 firm-year observations.   
 I merged the internal control data with the control variable data and audit characteristics 
data based on the CIK and fiscal year (FYEAR). I completed the merge using ACCESS. The 
merge of these three datasets resulted in 3467 firm-years observations. Finally, I merged the 
3467 firm-years observations with the discretionary accruals and secondary loan market data 
                                                          
28
 I used the log transformation for key variables such as: Assets, CFO, and Loan size to correct for skewness. 
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(3630 firm-years observations). I merged the two datasets based on the CIK and fiscal year 
(FYEAR). The final sample after the merge is 533 (1802) firms (firm-years observations.)  
I then classified the material weaknesses into Company Level (CL), Account Specific 
(AS) and further coded firms that remediated part of or all Internal Control Deficiencies in the 
following accounting period. In categorizing the Internal Control Deficiencies as either CL or 
AS, I classified weaknesses in internal control related to any accounts such as: inventory, 
accounts receivables, loan receivables, gain or loss recognition issues, liabilities, reserves, tax 
expense, depreciation, depletion or amortization issues, and financial derivatives as AS 
weaknesses in internal control. Similarly, I classified weaknesses in internal control related to 
company level issues such as: acquisition, merger, disposal or reorganization issues deferred, 
stock-based or executive compensation issues, intercompany issues, foreign-related party, 
consolidation, affiliated and/or subsidies issues as CL weaknesses in internal control. I then 
manually coded firms with CL with 1 and firms with AS with zero.  
I also manually coded firms that remediated part or all weaknesses in internal control 
from year t-1 to year t with 1 and firms that did not remediate Internal Control Deficiencies with 
zero. The variables definitions and measurement used in the statistical analysis are listed in 
Appendix A. Table 6 summarizes the steps taken to reach the final sample after merging various 
databases. My final sample consists of 553 (1802) firms (facilities) from 2002-2005. This final 
sample includes firms with ICDs as well as firms with effective IC systems. Out of the 553 
(1802) firms (facilities), 81(398) firms (facilities) are having ICDs and the rest of the sample 472 
(1404) firms (facilities) are firms with effective IC. The effective IC sample is used as the 
control sample in my statistical analysis.   
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My final sample represents a wide-variety of sectors in the economy. Table 7 lists sample 
firms by industry categories. Almost one third, 184 (or 33.27%) of my sample firms are 
manufacturing firms. The second most represented category is Finance, Insurance, and Real 
Estate, where it represents 109 firms (or 19.71%), almost one fifth of my sample. Transportation, 
Communication and utilities is represented by 79 (14.29%) of my sample. Other included sectors 
are Service Industries 76 (13.74), Retail Trade 43 (7.78%), Mineral Industries 38 (6.87%), 
Wholesale Trade 13 (2.35%) and Construction Industries 11 (1.99).  
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TABLE 6 
Final Sample 
Industry # Firms # Observations 
The secondary loan market Data 1968 3971 
(-) The secondary loan market for Non-U.S. Firms (196) (341) 
= The secondary loan market Data for only U.S. Firms 1772 3630 
(-) Internal Control and Control data not available in either COMPUSTAT and/or 
Audit Analytics (1219) (1828) 
= Final full sample  (including control sample) 553 1802 
(-) Firms with no ICDs (control sample) (472) (1404) 
= Final sub-sample including only ICDs firms (treatment sample) 81 398 
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TABLE 7 
Sample Distribution by Industry Type 
Industry Codes # Firms % Firms # Obs.  % Obs. 
Mineral Industries  12,13 38 6.87% 124 6.88% 
Construction Industries  15-17 11 1.99% 56 3.11% 
Manufacturing  20,22,24-30,32-39 184 33.27% 622 34.52% 
Transportation, Communication, and Utilities  40,42,45,47-49 79 14.29% 303 16.81% 
Wholesale Trade  50,51 13 2.35% 32 1.78% 
Retail Trade  52-59 43 7.78% 128 7.10% 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate  60-65,67 109 19.71% 317 17.59% 
Service Industries  70,73,78,79,80,82,87 76 13.74% 220 12.21% 
  553 100% 1802 100% 
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6.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics of the final sample of 533 firms (1802 firm-years observations) 
are shown in table 8. Table 8 consists of three panels with a decomposed full sample (1802 firm-
year facilities) into ICDs (398 firms) and effective IC samples (1404 firms). Panel A summarizes 
the descriptive statistics for the variables of interests such as the bid-ask spread and Internal 
Control Deficiencies variables. Panel B demonstrates the descriptive statistics of the firm-
specific characteristics. Panel C lists the summary statistics of the loan specific characteristics.  
As shown in panel A, the bid-ask spread for the full sample ranges from 10 to 975 basis 
points with standard deviation of 124.3958. The average (median) bid-ask spread for firms with 
ICDs 198.7764 (175) is higher than that for firms with effective IC 160.0974 (137.5). ICDs 
(ICMWs) represent 22.09% (20.20%) of the total sample. Out of the 20.20% firms with ICMWs 
in the full sample, 1.44% (18.76%) is firms with ICMWs reported under section 302 (404). For 
the ICDs sample, 91.46% are firms with ICMWs. The majority of ICMWs (87%) seems to be 
clustered post section 404 of the ICDs sample. 33.17% of the ICDs sample are firms with CL 
internal control and 20.60% are firms that took remediation actions from year t-1 to year t to 
correct the documented deficiency in their internal control system.  
Panel B of table 8 shows summary statistics of the firm-specific characteristics of the full 
sample and its decompositions of ICDs and effective ICs. As expected, the comparison of the 
firm-specific characteristics of the firms with ICDs versus firms with effective IC shows that 
firms with ICDs have lower ROA, Assets size, and liquidity. ICDs firms also experience, on 
average, high auditor resignation, less audit involvement from Big 6 firms, and more loss firms 
than firms with effective ICDs. On average, 20.31% of the full sample firms are post section 404.  
76 
 
 
Overall, the descriptive statistics of firms with ICDs in panel B reveal that firms with 
reported ICDs are generally smaller, poorer performers, and financially weaker, with higher 
market risk. These results are consistent with and documented by numerous studies(Bryan and 
Lilien, 2005; Ge and McVay, 2005; Doyle, Ge and McVay 2007 a,b; Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, 
and Kinney, 2007, Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and LaFond, 2008). 
Panel C lists the summary statistics of the loan-specific characteristics. It shows that 
firms with ICDs are composed of lower percentage (12.60%) of short-term revolvers loan than 
firms with effective IC (29.13%). 9% of the ICDs firms are loans by institutional investors 
compared to 6.84% for effective ICDs firms. However, 3.5% of ICDs firms are loans by banks 
compared to 1.78% loans financed by banks for effective IC sample. 36.13% of the full sample is 
corporate purpose loans. On average, firms with ICDs sample are less rated29 (2.8) by credit 
agencies than effective IC sample firms (2.4). On average, 68.04% of the full sample has debt 
covenants but ICDs firms have higher debt covenants, 72%, compared to 66.95%, for firms with 
effective IC.    
 
  
                                                          
29
 The rating categories are three levels: 1, 2 and 3. The level 1 category indicates a high credit rating and a level 3 
category indicates a lower credit rating.  
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TABLE 8 
Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean Med. Std.  Min. Max.   Mean Med. Std.  Min. Max.   
    Full sample N=1802       ICDs sample N=398     
Panel A: Variables of Interest   
      
  
  
  
      
  
  
IA 168.6403 150.0000 124.3958 10.0000 975.0000   198.7764 175.0000 119.7335 18.0000 650.0000  
ICDs 0.2209 0.0000 0.4149 0.0000 1.0000   1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000  
ICMWs 0.2020 0.0000 0.4016 0.0000 1.0000   0.9146 1.0000 0.2799 0.0000 1.0000  
ICMWs_302 0.0144 0.0000 0.1193 0.0000 1.0000   0.0402 0.0000 0.1967 0.0000 1.0000  
ICMWs_404 0.1876 0.0000 0.3905 0.0000 1.0000   0.8744 1.0000 0.3318 0.0000 1.0000  
CL 0.0733 0.0000 0.2606 0.0000 1.0000   0.3317 0.0000 0.4714 0.0000 1.0000  
REM 0.0455 0.0000 0.2085 0.0000 1.0000   0.2060 0.0000 0.4050 0.0000 1.0000  
            
Panel B: Firm -Specific Characteristics            
ROA 0.0126 0.0269 0.1472 -1.0092 2.3157  -0.0151 0.0033 0.1669 -0.3232 1.4805  
ASSETS 21.2479 21.1311 1.6013 16.6603 26.8993  20.9555 20.7645 1.3289 18.7340 25.5792  
MTB 1.0937 0.8969 1.1339 -3.6942 8.1910  1.2656 1.4080 1.0315 -1.1568 3.6010  
DA 0.1026 0.0089 0.6625 -2.7740 5.4347  0.0069 0.0082 0.5604 -2.3169 2.3082  
REG 0.2647 0.0000 0.4413 0.0000 1.0000  0.1457 0.0000 0.3533 0.0000 1.0000  
LQ 4.1862 4.0527 1.2104 0.0000 7.9959  3.8847 3.8456 1.0864 0.0000 6.4264  
LOSS 0.5610 1.0000 0.4964 0.0000 1.0000  0.6935 1.0000 0.4616 0.0000 1.0000  
AUD_D 0.1138 0.0000 0.3176 0.0000 1.0000  0.0553 0.0000 0.2288 0.0000 1.0000  
AUD_R 0.0139 0.0000 0.1170 0.0000 1.0000  0.0503 0.0000 0.2187 0.0000 1.0000  
BIG_6 0.9856 1.0000 0.1193 0.0000 1.0000  0.9648 1.0000 0.1845 0.0000 1.0000  
SOX 404 0.2031 0.0000 0.4024 0.0000 1.0000   0.9196 1.0000 0.2723 0.0000 1.0000  
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TABLE 8 (Concluded) 
Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean Med. Std.  Min. Max.   Mean Med. Std.  Min. Max.  
    ICDs sample N=398       Effective IC sample N=1404    
Panel A: Variables of Interest   
      
  
  
  
      
  
 
IA 198.7764 175.0000 119.7335 18.0000 650.0000  160.0974 137.5000 124.4056 10.0000 975.0000  
ICDs 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
ICMWs 0.9146 1.0000 0.2799 0.0000 1.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
ICMWs_302 0.0402 0.0000 0.1967 0.0000 1.0000  0. 0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
ICMWs_404 0.8744 1.0000 0.3318 0.0000 1.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
CL 0.3317 0.0000 0.4714 0.0000 1.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
REM 0.2060 0.0000 0.4050 0.0000 1.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
Panel B: Firm -Specific Characteristics            
ROA -0.0151 0.0033 0.1669 -0.3232 1.4805  0.0204 0.0311 0.1402 -1.0092 2.3157  
ASSETS 20.9555 20.7645 1.3289 18.7340 25.5792  21.3308 21.2352 1.6616 16.6603 26.8993  
MTB 1.2656 1.4080 1.0315 -1.1568 3.6010  1.0450 0.7958 1.1569 -3.6942 8.1910  
DA 0.0069 0.0082 0.5604 -2.3169 2.3082  0.1297 0.0125 0.6865 -2.7740 5.4347  
REG 0.1457 0.0000 0.3533 0.0000 1.0000  0.2984 0.0000 0.4577 0.0000 1.0000  
LQ 3.8847 3.8456 1.0864 0.0000 6.4264  4.2717 4.1606 1.2302 0.0000 7.9959  
LOSS 0.6935 1.0000 0.4616 0.0000 1.0000  0.5235 1.0000 0.4996 0.0000 1.0000  
AUD_D 0.0553 0.0000 0.2288 0.0000 1.0000  0.1303 0.0000 0.3368 0.0000 1.0000  
AUD_R 0.0503 0.0000 0.2187 0.0000 1.0000  0.0036 0.0000 0.0596 0.0000 1.0000  
BIG_6 0.9648 1.0000 0.1845 0.0000 1.0000  0.9915 1.0000 0.0921 0.0000 1.0000  
SOX 404 0.9196 1.0000 0.2723 0.0000 1.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
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TABLE 8 (Concluded) 
Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean Med. Std. Min. Max.   Mean Med. Std. Min. Max.   
   Full sample N=1802      ICDs sample N=398     
Panel C: Loan -Specific Characteristics          
S_REVOLVERS 0.2547 0.0000 0.4358 0.0000 1.0000  0.1260 0.0000 0.3318 0.0000 1.0000  
L_REVOLVERS 0.5277 1.0000 0.4994 0.0000 1.0000  0.6130 1.0000 0.4877 0.0000 1.0000  
BANK_LENDERS 0.0216 0.0000 0.1456 0.0000 1.0000  0.0350 0.0000 0.1845 0.0000 1.0000  
INSTIT_LENDERS 0.0733 0.0000 0.2606 0.0000 1.0000  0.0900 0.0000 0.2872 0.0000 1.0000  
CAP 0.0117 0.0000 0.1074 0.0000 1.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
CORP 0.3613 0.0000 0.4805 0.0000 1.0000  0.5100 1.0000 0.5010 0.0000 1.0000  
CP_PACKUP 0.1443 0.0000 0.3515 0.0000 1.0000  0.0600 0.0000 0.2380 0.0000 1.0000  
DEBT 0.0660 0.0000 0.2484 0.0000 1.0000  0.0600 0.0000 0.2380 0.0000 1.0000  
TAKEOVER 0.0427 0.0000 0.2023 0.0000 1.0000  0.0500 0.0000 0.2190 0.0000 1.0000  
OTHER_LOANS 0.0316 0.0000 0.1751 0.0000 1.0000  0.0200 0.0000 0.1220 0.0000 1.0000  
SECURED 0.4362 0.0000 0.4960 0.0000 1.0000   0.5900 1.0000 0.4920 0.0000 1.0000   
SPONSORED 0.0527 0.0000 0.2235 0.0000 1.0000   0.1000 0.0000 0.3010 0.0000 1.0000   
RATING_CAT 2.4850 3.0000 0.7384 1.0000 3.0000   2.8100 3.0000 0.4380 1.0000 3.0000   
SYND 8.5710 7.0000 7.4504 1.0000 76.0000   6.9200 5.0000 5.5200 1.0000 30.0000   
MATURITY 33.0766 36.0000 20.4622 2.0000 95.0000   41.4000 43.0000 20.1090 6.0000 84.0000   
LOAN_SIZE 19.0522 19.1138 1.2761 15.2018 22.4280   19.0913 18.9803 1.0640 16.5236 21.8219   
COVEN 0.6804 1.0000 0.4665 0.0000 1.0000   0.7200 1.0000 0.4500 0.0000 1.0000   
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TABLE 8 (Concluded) 
Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean Med. Std.  Min. Max.   Mean Med. Std. Min. Max.  
    ICDs sample N=398      Effective IC sample =1404   
Panel C: Loan -Specific Characteristics          
S_REVOLVERS 0.1260 0.0000 0.3318 0.0000 1.0000  0.2913 0.0000 0.4545 0.0000 1.0000  
L_REVOLVERS 0.6130 1.0000 0.4877 0.0000 1.0000  0.5036 1.0000 0.5002 0.0000 1.0000  
BANK_LENDERS 0.0350 0.0000 0.1845 0.0000 1.0000  0.0178 0.0000 0.1323 0.0000 1.0000  
INSTIT_LENDERS 0.0900 0.0000 0.2872 0.0000 1.0000  0.0684 0.0000 0.2525 0.0000 1.0000  
CAP 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0150 0.0000 0.1214 0.0000 1.0000  
CORP 0.5100 1.0000 0.5010 0.0000 1.0000  0.3198 0.0000 0.4666 0.0000 1.0000  
CP_PACKUP 0.0600 0.0000 0.2380 0.0000 1.0000  0.1681 0.0000 0.3741 0.0000 1.0000  
DEBT 0.0600 0.0000 0.2380 0.0000 1.0000  0.0677 0.0000 0.2513 0.0000 1.0000  
TAKEOVER 0.0500 0.0000 0.2190 0.0000 1.0000  0.0406 0.0000 0.1974 0.0000 1.0000  
OTHER_LOANS 0.0200 0.0000 0.1220 0.0000 1.0000  0.0363 0.0000 0.1872 0.0000 1.0000  
SECURED 0.5900 1.0000 0.4920 0.0000 1.0000   0.3917 0.0000 0.4883 0.0000 1.0000  
SPONSORED 0.1000 0.0000 0.3010 0.0000 1.0000   0.0392 0.0000 0.1941 0.0000 1.0000  
RATING_CAT 2.8100 3.0000 0.4380 1.0000 3.0000   2.3917 3.0000 0.7786 1.0000 3.0000  
SYND 6.9200 5.0000 5.5200 1.0000 30.0000   9.0392 7.0000 7.8510 1.0000 76.0000  
MATURITY 41.4000 43.0000 20.1090 6.0000 84.0000   30.7179 30.0000 19.9462 2.0000 95.0000  
LOAN_SIZE 19.0913 18.9803 1.0640 16.5236 21.8219   19.0412 19.1138 1.3302 15.2018 22.4280  
COVEN 0.7200 1.0000 0.4500 0.0000 1.0000   0.6695 1.0000 0.4706 0.0000 1.0000  
IA= Natural log of the difference between the average annual bid and ask spread of the traded facility. ICDS= an indicator variable equals 1 if the firm disclosed Internal Control Deficiencies, zero otherwise. ICMWs= an indicator 
variable = 1 if the firm disclosed ICMWs under section 302 or section 404, zero otherwise. ICMWs_302= an indicator variable = 1 if the firm disclosed ICMWs under section 302, zero otherwise. ICMWs_404= an indicator 
variable = 1 if the firm disclosed ICMWs under section 404, zero otherwise. CL= an indicator variable equal 1 if the disclosed IC weaknesses is on the company level, zero otherwise. REM= an indicator variable = 1 if the firm 
remediated part or all the disclosed IC weaknesses in the year t-1, zero otherwise. ROA= Return on Asset is Income before Extraordinary items / lagged total assets. ASSETS= Natural log of total assets [Compustat data item # 6]. 
MTB= Natural log of  the ratio of the firm’s market value to book value of common equity, computed as [share price times the number of shares outstanding [Compustat data item #25 * Compustat data item #199] divided by 
[Compustat data item # 60]. DA= I measure the discretionary accruals using the correct model of the Modified Jones Model as in Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (2005). REG= an indicator variable = 1 if the firm is in regulated 
industry such as financial or utility industry (SIC codes 6000-6999 and 4900-4999), zero otherwise. LQ= Natural log of the volume of stock traded. LOSS= an indicator variable = 1 if the firm had losses over the last two years 
[Compustat data item # 172]. AUD_D= an indicator variable = 1 if the firm dismissed the auditor, zero otherwise. AUD_R= an indicator variable = 1 if the auditor resigned, zero otherwise. BIG_6= an indicator variable = 1 if the 
financial statements are audited by one of the top 6 audit firms, zero otherwise. S_REVOLVERS= an indicator variable = 1 if it is a short term revolver loan such as 364-Day Facility, and 0 otherwise. L_REVOLVERS= an 
indicator variable = 1 if it is a long term revolver loan such as Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr., and 0 otherwise. BANK_LENDERS= an indicator variable = 1 if the identity of the lender is a bank (Term Loan A), and 0 otherwise. 
INSTIT_LENDERS= An indicator variable = 1 if the identity of the lender is an institutional lender (Term Loan B, C, and D), and 0 otherwise. CAP= an indicator variable = 1 if the loan purpose is to cover capital expenditures, and 
0 otherwise. CORP= an indicator variable = 1 if the loan purpose is to cover corporate expenditures, and 0 otherwise. CP_BACKUP= an indicator variable = 1 if the loan is a CP Back Up, and 0 otherwise. DEBT= an indicator 
variable = 1 if the loan purpose is to repay debt, and 0 otherwise. TAKEOVER= An indicator variable = 1 if the loan purpose is takeover, and 0 otherwise. OTHER_LOANS= an indicator variable = 1 if the loan purpose is any other 
reason than the ones listed above, and 0 otherwise. SECURED= An indicator variable = 1 if it is a secured loan, and 0 otherwise. SPONSORED= an indicator variable = 1 if it is a sponsored loan, and 0 otherwise. RATING_CAT= 
A continuous number indicating the rating categories. SYND= A continuous number indicating number of lenders. MATURITY= A continuous number indicating the maturity of a loan or the length of time until the loan is due.  
LOAN_SIZE= Natural log of the loan value in dollar amount. COVEN= an indicator variable = 1 if covenants exist, and 0 otherwise.  SOX 404= an indicator variable = 1 if the reporting period underlying SOX 404period, zero 
otherwise. IND= Eight indicator variables to represent the different industries in my sample firms, SIC two digits code are used to categorize the industries. 
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Table 9 summarizes the descriptive statistics by year for the variables of interest within only the 
ICDs sample of firms. Panels A, B, C and D of table 9 contains the four years of sample period 
from 2002-2005, respectively. Panel A shows that the average IA in 2001 are 147.5 and ranges 
from 50-300 with standard deviation of 93.6544. It also shows that 71.43% of ICDs sample in 
2002 are firms with ICMWs, 28.57% (42.86%) out of these firms are firms with ICMWs 
reported under section 302 (section 404). Within the same year, 85.71% of firms with reported 
weaknesses are having CL weaknesses and only 42.86% were able to remediate their Internal 
Control Deficiencies.  
 Panel B summarizes the descriptive statistics for the year 2003 and it indicates that IA goes 
up to reach 191.667 on average with standard deviation of 52.8594 and ranges from 100-250. 
66.67% of the sample are firms with ICMWs of which 44.44% are firms with ICMWs reported 
under section 302, while 22.22% were reported under section 404. 66.67% are firms with CL and 
55.56% of the reported weaknesses were remediated by the firm or auditor.  
 The average IA goes down in year 2004 relative to IA in year 2003 as shown in Panel C. 
Average IA in 2004 scored 176.0714 with standard deviation of 95.7838 and ranges from 19-
400. Panel C shows that ICMWs in 2004 are 93.65% of the ICDs sample, while 3.17% (90.48%) 
are firms with ICMWs reported under section 302 (section 404). 26.98% of firms in 2004 are 
with CL weaknesses and almost one third of the reported firms with ICMWs remediated their 
Internal Control Deficiencies. IA reported the highest average in 2005 (214.2208) as panel D 
suggests. The average IA in 2005 ranges from 18-650 with standard deviation 132.9292 and 
median of 187.5, the highest among all IA in all years.    
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TABLE 9 
Descriptive Statistics by Year 
  Mean Median Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Panel A: For the year 2002       
N=14      
IA 147.5000 150.0000 93.6544 50.0000 300.0000 
ICMWs 0.7143 1.0000 0.4688 0.0000 1.0000 
ICMWs_302 0.2857 0.0000 0.4688 0.0000 1.0000 
ICMWs_404 0.4286 0.0000 0.5136 0.0000 1.0000 
CL 0.8571 1.0000 0.3631 0.0000 1.0000 
REM 0.4286 0.0000 0.5136 0.0000 1.0000 
Panel B: For the year 2003      
N=18      
IA 191.6667 175.0000 52.8594 100.0000 250.0000 
ICMWs 0.6667 1.0000 0.4851 0.0000 1.0000 
ICMWs_302 0.4444 0.0000 0.5113 0.0000 1.0000 
ICMWs_404 0.2222 0.0000 0.4278 0.0000 1.0000 
CL 0.6667 1.0000 0.4851 0.0000 1.0000 
REM 0.5556 1.0000 0.5113 0.0000 1.0000 
Panel C: For the year 2004      
N=126      
IA 176.0714 180.0000 95.7838 19.0000 400.0000 
ICMWs 0.9365 1.0000 0.2448 0.0000 1.0000 
ICMWs_302 0.0317 0.0000 0.1760 0.0000 1.0000 
ICMWs_404 0.9048 1.0000 0.2947 0.0000 1.0000 
CL 0.2698 0.0000 0.4456 0.0000 1.0000 
REM 0.3333 0.0000 0.4733 0.0000 1.0000 
Panel D: For the year 2005      
N=240      
IA 214.2208 187.5000 132.9292 18.0000 650.0000 
ICMWs 0.9333 1.0000 0.2500 0.0000 1.0000 
ICMWs_302 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ICMWs_404 0.9333 1.0000 0.2500 0.0000 1.0000 
CL 0.3083 0.0000 0.4628 0.0000 1.0000 
REM 0.1000 0.0000 0.3006 0.0000 1.0000 
IA= the difference between the average annual bid and ask spread of the traded facility.  ICDS= an indicator variable equals 1 if the firm 
disclosed Internal Control Deficiencies, zero otherwise. ICMWs = an indicator variable = 1 if the firm disclosed ICMWs under section 302 or 
section 404, zero otherwise. ICMWs_302 = an indicator variable = 1 if the firm disclosed ICMWs under section 302, zero otherwise.  
ICMWs_404 = an indicator variable = 1 if the firm disclosed ICMWs under section 404, zero otherwise. CL = an indicator variable equal 1 if the 
disclosed IC weaknesses on the company level, zero otherwise. REM = an indicator variable = 1 if the firm remediated part or all the disclosed IC 
weaknesses in the year t-1, zero otherwise.
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 The correlation matrix is in table 10. Table 10 consists of four panels. Panel A summarizes 
the correlations among IA and ICD variables. Panel B summarizes the correlations among  IA, 
ICD variables, and firm-specific characteristics. Panel C summarizes the correlations among IA 
and ICD variables, firm and loan-specific characteristics. Panel D shows the correlations among 
loan-specific characteristics. As predicted, panel A shows a statistically significant positive 
correlation at 1% and p-value < 0.01 between IA and ICD variables such as ICMWs, 
ICMW_404, ICD, and CL. It also shows a strong statistically-significant positive correlation at 
1% and p-value < 0.01 among ICD variables such as between ICMWs_404 and ICMWs and 
between ICD and ICMWs, suggesting a probable multicollinearity among the ICDs measures. 
This multicollinearity would be an obstacle to run a model with an interaction term between 
measures of ICDs.   
 Panel B shows a significant negative correlation between IA and ROA, Assets, MTB, 
Liquidity at 1% and p-value < 0.01 and Big 6 audit firms at 5% and p-value < 0.05. It also shows 
a significant positive correlation between IA and losses and audit resignation and dismissal 
(auditor changes). The previous correlations in panel B suggest that firms with good firm 
performance as measured by ROA, big firms as measured by total assets, firms with higher 
liquidity, and firms that involve Big 6 in the audit process are associated with lower IA. 
Similarly, firms with losses and that experience auditor changes are associated with higher IA. 
Panel B documents a significant positive correlation between Liquidity and assets, ICMW_404 
and post-section 302 period, ICDs and post-section 302 period, indicating a possible 
multicollinearity among these variables.  
 Panel C indicates a positive significant correlation between IA and long-term revolvers, 
bank lenders, institutional lenders, capital-expenditure loans, corporate-purpose loans, debt 
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loans, takeover loans, secured loans, sponsored loans, loans with a low credit rating, maturity 
and the existence of debt covenants. There is a negative significant correlation between IA and 
CP backup loans, the number of lenders (syndication), and loan size.  
 Panel C also shows high significant positive correlation between loan size and assets as 
well as loan size and liquidity. Panel D summarizes the correlation among the loan-specific 
characteristics and it shows a negative significant correlation between long and short revolvers. It 
also shows positive significant correlation between CP backup and short term revolvers. A 
significant negative correlation exists between short term revolvers and credit rating, maturity 
and covenants. A positive significant correlation exists between credit rating and secured loans 
as well as loan size and syndication or the number of lenders. Overall, other correlations are non-
significant and modest (<0.5), indicating the absence of the multicollienarity among most of the 
loan-specific characteristics.  
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TABLE 10 
Spearman Correlations Matrixes 
 
Panel A: Correlations among IA and ICD Variables 
 IA ICMWs ICMWs_302 ICMWs _404 ICD CL REM 
IA 1.0000 0.1317*** -0.0034 0.1348*** 0.1558*** 0.0683*** 0.0669*** 
ICMWs  1.0000 0.1881*** 0.9724*** 0.9450*** 0.4845*** 0.4075*** 
ICMWs_302   1.0000 -0.0463** 0.1778*** 0.2913*** 0.2632*** 
ICMWs _404    1.0000 0.9189*** 0.4236*** 0.3519*** 
ICD     1.0000 0.5280*** 0.4101*** 
CL      1.0000 0.0613*** 
REM             1.0000 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). **. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), *. Correlation is significant at 
the 0.10 level (2-tailed.) Using a cut-off of .5, all significant correlations equal to or greater than .5 are in bold.  Also, correlation among 
variables of interest such as IA and IC measures is in bold.  
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TABLE 10 (Concluded) 
 
Panel B: Correlation among IA, ICD Variables, and Firm-Specific Characteristics 
  ROA ASSETS MTB DA REG LQ LOSS AUD_D AUD_R BIG_6 SOX 404 
IA 
-0.3290*** -0.5396*** -0.1355*** 0.0248 -0.1711*** -0.4730*** 0.2889*** 0.0490** 0.0744*** -0.0553** 0.1527*** 
ICMWs 
-0.2547*** -0.0897*** 0.1237*** -0.0599** -0.1327*** -0.1030*** 0.1386*** -0.0932*** 0.1767*** -0.1014*** 0.9210*** 
ICMWs_302 
-0.0363 0.0565** 0.0292 0.0645*** -0.0032 0.0396* 0.0837*** -0.0339 -0.0112 0.0115 0.0110 
ICMWs_404 
-0.2504*** -0.1047*** 0.1188*** -0.0762*** -0.1342*** -0.1141*** 0.1211*** -0.0867*** 0.1824*** -0.1059*** 0.9341*** 
ICD 
-0.2490*** -0.1099*** 0.1296*** -0.0436* -0.1436*** -0.1294*** 0.1421*** -0.0981*** 0.1656*** -0.0926*** 0.9482*** 
CL 
-0.1591*** 0.0216 0.0831*** -0.0268 -0.0239 0.0192 0.1285*** -0.0739*** 0.0031 -0.0017 0.4298*** 
REM 
-0.1447*** -0.0835*** 0.0886*** -0.0086 -0.0707*** -0.0438* 0.1073*** -0.0279 0.2018*** -0.1076*** 0.3266*** 
ROA 1.0000 0.0001 0.3062*** 0.0550** -0.0145 0.0435* -0.4993*** -0.0392* -0.0267 -0.0060 -0.2479*** 
ASSETS 
  1.0000 -0.0916*** -0.0209 0.2914*** 0.7515*** -0.0624*** -0.0718*** -0.0498** 0.1320*** -0.1174*** 
MTB 
    1.0000 -0.0442* -0.2751*** 0.1512*** -0.1256*** -0.0187 0.0830*** 0.0201 0.1252*** 
DA 
      1.0000 -0.0176 -0.0620*** -0.0108 -0.0234 0.0396* -0.0013 -0.0484** 
REG 
        1.0000 0.0210 -0.0244 0.0069 -0.0389* 0.0726*** -0.1403*** 
LQ 
          1.0000 -0.0240 -0.0526** -0.0347 0.1347*** -0.1275*** 
LOSS 
            1.0000 0.0281 -0.0002 0.0618*** 0.1186*** 
AUD_R 
              1.0000 -0.0425* 0.0434* -0.1027*** 
AUD_D 
                1.0000 -0.0652*** 0.1760*** 
BIG_6 
                  1.0000 -0.1009*** 
SOX 404 
                    1.0000 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). **. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), *. Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed.) Using a cut-off of .5, all 
significant correlations equal to or greater than .5 are in bold. 
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TABLE 10 (Concluded) 
 
Panel C: Correlation among IA, ICD Variables, Firm and Loan-Specific Characteristics 
  S_REVOLVERS L_REVOLVERS BANK_LENDERS INSTIT_LENDERS CAP CORP CP_PACKUP DEBT 
IA -0.5278*** 0.1672*** 0.1444*** 0.2848*** 0.0650*** 0.0608*** -0.4910*** 0.1548*** 
ICMWs -0.1419*** 0.0717*** 0.0582** 0.0283 -0.0546** 0.1511*** -0.1122*** -0.0113 
ICMWs_302 0.0804*** -0.0764*** -0.0141 0.0188 -0.0103 -0.0219 0.0621*** -0.0252 
ICMWs_404 -0.1634*** 0.0911*** 0.0625*** 0.0243 -0.0531** 0.1589*** -0.1289*** -0.0056 
ICD -0.1577*** 0.0910*** 0.0495** 0.0351 -0.0578** 0.1621*** -0.1273*** -0.0123 
CL -0.0470** -0.0156 -0.0125 0.0354 -0.0305 0.0546** -0.0427* 0.0110 
REM -0.0299 0.0572** -0.0325 -0.0409* -0.0237 0.0575** 0.0013 -0.0581** 
ROA 0.1008*** -0.0245 0.0448* -0.0725*** -0.0883*** -0.1310*** 0.1444*** -0.0091 
ASSETS 0.4449*** -0.3347*** -0.0210 -0.0361 -0.1078*** -0.0255 0.4491*** -0.0952*** 
MTB 0.1169*** -0.1158*** 0.0418* -0.0538** 0.0113 -0.0548** 0.1501*** -0.0579** 
DA -0.0448* 0.0087 -0.0719*** -0.0018 -0.0400* 0.0189 -0.0836*** -0.0089 
REG 0.1025*** -0.0724*** -0.0547** -0.0625*** 0.0286 -0.0113 0.0651*** -0.0886*** 
LQ 0.4067*** -0.3010*** -0.0270 -0.0557** -0.0794*** -0.0057 0.4054*** -0.0903*** 
LOSS -0.2067*** 0.0861*** -0.0452* 0.1414*** 0.0752*** 0.0390* -0.1364*** 0.0506** 
AUD_D 0.0352 -0.0042 -0.0413* 0.0468** -0.0226 -0.0111 -0.0228 0.0384 
AUD_R -0.0585** 0.0077 -0.0176 -0.0333 -0.0129 0.0491** -0.0352 0.0067 
BIG_6 0.0280 0.0720*** 0.0180 -0.0017 0.0131 -0.0253 0.0497** 0.0322 
SOX 404 -0.1812*** 0.1073*** 0.0576** 0.0381 -0.0548** 0.1831*** -0.1445*** -0.0121 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). **. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), *. Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed.) Using a cut-off of .5, all 
significant correlations equal to or greater than .5 are in bold.  Also, correlation among the variables of interest is also in bold. 
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TABLE 10 (Concluded) 
 
Panel C (concluded): Correlation among IA, ICD Variables, Firm and Loan-Specific Characteristics 
  TAKEOVER 
OTHER_ 
LOANS 
SECURED SPONSORED 
RATING_ 
CAT 
SYND MATURITY 
LOAN_ 
SIZE 
COVEN 
IA 0.0774*** 0.0180 0.5975*** 0.2122*** 0.6667*** -0.4064*** 0.4287*** -0.3320*** 0.2487*** 
ICMWs 0.0304 -0.0435* 0.1539*** 0.1163*** 0.2227*** -0.0930*** 0.2005*** 0.0194 0.0425* 
ICMWs_302 0.0385 0.0505** 0.0122 -0.0223 -0.0113 0.0203 -0.0373 0.0520** 0.0649*** 
ICMWs_404 0.0218 -0.0563** 0.1537*** 0.1236*** 0.2292*** -0.0994*** 0.2128*** 0.0074 0.0278 
ICD 0.0198 -0.0504** 0.1683*** 0.1138*** 0.2355*** -0.1067*** 0.2300*** 0.0045 0.0437* 
CL 0.0880*** -0.0265 0.0362 0.0480** 0.0924*** -0.0190 0.1156*** 0.0575** 0.0557** 
REM -0.0198 -0.0090 0.0979*** -0.0515** 0.0665*** -0.0608*** -0.0401* -0.0384 0.0811*** 
ROA -0.0705*** 0.0661*** -0.2457*** -0.0504** -0.1733*** 0.1625*** -0.0463** 0.0504** 0.0003 
ASSETS 0.0082 0.0394* -0.4086*** -0.0165 -0.6789*** 0.5723*** -0.2366*** 0.6830*** -0.2867*** 
MTB 0.0635*** 0.0324 -0.0604** -0.0018 -0.0519** 0.0713*** -0.0434* 0.0398* -0.0154 
DA -0.1117*** 0.0976*** 0.0382 -0.0506** 0.0682*** -0.0467** 0.0060 -0.0648*** 0.0538** 
REG -0.0521** 0.0425* -0.2563*** -0.1078*** -0.3052*** 0.0551** -0.1759*** 0.0430* -0.1012*** 
LQ 0.0239 0.0252 -0.3143*** -0.0114 -0.5276*** 0.4540*** -0.2569*** 0.5398*** -0.2421*** 
LOSS 0.0044 -0.0126 0.2052*** 0.0586** 0.2053*** -0.1348*** 0.1265*** -0.0444* 0.0771*** 
AUD_D 0.0366 -0.0248 0.0514** -0.0063 0.0349 -0.0178 -0.0547** -0.0383 0.0507** 
AUD_R -0.0251 -0.0214 0.0105 0.0569** 0.0800*** -0.0565** 0.0262 -0.0549** 0.0101 
BIG_6 -0.0205 0.0219 -0.0437* 0.0285 -0.0899*** 0.1076*** -0.0150 0.0730*** -0.0430* 
SOX 404 0.0025 -0.0440* 0.1623*** 0.1278*** 0.2338*** -0.1067*** 0.2445*** -0.0003 0.0207 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). **. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), *. Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed.) Using a cut-off of .5, all 
significant correlations equal to or greater than .5 are in bold.  Also, correlation among the variables of interest is also in bold.  
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TABLE 10 (Concluded) 
 
Panel D: Correlation among Loan-Specific Characteristics 
  S_REVOLVERS L_REVOLVERS BANK_LENDERS INSTIT_LENDERS CAP CORP CP_PACKUP DEBT 
S_REVOLVERS 1.0000 -0.6180*** -0.0870*** -0.1644*** -0.0397* -0.0552** 0.5465*** -0.1042*** 
L_REVOLVERS    -0.1572*** -0.2972*** -0.0319 0.0889*** -0.3044*** 0.0233 
BANK_LENDERS     -0.0418* -0.0162 -0.0483** -0.0611*** 0.0219 
INSTIT_LENDERS      0.0092 -0.0696*** -0.1154*** 0.1568*** 
CAP        -0.0817*** -0.0446* -0.0289 
CORP        -0.3088*** -0.2000*** 
CP_PACKUP         -0.1092*** 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). **. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), *. Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed.) Using a cut-off of .5, all 
significant correlations equal to or greater than .5 are in bold.  Also, correlation among the variables of interest is also in bold.  
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TABLE 10 (Concluded) 
 
Panel D (concluded): Correlation among Loan-Specific Characteristics 
  TAKEOVER OTHER_LOANS SECURED SPONSORED RATING_CAT SYND MATURITY LOAN_SIZE COVEN 
S_REVOLVERS -0.0731*** -0.0474** -0.3884*** -0.1379*** -0.5559*** 0.3140*** -0.6176*** 0.2865*** -0.1892*** 
L_REVOLVERS -0.0585** -0.1085*** 0.2066*** -0.0156 0.3164*** -0.1635*** 0.2802*** -0.2364*** 0.1859*** 
BANK_LENDERS 0.1383*** 0.0603** 0.1537*** 0.1014*** 0.0842*** 0.0283 0.1307*** 0.1064*** 0.0529** 
INSTIT_LENDERS 0.0038 0.0465** 0.1951*** 0.2673*** 0.1691*** -0.0255 0.2990*** 0.0889*** 0.0603** 
CAP -0.0229 -0.0196 0.0400* -0.0256 0.0629*** -0.1014*** -0.0279 -0.1180*** 0.0301 
CORP -0.1589*** -0.1359*** -0.0139 0.0449* 0.0936*** -0.1377*** 0.0122 -0.1062*** -0.1311*** 
CP_PACKUP -0.0868*** -0.0742*** -0.3357*** -0.0969*** -0.5771*** 0.3983*** -0.3988*** 0.3722*** -0.2130*** 
DEBT -0.0562** -0.0481** 0.1266*** 0.0773*** 0.1172*** -0.0125 0.1847*** 0.0485** 0.0385 
TAKEOVER   -0.0382 0.0521** 0.0852*** 0.1192*** 0.0296 0.0886*** 0.1338*** 0.0566** 
OTHER_LOANS    -0.0311 -0.0426* 0.0796*** -0.0465** 0.0493** -0.0755*** -0.1413*** 
SECURED     0.1280*** 0.5004*** -0.2390*** 0.3581*** -0.1840*** 0.3965*** 
SPONSORED      0.1496*** 0.0044 0.2453*** 0.1667*** 0.0126 
RATING_CAT       -0.4777*** 0.4174*** -0.4443*** 0.2608*** 
SYND        -0.0573** 0.7589*** -0.0045 
MATURITY         0.0040 0.1527*** 
LOAN_SIZE          -0.0892*** 
COVEN         1.0000 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). **. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), *. Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed.) Using a cut-off of .5, all 
significant correlations equal to or greater than .5 are in bold.  Also, correlation among the variables of interest is also in bold.  
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6.3 Univariate Analysis 
 
Table 11 summarizes the results of the univariate analysis. I used the full sample to test 
the statistical differences in the means and medians of the IA between the treatment and control 
samples. Table 11 is composed of five panels. Panel A summarizes the results of the differences 
in means and medians of IA across firms with effective versus ICD firms.  Results of panel A 
support the first hypothesis (H1a) that firms with ICDs are having significantly higher IA than 
firms with effective IC; and the p-value is <0.01 (significant at 1%). Wilcoxon-test shows also a 
statistical significant difference between the distribution of IA for ICDs firms and IA of effective 
IC sample, with the ICDs having a higher median.  
Panel B summarizes the differences of IA across two samples of firms, firms with 
ICMWs reported under section 302 versus ICMWs reported under section 404. Panel C indicates 
that there are significant differences between IA for firms with ICDs and ICMWs and firms 
without ICDs. Firms with ICDs and ICMWs are having significantly higher mean IA than firms 
without ICDs. Firms with more severe types of ICDs such as CL-ICDs have non-significant 
differences in the mean and median IA. There is no evidence that firms that took actions to 
correct their ICDs experience lower information asymmetry as panel E summarizes non-
significant t and z values.   
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
TABLE 11 
Univariate Analysis 
Panel A: Effective IC versus ICD samples:         
            Difference Tests 
    Effective IC ICDs t-test Wilcoxon-test 
    Mean Median Mean Median (p-value) (z-value) 
  IA 153.419 154 175.907 154 -5.489*** 5.532*** 
  N 1404   398       
Panel B: ICMW 302 versus ICMW 404 samples:         
            Difference Tests 
    ICMWs_302 ICMWs_404 t-test Wilcoxon-test 
    Mean Median Mean Median (p-value) (z-value) 
  IA 148.438 150 196.647 154 1.606 1.520 
  N 16   348        
Panel C: ICD*ICMW versus No ICD*ICMW         
            Difference Tests 
    No ICDs*ICMWs ICDs*ICMWs t-test Wilcoxon-test 
    Mean Median Mean Median (p-value) (z-value) 
  IA 154.470 154 173.857 154 -4.569*** 4.635*** 
  N 1438  364      
Panel D: ICD*CL versus No ICD*CL           
            Difference Tests 
    No ICDs*CL ICDs*CL t-test Wilcoxon-test 
    Mean Median Mean Median (p-value) (z-value) 
  IA 158.191 150 160.856 175 -.405 .491 
  N 1670  132      
Panel E: No REM versus REM           
            Difference Tests 
    No REM REM t-test Wilcoxon-test 
    Mean Median Mean Median (p-value) (z-value) 
  IA 202.408 154 184.78 154 1.189 2.577** 
  N 316  82      
The bid-ask spread is winzorized at 10% and 90% 
***. The difference is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). **. The difference is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). *. The difference is 
significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). ICDs*ICMWs = the interaction term between the quality of internal control and the Internal Control 
Material Weaknesses (ICMW).  ICDs*CL= the interaction term between Internal Control Deficiencies (ICDs) and Company Level (CL) internal 
control. In categorizing the Internal Control Deficiencies as either Company Level (CL) or Account-Specific (AS), I classified weaknesses in 
internal control related to any accounts such as: inventory, accounts receivables, loan receivables, gain or loss recognition issues, liabilities, 
reserves, Tax expense, Depreciation, depletion or amortization  issues, and financial derivatives as Account- Specific (AS) weaknesses in 
internal control. With the same token, I classified weaknesses in internal control related to company level issues such as: Acquisition, merger, 
disposal or reorganization issues Deferred, stock-based or executive compensation issues, Intercompany issues, Foreign, related party, 
Consolidation, affiliated and/or subsidies issues as Company-Level (CL) weaknesses in internal control. I then manually coded firms with CL 
with 1 and firms with AS with zero. REM = An indicator variable = 1 if the firm remediated part or all the disclosed IC weaknesses in the year t-
1, zero otherwise. I manually coded firms that remediated part or all weaknesses in internal control with 1 and firms that did not remediate 
Internal Control Deficiencies with zero. For purposes of coding, I discarded the year 2002 from my manual coding since there is no need to 
measure the change from year 2001 to 2002. The remediation coding is done for only three paired years: 2002 versus 2003, 2003 versus 2004 
and 2004 versus 2005.   
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6.4 Results of Hypotheses 
Tables 12-19 summarize the results of the multivariate analysis regression models that 
test the association between the disclosure of ICDs and its decomposition, types, and remediation 
and IA in the secondary loan market.  
6.4.1 H1a: The Effect of ICDs Disclosure on Information Asymmetry 
Table 12 summarizes the results on the regression of IA on the disclosure of ICDs in the 
secondary loan market for 533 (1802) firms (facilitates) from 2002-2005. It shows a strong 
statistically significant positive association between the disclosure of ICDs and IA with a 
positive slope of .194. The model is statistically significant at 1% with p-vale < 0.01. The model 
explains 65.3% of the variations in the IA as measured by Adjusted R2.  I used the full sample 
(1802) to test model 1 and included in the regression a large pool of control variables to control 
for firm and loan-specific characteristics.  
The results show also that IA has a negative significant association with ROA, Assets, 
MTB, Liquidity, and loan size. This latter result supports the notion that big firms, high 
performers of firms, well established, large loans and profitable firms are experiencing lower IA 
than other small firms, low performers of firms. These results make sense, especially in the 
secondary loan market where big firms are able to reduce their overall  information asymmetry, 
and it also implies that IA are not uniform across different firm sizes.  
These latter results may be explained by the argument that big firms are more likely to 
have larger resources and be able to invest in their internal control systems, disclose interim 
reports and hence enhance transparency and disclosure of information. They also have top tier 
audit firms endorse their financial reporting. IA are having a statistically positive association 
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with loss firms, revolvers loan, CP pack-up loans, credit rating category and loan maturity. These 
latter positive associations imply an increase in the magnitude of IA in the presence of loss firms, 
long time to maturity and lower credit rating as well as certain types of loans such as revolvers 
and CP pack-up loans. Overall, the results of table 12 supports H1a that in the secondary loan 
market, the disclosure of Internal Control Deficiencies is positively associated with information 
asymmetry post SOX 2002. This result might be explained by the fact that disclosure of Internal 
Control Deficiencies increases the level of risk traders are willing to assume and hence increases 
the information asymmetry in the market.  
Results on table 12 can also be explained by Beneish, Billings and Hodder (2008) who 
claim that when a weakness in the internal control system is disclosed to the public, it increases 
the uncertainty about the firm’s internal operations and activities since the disclosure of ICDs is 
symptomatic of increased business risk (Ogneva, Subramanyam, and Raghunandan, 2007.) 
Additionally, uncertainty increases the demand for risk-taking actions by investors and traders. 
Hence, informed traders in the secondary loan market will demand more private information 
about unsecured collateral and increase the cost of borrowing to the firm relative to that cost 
demanded by informed traders.  Disclosure of ineffective ICs affects past, present and future 
financial reporting (Irving, 2006) providing information to internal managers and market-wide 
participants for decision-making purposes such as buying and selling decisions, ratings by credit 
agencies, loan decisions, and rating firm creditworthiness. 
Additionally, the results in this section suggest that the quality of accounting information 
matters in the secondary loan market. In other words, an effective IC system might play the same 
role that other proxies of the quality of accounting information do, such as the role of timely loss 
recognition in the secondary loan market (Moerman, 2008.) Moerman (2008) also finds that 
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timely loss recognition reduces information asymmetry in the secondary loan market. In other 
words, Moerman (2008) suggests that timely loss recognition increases debt contracting 
efficiency and reduces the agency cost through underestimating the net asset value and hence 
facilitates the monitoring by debt holders.  
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TABLE 12 
Regression of Information Asymmetry on Internal Control Deficiencies post SOX 2002 
                 
Model 1                 Ln_IA it = β0 + β1 ICDsit + ∑
=
j
i 1
 
αj δ it + εt 
Variable Expected Sign Estimated Coefficient t Value 
Intercept ?  6.9489  18.50*** 
Variable of Interest    
ICDs +  .1941  2.03** 
Firm-Specific Characteristics    
ROA - -.1757 -1.89* 
ASSETS - -.0922 -5.14*** 
MTB - -.0750 -5.83*** 
DA +  .0025  .13 
REG +  .1508   2.33** 
LQ - -.0417 -2.37** 
LOSS +  .1622  5.90*** 
AUD_D +  .0131  .34 
AUD_R +  .1861  1.70* 
BIG_6 -  .1163  1.07 
Loan-Specific Characteristics    
S_REVOLVERS - -.4546 -8.35*** 
L_REVOLVERS + -.3072 -7.32*** 
BANK_LENDERS +  .1851  1.95* 
INSTIT_LENDERS -  .0263  .41 
CAP ? -.0357 -.30 
CORP ?  .0441  1.42 
CP_PACKUP ? -.2506 -4.82*** 
DEBT +  .0911  1.69* 
TAKEOVER +  .0730  1.10 
OTHER_LOANS ?  .0015  .02 
SECURED -  .3919  12.26*** 
SPONSORED -  .2906  4.80*** 
RATING_CAT +  .2372  8.51*** 
SYND - -.0014 -.60 
MATURITY -  .0019  2.16** 
LOAN_SIZE - -.0356 -2.08** 
COVEN ?  .0255  .82 
SOX 404   - -.2450 -2.46** 
IND Included    
F Value 95.3516 
P Value 0.0000 
Adjusted R2 65.35% 
N 1802 
The following symbols ***, **, and * represent significant level at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 p-values respectively. IA
 it = information asymmetry as 
measured by the bid-ask spread in the secondary loan market. ICDsit =  an indicator variable equals 1 if the firm disclosed any types of Internal 
Control Deficiencies, zero otherwise. δ
 it = a set of control variables that explain the variation in IA in prior research.   
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6.4.2 H1b: The effect of ICDs disclosure under Section 302 and Section 404 on 
Information Asymmetry 
Prior research concludes that ICDs reported under section 302 are associated with 
negative stock returns (Gupta and Nayar 2006; Beneish, Billings and Hodder 2008) and higher 
cost of capital (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and LaFond, 2009.) My results in Table 13 
are consistent with prior research and show a strong statistically significant positive association 
with a positive slope of .399 and significant at 1% with p-value < 0.01 between the disclosure of 
ICDs under section 302 and IA. The model is statistically significant at 1% with p-vale < 0.01. 
The model explains 69.07% of the variations in the IA as measured by Adjusted R2.  I used a 
subset of samples of 398 firm-year observation with only ICDs reported under both sections 302 
and 404 to test model 2.  I included in the regression the same large pool of control variables to 
control for firm and loan-specific characteristics. The results show also that IA has a negative 
significant association with ROA, Assets, regulated industries (REG), MTB, syndication, and 
loan size.   
This latter result supports the notion that big firms, high performing of firms, well 
established, more syndicated to multiple lenders and large loans and profitable firms are 
experiencing lower IA than other small firms, low performing of firms. According to model 2, 
there is a statistical positive significant association between IA has and  loss firms, Big 6,  
identity of lenders,  maturity, secured, sponsored and rated loans. These positive associations 
imply an increase in the magnitude of IA as an increasing function of these control variables. 
Overall, the results of table 13 support H2a that in the secondary loan market, firms with Internal 
Control Deficiencies reported under section 302 have significantly higher information 
asymmetry than firms with Internal Control Deficiencies reported under section 404.  
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The results in this section are consistent with the findings of Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, 
Kinney, and LaFond (2009) who find a positive association between the cost of capital and 
disclosure of material weaknesses under sections 302. However, it is not contrary to the findings 
of Ogneva, Subramanyam, and Raghunandan (2007) who find no association between the 
disclosure of ICMW under section 404 and cost of capital, nor is it consistent with Botosan 
(1997) who also finds no relation between disclosure and the cost of capital in the pre-SOX 2002 
period. Overall, results suggest that the market response to IC quality is dependent on audit 
quality as argued by Gupta and Nayar (2006) and Beneish et al. (2008) because section 302 
(unaudited ICDs) showed a positive association with IA, while section 404 (audited ICDs) 
showed a negative association with IA.  Moreover, Kim and Park (2009) find that for a sample of 
firms that disclose internal control deficiencies under section 302, the abnormal stock returns are 
negatively associated with changes in market uncertainty. My results also support the notion of 
the study made by Kim and Park (2009), which suggest negative consequences of the disclosure 
of ICD to the market.  
 
 
  
99 
 
  
 
TABLE 13 
Regression of Information Asymmetry on Internal Control Deficiencies under Section 302   
Model 2       Ln_IA
 it = β0 + β1 ICDs_302it +∑
=
j
i 1
 
αj δ it + εt 
Variable Expected Sign Estimated Coefficient t Value 
Intercept ?  7.8272  8.44*** 
Variable of Interest    
ICDs_302 +  .3986  4.18*** 
Firm-Specific Characteristics    
ROA - -.4719 -2.87*** 
ASSETS - -.1157 -2.99*** 
MTB - -.0353 -1.12 
DA + -.0669 -1.36 
REG + -.2326 -1.67* 
LQ - -.0246 -.69 
LOSS +  .1476  2.30** 
AUD_D + -.1038 -1.06 
AUD_R +  .0804  .71 
BIG_6 -  .3822  1.83* 
Loan-Specific Characteristics    
S_REVOLVERS -  .0925  .64 
L_REVOLVERS + -.0260 -.30 
BANK_LENDERS +  .7442  4.50*** 
INSTIT_LENDERS -  .3245  2.79*** 
CORP ?  .1200  1.92* 
CP_PACKUP ?  .1097  .62 
DEBT +  .1098  .93 
TAKEOVER + -.4590 -3.75*** 
OTHER_LOANS ?  .1330  .64 
SECURED -  .3358  4.94*** 
SPONSORED -  .3168  3.43*** 
RATING_CAT +  .3142  3.34*** 
SYND - -.0193 -2.32** 
MATURITY -  .0059  3.74*** 
LOAN_SIZE - -.1027 -2.40** 
COVEN ? -.0090 -.13 
IND Included   
F Value 27.0780 
P Value 0.0000 
Adjusted R2 69.07% 
N 398 
The following symbols ***, **, and * represent significant level at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 p-values respectively. IA
 it = information asymmetry as 
measured by the bid-ask spread in the secondary loan market. ICDs_302it =  an indicator variable equals 1 if the firm disclosed Internal Control 
Deficiencies (ICDs) under section 302, zero otherwise. δ
 it =  a set of control variables that explain the variation in IA in prior research.   
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6.4.3 H2a: The Effect of ICMWs Disclosure on Information Asymmetry 
 
Table 14 documents a negative, but non-statistically significant, association between the 
disclosure of ICMWs and IA. Overall, the model is statistically significant at 1% with p-vale < 
0.01. The model explains 69.07% of the variations in the IA as measured by Adjusted R2.  I used 
a subset of samples of 398 firm-year observation with only ICMWs reported under both sections 
302 and 404 to test model 4.  I included in the regression the same large pool of control variables 
to control for firm and loan-specific characteristics. Results on the association between the 
control variables and IA are quite similar to that in models 1 and 2. Overall, the results in model 
3 do not support, nor refute, my (H2a), which states that, in the secondary loan market, firms 
with Internal Control Material Weaknesses have significantly higher information asymmetry 
than those with Significant and/or Control Deficiencies post SOX 2002. This hypothesis is 
supposed to measure the association between the rank of severity of ICDs as measured by the 
presence of ICMWs and IA. Although the hypothesized relationship in H2a is not supported by 
the results of the statistical analysis in Table 14, Table 15 tests the level of severity of ICDs as 
measured by the Company Level (CL) versus Account-Specific (AS) Internal Control 
Deficiencies. Nevertheless, Table 15 supports my prediction that the disclosure of severe types 
of ICDs as measured by CL is positively associated with IA.  
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TABLE 14 
Regression of Information Asymmetry on Internal Control Material Weaknesses 
Model 3       Ln_IA
 it = β0 + β1 ICMWs it +∑
=
j
i 1
 αj δ it + εt 
Variable Expected Sign Estimated Coefficient t Value 
Intercept ?  8.2150  8.69*** 
Variable of Interest    
ICMWs  + -.0856 -.99 
Firm-Specific Characteristics    
ROA - -.4960 -2.98*** 
ASSETS - -.1162 -3.01*** 
MTB - -.0366 -1.16 
DA + -.0749 -1.50 
REG + -.2013 -1.41 
LQ - -.0208 -.58 
LOSS +  .1486  2.32** 
AUD_D + -.1002 -1.03 
AUD_R +  .0843  .75 
BIG_6 -  .3700  1.77* 
Loan-Specific Characteristics    
S_REVOLVERS -  .0808  .56 
L_REVOLVERS + -.0379 -.43 
BANK_LENDERS +  .7465  4.52*** 
INSTIT_LENDERS -  .3096  2.64*** 
CORP ?  .1155  1.84* 
CP_PACKUP ?  .1244  .70 
DEBT + .1177  .99 
TAKEOVER + -.4661 -3.80*** 
OTHER_LOANS ?  .1340  .65 
SECURED -  .3365  4.95*** 
SPONSORED -  .3235  3.49*** 
RATING_CAT +  .3305  3.46*** 
SYND - -.0193 -2.32** 
MATURITY -  .0057  3.53*** 
LOAN_SIZE - -.0999 -2.33** 
COVEN ? -.0091 -.13 
SOX 404   - -.3745 -3.81*** 
IND Included   
F Value 26.3316 
P Value 0.0000 
Adjusted R2 69. 07% 
N 398 
The following symbols ***, **, and * represent significant level at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 p-values respectively. IA
 it = is information asymmetry as 
measured by the bid-ask spread in the secondary loan market. ICDsit =  an indicator variable equals 1 if the firm disclosed any types of Internal 
Control Deficiencies, zero otherwise.  δ
 it =  a set of control variables that explain the variation in IA in prior research.  
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6.4.4 H2b: The Effect of Company Level ICDs Disclosure on Information 
Asymmetry 
Table 15 summarizes the results of the association between the disclosure of more severe 
types of ICDs such as the Company Level versus Account Specific and IA. I used a subset of 
samples of 398 firm-year observation with only ICDs reported under both sections 302 and 404 
to test model 4.  I then manually coded firms with ICDs into either CL weaknesses or AS 
weaknesses30.  It is hypothesized that disclosure of severe types of IC weaknesses may lead 
banks and short-term lenders to discount the collateral potential of the borrowing firms’ financial 
assets (Gupta and Nayar, 2006) and trigger a lower debt rating thus increasing the probability of 
default and/or higher borrowing costs (Moody’s Investor Service, 2004; Fitch Rating, 2005), 
thus increasing market uncertainty (Beneish, Billings and Hodder 2008; Kim and park 2009.) In 
summary, prior research suggests that different types of IC weaknesses result in varying degrees 
of uncertainty. Overall, the more severe the IC weakness, the more likely investors will perceive 
higher information asymmetry. In this case, the disclosure of these IC weaknesses will be 
perceived by uninformed traders as requiring them to seek private information to reduce the 
information asymmetry. Conversely, this will induce informed traders to lessen their trading 
activities. The overall effect will be a subsequent increase in IA.  
I expect various types of IC weaknesses to have varying impacts on information 
asymmetry in the secondary loan market. I will stratify IC weaknesses by type and investigate 
                                                          
30
 In categorizing the Internal Control Deficiencies as either Company Level (CL) or Account-Specific (AS), I 
classified weaknesses in internal control related to any accounts such as: inventory, accounts receivables, loan 
receivables, gain or loss recognition issues, liabilities, reserves, Tax expense, Depreciation, depletion or 
amortization issues, and financial derivatives as Account- Specific (AS) weaknesses in internal control. With the 
same token, I classified weaknesses in internal control related to company level issues such as: Acquisition, merger, 
disposal or reorganization issues Deferred, stock-based or executive compensation issues, Intercompany issues, 
Foreign, related party, Consolidation, affiliated and/or subsidies issues as Company-Level (CL) weaknesses in 
internal control. I then manually coded firms with CL with 1 and firms with AS with zero.  
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their relationship to information asymmetry in the secondary loan market. Doyle, Ge and McVay 
(2007a) suggest that the determinants of material Internal Control Deficiencies vary according to 
the reasons for those weaknesses.  
The results in table 15 show a strong statistically positive significant association at 1% 
between the disclosure of Company Level (CL) weaknesses and IA with a positive slope of .212. 
The model is statistically significant with p-vale < 0.01 and the model explains 70.34% of the 
variations in the IA as measured by Adjusted R2.  I included in the regression the same large pool 
of control variables to control for firm and loan-specific characteristics. Results on the 
association between control variables and IA are quite similar to what is documented in 
previously used regression models in this study.  Overall, the results of Table 18 support the H2b 
hypothesis that in the secondary loan market, firms with company-level weaknesses have 
significantly higher information asymmetry than those with account-specific weaknesses post 
SOX 2002. 
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TABLE 15 
 Regression of Information Asymmetry on Company-level Internal Control Deficiencies 
Model 4      Ln_IA
 it = β0 + β1 CL it +∑
=
j
i 1
 
αj δ it + εt 
Variable Expected Sign Estimated Coefficient t Value 
Intercept ?  8.0612  8.70*** 
Variable of Interest    
CL  +  .2117  4.07*** 
Firm-Specific Characteristics    
ROA - -.4863 -3.02*** 
ASSETS - -.11988 -3.14*** 
MTB - -.0446 -1.45 
DA + -.0906 -1.86* 
REG + -.2735 -2.00** 
LQ - -.0436 -1.24 
LOSS +  .1094  1.72* 
AUD_D + -.0957 -1.00 
AUD_R +  .1194  1.08 
BIG_6 -  .3463  1.69* 
Loan-Specific Characteristics    
S_REVOLVERS -  .1543  1.08 
L_REVOLVERS +  .0206  .24 
BANK_LENDERS +  .7549  4.67*** 
INSTIT_LENDERS -  .3688  3.22*** 
CORP ?  .1160  1.90* 
CP_PACKUP ?  .0867  .50 
DEBT +  .0826  .71 
TAKEOVER + -.5172 -4.28*** 
OTHER_LOANS ?  .1972  .97 
SECURED -  .3477  5.22*** 
SPONSORED -  .2916  3.22*** 
RATING_CAT +  .2994  3.25*** 
SYND - -.0221 -2.71*** 
MATURITY -  .0053  3.42*** 
LOAN_SIZE - -.0888 -2.11** 
COVEN ? -.0238 -.34 
SOX 404   - -.3360 -3.55*** 
IND Included   
F Value 27.9040 
P Value 0.0000 
Adjusted R2 70.34% 
N 398 
The following symbols ***, **, and * represent significant level at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 p-values respectively. IA
 it = information asymmetry as 
measured by the bid-ask spread in the secondary loan market. CL
 it =  an indicator variable equals 1 if the firm disclosed company-level 
weaknesses under section 302 and  section 404, zero otherwise. δ
 it = a set of control variables that explain the variation in IA in prior research.   
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6.4.5 H3: The Effect of IC Remediation on Information Asymmetry   
Table 16 summarizes the results of the association between the remediation of Internal 
Control Deficiencies and IA. I used a subset of samples of 398 firm-year observations with only 
ICDs reported under both sections 302 and 404 with their subsequent remediation to test model 
5.   I then manually coded firms that remediated part or all of their weaknesses in internal control 
with 1 and firms that did not remediate Internal Control Deficiencies with zero.  
The results in Table 16 show a strong statistically significant negative association, at 1%, 
between the disclosure of remediation of ICDs and IA. The slope of the association is .193. The 
model is statistically significant at 1% with p-vale < 0.01. The model explains 74% of the 
variations in IA as measured by Adjusted R2.  I included in the regression the same large pool of 
control variable to control for firm and loan specific characteristics. However, I added an 
additional control variable, which is Cash Flow from Operation (CFO) as a measure of 
investment in internal control because  remediation requires more investment in internal control 
systems (Gupta and Nayar, 2006; Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and LaFond , 2008; Feng et 
al., 2009.) The results of the regression analysis shows a negative significant association between 
CFO and IA, implying that firms with a higher magnitude of CFO are experiencing lower IA, as 
measured by the average bid-ask spread. Results on the association between control variables 
and IA are quite similar to what is documented in previous regression models used in this study.  
Overall, the results of table 16 support my hypothesis (H3) that in the secondary loan market, 
firms that remediate their ICDs have significantly lower information asymmetry than firms that 
did not remediate their ICDs SOX 2002. 
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TABLE 16 
Regression of Information Asymmetry on Remediation of Internal Control Deficiencies 
Model 5      Ln_IA
 it = β0 + β1 REM it +  ∑
=
j
i 1
 
αj δ it + εt 
Variable Expected Sign Estimated Coefficient t Value 
Intercept ?  7.7125  8.71*** 
variable of interest    
REM - -.1927 -3.01*** 
Firm-Specific Characteristics    
ROA - -.4574 -3.03*** 
ASSETS -  .0046  .12 
MTB -  .0321  1.07 
DA + -.0990 -2.18** 
REG + -.1443 -1.13 
LQ -  .0938  2.63*** 
LOSS +  .1134  1.90* 
AUD_D + -.1373 -1.53 
AUD_R +  .1610  1.55 
Ln_CFO - -.2226 -8.23*** 
BIG_6 -  .0792  .40 
Loan-Specific Characteristics    
S_REVOLVERS -  .0960  .72 
L_REVOLVERS + -.0687 -.85 
BANK_LENDERS +  .6212  4.06*** 
INSTIT_LENDERS -  .2148  2.00** 
CORP ?  .0309  .53 
CP_PACKUP ? -.0648 -.40 
DEBT +  .1295  1.18 
TAKEOVER + -.5113 -4.55*** 
OTHER_LOANS ?  .2419  1.26 
SECURED -  .3716  5.95*** 
SPONSORED -  .2898  3.37*** 
RATING_CAT +  .2140  2.42** 
SYND - -.0077 -.98 
MATURITY -  .0053  3.51*** 
LOAN_SIZE - -.1415 -3.56*** 
COVEN ? -.1367 -2.03** 
SOX 404   - -.4282 -4.82*** 
IND  Included 
F Value 32.3817 
P Value 0.0000 
Adjusted R2 74.00% 
N 398 
The following symbols ***, **, and * represent significant level at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 p-values respectively. IA
 t = the bid-ask spread in the 
secondary loan market. REM
 it = an indicator variable equal 1 if the firm remediated part or all the disclosed IC weaknesses in the year t-1, zero 
otherwise.  δ
 it = a set of control variables that explain the variation in IA in prior research.   
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6.4.6 H4: The Moderating Effect of the Secondary Loan Market Characteristics on the 
Association between Information Asymmetry and ICDs 
The previous statistical analysis shows that the disclosure of ICDs exacerbates conditions 
of information asymmetry in the secondary loan market. One might pose an intriguing question 
in response to such results. Why such association exists in the secondary loan market and what 
would make such association unique in these market settings relative to other market settings 
found in the primary loan market or equity market?  
Possible explanations for the documented positive significant association between 
Internal Control Deficiencies and information asymmetry in the secondary loan market are the 
unique characteristics of the secondary loan market. The secondary loan market is characterized 
by the existence of multiple lenders, various types of loans, debt covenants, credit rating, and 
different loan purposes. For example, the existence of credit rating of the firm and/or the loan in 
the secondary loan market is expected to reflect the loan’s creditworthiness and indicative of a 
higher firm value and performance. Therefore, I would expect a significant negative association 
between the interaction term of ICDs and the existence of credit rating and IA in the secondary 
loan market.  
Ogneva, Subramanyam, and Raghunandan (2007) suggest that firms with internal control 
weakness post-SOX 404 and prior to AS5 have higher costs of equity capital. Nevertheless, the 
positive effect between the reporting of material weakness and cost of equity capital dissipates 
after controlling for firm-specific characteristics and analysts’ forecasts bias, implying an 
indirect association between the disclosure of material weaknesses and the cost of equity capital. 
Additionally, in the secondary loan market research area, Sufi (2007) and Moerman (2008) find 
that participant-lender reputation mitigates, but does not eliminate, information asymmetry.  
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The debt covenant plays a crucial role in the determination of the loan prices and hence 
the average bid-ask spread. The interaction term between ICDs and the debt covenant should 
presumably show a significant negative/positive association with IA in the secondary loan 
market. The same analogy can be applied to multiple lenders/arranges.  IA for loans that are 
syndicated to a large number of lenders should be lower than that IA for loans that are syndicated 
to less number of lenders. Therefore, the interaction term of the ICDs and the number of lenders 
should show a significant negative association with IA in the secondary loan market.  
In this section, I will try to explain the documented positive relationship between the 
disclosure of Internal Control Deficiencies and information asymmetry in the secondary loan 
market by focusing on three unique characteristics of the secondary loan market, namely, 
syndication, credit rating and debt covenants. My prediction is that the unique characteristics of 
the secondary loan market mitigate or moderate the association between ICDs and IA. In proving 
my conjectures, I then rerun the previous statistical analysis of the regression of IA on ICDs by 
focusing on the interaction term between the ICDs and three previously discussed loan-specific 
characteristics as my variables of interest.  My expectation is that the source of the increasing 
magnitude of IA in the presence of the ICD variable is primarily due to the existence of smaller 
number of syndicated lenders, the absence of debt covenants and the absence of credit rating.   
Tables 17-19 summarize the results of the additional regression models. Results of all 
three models seem to be fairly consistent with my prediction that the unique characteristics of the 
secondary loan market mitigate the positive significant association between ICDs and IA. All 
models are significant at 1% and their p-values are <0.01.  While the disclosure of ICDs has a 
significant positive association with IA, the interaction term between ICDs and the number of 
lenders, the existence of credit rating, and the existence of debt covenants have statistically 
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significant negatives associated with IA, suggesting a mediating effect of such unique 
characteristics on the association between the disclosure of ICDs and IA in the secondary loan 
market.  
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TABLE 17 
Regression of Information Asymmetry on the interaction term between ICDs and Number of Lenders (Syndication) 
Model 6a      Ln_IA
 it = β0 + β1 ICDs it + β2 SYND it+ β3 ICDs*SYND it +∑
=
j
i 1
 
αj δ it + εt 
Variable Expected Sign Estimated Coefficient t Value 
Intercept ?  6.7659  17.97*** 
variable of interest    
ICDs +  0.3347  3.24*** 
SYND ?  0.0003  0.11 
ICDs*SYND - -0.0184 -3.54*** 
Firm-Specific Characteristics    
ROA - -0.1971 -2.13** 
ASSETS - -0.0898 -5.02*** 
MTB - -0.0743 -5.79*** 
DA +  0.0015  0.08 
REG +  0.1447  2.25** 
LQ - -0.0431 -2.45** 
LOSS +  0.1592  5.81*** 
AUD_D +  0.0142  0.36 
AUD_R +  0.1627  1.49 
BIG_6 -  0.1597  1.47 
Loan-Specific Characteristics    
S_REVOLVERS - -0.4579 -8.45*** 
L_REVOLVERS + -0.3140 -7.53*** 
BANK_LENDERS +  0.1652  1.74* 
INSTIT_LENDERS - -0.0011 -0.02 
CORP ?  0.0403  1.31 
CP_PACKUP ? -0.2520 -4.87*** 
DEBT +  0.0962  1.79* 
TAKEOVER +  0.0602  0.91 
OTHER_LOANS ?  0.0105  0.14 
SECURED -  0.3827  11.97*** 
SPONSORED -  0.2873  4.77*** 
RATING_CAT +  0.2391  8.61*** 
MATURITY -  0.0018  2.13** 
LOAN_SIZE - -0.0315 -1.85* 
COVEN ?  0.0441  1.41 
SOX 404   - -0.2498 -2.52** 
IND  Included 
F Value 96.3665 
P Value 0.0000 
Adjusted R2 65.59% 
N 1802 
The following symbols ***, **, and * represent significant level at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 p-values respectively. IA
 t = the bid-ask spread in the 
secondary loan market.  ICDsit =  an indicator variable equals 1 if the firm disclosed any types of Internal Control Deficiencies, zero otherwise. 
SYND
 it = the number of lenders or syndication. ICDs*SYND it = the interaction term between the number of lenders or syndication and ICDs.  
δ
 it =  a set of control variables that explain the variation in IA in prior research.  
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TABLE 18 
Regression of Information Asymmetry on the interaction term between ICDs and Credit Rating 
Model 6b      Ln_IA
 it = β0 + β1 ICDs it + β2 RATING it+ β3 ICDs*RATING it +∑
=
j
i 1
 
αj δ it + εt 
Variable Expected Sign Estimated Coefficient t Value 
Intercept ?  7.5135  19.25*** 
variable of interest    
ICDs +  0.2845  2.70*** 
RATING(A) -  0.2230  5.33*** 
ICDs*RATING - -0.1440 -2.28** 
Firm-Specific Characteristics    
ROA - -0.2033 -2.21** 
ASSETS - -0.1139 -6.24*** 
MTB - -0.0727 -5.69*** 
DA + -0.0009 -0.05 
REG +  0.1328  2.07** 
LQ - -0.0358 -2.04** 
LOSS +  0.1552  5.68*** 
AUD_D +  0.0088  0.23 
AUD_R +  0.1474  1.35 
BIG_6 -  0.0741  0.68 
Loan-Specific Characteristics    
S_REVOLVERS - -0.4575 -8.48*** 
L_REVOLVERS + -0.3178 -7.64*** 
BANK_LENDERS +  0.1732  1.84* 
INSTIT_LENDERS - -0.0154 -0.24 
CORP ?  0.0390  1.28 
CP_PACKUP ? -0.2446 -4.75*** 
DEBT +  0.0839  1.56 
TAKEOVER +  0.0545  0.83 
OTHER_LOANS ?  0.0046  0.06 
SECURED -  0.3607  11.18*** 
SPONSORED -  0.2625  4.34*** 
RATING_CAT +  0.2885  9.85*** 
SYND - -0.0005 -0.20 
MATURITY -  0.0015  1.76* 
LOAN_SIZE - -0.0522 -3.01*** 
COVEN ?  0.0254  0.83 
SOX 404   - -0.2315 -2.33** 
IND  Included 
F Value 94.9811 
P Value 0.0000 
Adjusted R2 65.59% 
N 1802 
(A) The documented positive significant association between the existence of RATING  and IA can be explained by the possible existence of 
multicollinearity between RATING and RATING_CAT. I rerun the model after excluding RATING_CAT  and again got a positive significant 
association between the existence of credit rating and IA. I checked the multicollinearity statistics for the model after excluding RATING_CAT 
and I found a high collienarity between the interaction term of ICDs and the existence of credit rating and the existence of credit rating as. I then 
impute the positive sign of the RATING slope to the presence of  multicollinearity.   
 
The following symbols ***, **, and * represent significant level at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 p-values respectively. IA
 t = the bid-ask spread in the 
secondary loan market.  ICDit =  an indicator variable equals 1 if the firm disclosed any types of Internal Control Deficiencies, zero otherwise. 
RATING
 it = an indicator variable = 1 for the presence of credit rating and 0 otherwise. ICDs*RATING it = the interaction term between the 
existence of the credit rating and ICDs.  δ
 it =  a set of control variables that explain the variation in IA in prior research.  
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TABLE 19 
Regression of Information Asymmetry on the interaction term between ICDs and Debt Covenants 
Model 6c      Ln_IA
 it = β0 + β1 ICDs it + β2 COVEN it+ β3 ICDs*COVEN it +∑
=
j
i 1
 
αj δ it + εt 
Variable Expected Sign Estimated Coefficient t Value 
Intercept ?  6.8337  18.26*** 
variable of interest    
ICDs +  0.4116  3.68*** 
COVEN ?  0.0832  2.41** 
ICDs*COVEN - -0.2552 -3.70*** 
Firm-Specific Characteristics    
ROA - -0.1694 -1.84* 
ASSETS - -0.0827 -4.58*** 
MTB - -0.0722 -5.62*** 
DA +  0.0053  0.28 
REG +  0.1706  2.64*** 
LQ - -0.0453 -2.58** 
LOSS +  0.1723  6.26*** 
AUD_D +  0.0078  0.20 
AUD_R +  0.1709  1.57 
BIG_6 -  0.0796  0.73 
Loan-Specific Characteristics    
S_REVOLVERS - -0.4665 -8.60*** 
L_REVOLVERS + -0.3204 -7.66*** 
BANK_LENDERS +  0.1709  1.81* 
INSTIT_LENDERS -  0.0013  0.02 
CORP ?  0.0456  1.48 
CP_PACKUP ? -0.2534 -4.90*** 
DEBT +  0.0847  1.58 
TAKEOVER +  0.0678  1.02 
OTHER_LOANS ?  0.0185  0.24 
SECURED -  0.4000  12.53*** 
SPONSORED -  0.2856  4.74*** 
RATING_CAT +  0.2351  8.47*** 
SYND - -0.0010 -0.43 
MATURITY -  0.0017  1.94* 
LOAN_SIZE - -0.0391 -2.29** 
SOX 404   - -0.2837 -2.84*** 
IND  Included 
F Value 96.4664 
P Value 0.0000 
Adjusted R2 65.62% 
N 1802 
The following symbols ***, **, and * represent significant level at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 p-values respectively. IA
 t = the bid-ask spread in the 
secondary loan market.  ICDsit =  an indicator variable equals 1 if the firm disclosed any types of Internal Control Deficiencies, zero otherwise. 
COVEN
 it = an indicator variable = 1 for the presence of debt covenants and 0 otherwise. ICDs*COVEN it = the interaction term between the 
existence of debt covenants and ICDs.  δ
 it =  a set of control variables that explain the variation in IA in prior research 
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6.5 Additional Analyses: 
The Moderating Effect of the Secondary Loan Market Characteristics on the Association 
between Information Asymmetry and Severity of Internal Control Deficiencies 
Based on prior research (Sufi, 2007; Moerman, 2008; Ball, Bushman, and Vasvari, 2008; 
Lee and Mullineaux, 2004), which documents that loan specific characteristics are having a 
significant association with information asymmetry, I would expect that the interaction effect 
between severity of internal control weaknesses as measured by CL and loan-specific 
characteristics, namely, syndication, credit rating and debt covenants, to have a significant 
association with IA in the secondary loan market. However, I am not expecting a specific 
direction between IA and the interaction term because the asymmetric information emitting from 
the problem severity of internal control is not easy to predict. My opinion  is based on prior 
research (e.g., Beneish, Billings and Hodder 2008; Kim and Park 2009), which suggests that 
different types of IC weaknesses result in varying degrees of uncertainty. In this section, I test 
whether in the secondary loan market, loan-specific characteristics, namely, credit rating, debt 
covenants, and syndication mitigate the association between the severity of internal weaknesses 
and information asymmetry. I use the below model to test these relationships: 
IA
 it = β0 + β1 CLit + β2 LS_CHARit + β3 CL*LS_CHARit +∑
=
j
i 1
 αj δ it + εt                     (Model 6) 
 Where 
   
IA
 it = is information asymmetry as measured by the bid-ask spread in the secondary loan market. 
CL
 it =  is an indicator variable equals 1 if the firm disclosed company-level weaknesses under section 302 
or section 404, zero otherwise. 
LS_CHARit = syndication or number of lenders, the availability of credit rating and the existence of debt 
covenants.31 
 
CL*LS_CHARit = the interaction term between ICDs and LS_CHARit. 
δ
 it = is a set of control variables that explain the variation in IA in prior research.   
 
                                                          
31
 Same footnote as above.  
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Tables 20-22 summarize the moderating effect of the secondary loan market 
characteristics on the association between information asymmetry and severity of internal control 
deficiencies. All models are statistically significant at 1% and have p-values < 0.01. They 
explain the, on average, 70% of the variations in the IA in the secondary loan market. Overall, 
the interaction term between loan-specific characteristics does not show a consistent direction on 
whether it mitigates the IA. In Table 20, the results of model 7a, which use the interaction 
between CL and loan syndication as an independent variable of interest, show no statistical 
association between the interaction term and IA, suggesting no impact of loan syndication on IA 
in the present of CL as a severe type of ICDs. Model 7b in Table 21, however, shows a 
statistically positive significant association between the interaction term between CL and debt 
rating and IA, suggesting that the existence of debt rating does not lessen the IA in the presence 
of CL internal control deficiencies. Surprisingly, model 6c in Table 22 shows a statistically 
negative association between the interaction term between CL and debt covenants and IA, 
suggesting that the existence of debt covenants mitigates, but does not eliminate, the IA in the 
presence of CL internal control deficiencies. These latter results are consistent with findings by 
Bradley and Robert (2004) who suggest a positive impact of the existence of debt covenants in 
the loan arrangements. Theoretically, the existence of debt covenants mitigates the asymmetric 
information between lead arranger and participant lenders because it restricts the earnings 
manipulation and provides reliable and quality financial reporting, which decreases the 
asymmetric information.   
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TABLE 20 
Regression of Information Asymmetry on the interaction term between ICDs and Number of Lenders (Syndication) 
Model 7a      Ln_IA
 it = β0 + β1 CL it + β2 SYND it+ β3 CL*SYND it +∑
=
j
i 1
 
αj δ it + εt 
Variable Expected Sign Estimated Coefficient t Value 
Intercept ?  7.9581  8.50*** 
variable of interest    
CL +  0.1619  1.98** 
SYND - -0.0252 -2.78*** 
CL*SYND ?  0.0064  0.79 
Firm-Specific Characteristics    
ROA - -0.4650 -2.84*** 
ASSETS - -0.1148 -3.00*** 
MTB - -0.0440 -1.42 
DA + -0.0901 -1.85* 
REG + -0.2667 -1.95* 
LQ - -0.0421 -1.19 
LOSS +  0.1108  1.74* 
AUD_D + -0.0894 -0.93 
AUD_R +  0.1176  1.06 
BIG_6 -  0.3436  1.68* 
Loan-Specific Characteristics    
S_REVOLVERS -  0.1598  1.12 
L_REVOLVERS +  0.0249  0.29 
BANK_LENDERS +  0.7624  4.70*** 
INSTIT_LENDERS -  0.3700  3.23*** 
CORP ?  0.1174  1.92* 
CP_PACKUP ?  0.0859  0.50 
DEBT +  0.0805  0.69 
TAKEOVER + -0.5136 -4.25*** 
OTHER_LOANS ?  0.1867  0.91 
SECURED -  0.3424  5.11*** 
SPONSORED -  0.2972  3.27*** 
RATING_CAT +  0.3114  3.33*** 
MATURITY -  0.0053  3.40*** 
LOAN_SIZE - -0.0890 -2.12** 
COVEN ? -0.0248 -0.35 
SOX 404   - -0.3360 -3.55*** 
IND  Included 
F Value 27.1172 
P Value 0.0000 
Adjusted R2 70.31% 
N 398 
The following symbols ***, **, and * represent significant level at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 p-values respectively. IA
 t = the bid-ask spread in the 
secondary loan market.  CLit =  an indicator variable equals 1 if the firm disclosed Company Level internal control deficiencies, zero otherwise. 
SYND
 it = the number of lenders or syndication. CL*SYND it = the interaction term between the number of lenders or syndication and CL.  δ it =  
a set of control variables that explain the variation in IA in prior research.  
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TABLE 21 
Regression of Information Asymmetry on the interaction term between ICDs and Credit Rating 
Model 7b      Ln_IA
 it = β0 + β1 CL it + β2 RATING it+ β3 CL*RATING it +∑
=
j
i 1
 
αj δ it + εt 
Variable Expected Sign Estimated Coefficient t Value 
Intercept ?  8.7445  9.45*** 
variable of interest    
CL + -0.1465 -1.65* 
RATING -   0.0864  1.20 
CL *RATING ?  0.4729  4.50*** 
Firm-Specific Characteristics    
ROA - -0.5175 -3.75*** 
ASSETS - -0.1235 -3.57*** 
MTB - -0.0157 -0.80 
DA + -0.1203 -2.15** 
REG + -0.2733 -1.78* 
LQ - -0.0582 -1.38 
LOSS +  0.1268  2.35** 
AUD_D + -0.0861 -0.92 
AUD_R +  0.0945  0.68 
BIG_6 -  0.3245  0.73 
Loan-Specific Characteristics    
S_REVOLVERS -  0.1245  0.90 
L_REVOLVERS + -0.0495 -0.58 
BANK_LENDERS +  0.5954  3.73*** 
INSTIT_LENDERS -  0.2035  1.79* 
CORP ?  0.1278  2.16** 
CP_PACKUP ?  0.1750  1.05 
DEBT +  0.0564  0.50 
TAKEOVER + -0.3816 -3.21*** 
OTHER_LOANS ?  0.1175  0.59 
SECURED -  0.3471  5.31*** 
SPONSORED -  0.2279  2.57** 
RATING_CAT +  0.3535  3.91*** 
SYND - -0.0238 -3.02*** 
MATURITY   0.0056  3.75*** 
LOAN_SIZE - -0.1323 -3.18*** 
COVEN ?  0.0344  0.50 
SOX 404   - -0.2531 -2.75*** 
IND  Included 
F Value 29.3961 
P Value 0.0000 
Adjusted R2 72.58% 
N 398 
The following symbols ***, **, and * represent significant level at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 p-values respectively. IA
 t = the bid-ask spread in the 
secondary loan market.  CLit =  an indicator variable equals 1 if the firm disclosed Company Level internal control deficiencies, zero otherwise. 
RATING
 it = an indicator variable = 1 for the presence of credit rating and 0 otherwise. CL*RATING it = the interaction term between the 
existence of the credit rating and CL.  δ
 it =  a set of control variables that explain the variation in IA in prior research.  
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TABLE 22 
Regression of Information Asymmetry on the interaction term between ICDs and Debt Covenants 
Model 7c      Ln_IA
 it = β0 + β1 CL it + β2 COVEN it+ β3 CL *COVEN it +∑
=
j
i 1
 
αj δ it + εt 
Variable Expected Sign Estimated Coefficient t Value 
Intercept ?  8.1431  8.85*** 
variable of interest    
CL +  0.4247  4.43*** 
COVEN ?  0.0421  0.57 
CL *COVEN ? -0.3079 -2.64*** 
Firm-Specific Characteristics    
ROA - -0.4643 -2.90*** 
ASSETS - -0.1211 -3.23*** 
MTB - -0.0329 -1.06 
DA + -0.0939 -1.95* 
REG + -0.2283 -1.67* 
LQ - -0.0422 -1.21 
LOSS +  0.1272  2.01** 
AUD_D + -0.0821 -0.86 
AUD_R +  0.1226  1.12 
BIG_6 -  0.3750  1.85* 
Loan-Specific Characteristics    
S_REVOLVERS -  0.1120  0.79 
L_REVOLVERS +  0.0060  0.07 
BANK_LENDERS +  0.6765  4.15*** 
INSTIT_LENDERS -  0.3111  2.70*** 
CORP ?  0.1157  1.91* 
CP_PACKUP ?  0.1175  0.68 
DEBT +  0.1270  1.09 
TAKEOVER + -0.4985 -4.15*** 
OTHER_LOANS ?  0.2136  1.06 
SECURED -  0.3862  5.71*** 
SPONSORED -  0.2530  2.78*** 
RATING_CAT +  0.2689  2.92*** 
SYND - -0.0203 -2.49** 
MATURITY -  0.0054  3.48*** 
LOAN_SIZE - -0.0902 -2.16** 
SOX 404   - -0.3363 -3.58*** 
IND  Included 
F Value 27.7695 
P Value 0.0000 
Adjusted R2 70.82% 
N 398 
The following symbols ***, **, and * represent significant level at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 p-values respectively. IA
 t = the bid-ask spread in the 
secondary loan market.  CLit =  an indicator variable equals 1 if the firm disclosed Company Level internal control deficiencies, zero otherwise. 
COVEN
 it = an indicator variable = 1 for the presence of debt covenants and 0 otherwise. CL*COVEN it = the interaction term between the 
existence of debt covenants and CL.  δ
 it =  a set of control variables that explain the variation in IA in prior research 
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CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Limited research examines the impact of the quality of financial reporting on the 
secondary loan market (Ball, Bushman, and Vasvari 2008; Yu 2007; Gaul and Uysal, 2009; 
Moerman, 2008).  To the best of my knowledge, examining the association between the 
disclosures of Internal Control quality on information asymmetry in the secondary loan market 
has been missing from this line of research. The main purpose of my study is to void the missing 
link in prior literature by testing the association between the disclosure of IC effectiveness and 
information asymmetry in the secondary loan market. An effective internal control system is an 
indication on the creditworthiness of the business environment and quality of financial reporting. 
Likewise, the presence of Internal Control Deficiencies is a sign that information provided to 
management for the decision-making process contains errors and that assets are not protected. 
Considering that assets are the collateral in any loan agreement, if these assets are not protected, 
then collateral will be viewed by creditors as overvalued assets. Therefore, to the extent that 
assets are not protected in a firm, creditors must account for the high risk associated with their 
investment in such firms by increasing the cost of borrowing. Likewise, credit rating agencies 
might lower the credit rating of such risky firms.  
The primary objective of this study is tri-fold. First, it examines the association between 
the disclosure of the IC quality as a proxy for the firm’s informational environment, and 
information asymmetry in the secondary loan market. Second, it identifies which types of IC 
weaknesses exacerbate conditions of information asymmetry in the secondary loan market. 
Third, it investigates whether firms that remediate or take corrective actions to address IC 
weaknesses lead to a reduction in information asymmetry in the market. Moreover, this study 
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examines the effect of the loan specific characteristics in the secondary loan market on the 
association between internal control deficiencies and information asymmetry.  
To the best of my knowledge, my study is the first to integrate the quality of IC and 
information asymmetry in the secondary loan market into one paradigm. My study extends 
numerous research on the association between the quality of accounting information and 
information asymmetry or cost of capital. For example, my study differs from and extends the 
study by Beneish, Billings and Hodder (2008). It also extends research on audit quality 
(DeAngelo, 1981, Teoh and Wong, 1993, Krishnan, 2005) because I compare two SOX 2002 
provisions, section 302 is unaudited disclosure of ICDs and section 404 is audited disclosure of 
ICMWs. My work extends the study made by Moerman (2008), which finds that timely loss 
recognition, as a measure of financial reporting quality, decreases information asymmetry in the 
secondary loan market. Furthermore, my study extends research by Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, 
Kinney, and Lafond (2009), which argues that firms that failed to remediate their Internal 
Control Deficiencies (ICDs) receive an adverse SOX 404 opinion for the period after the ICDs 
disclosure, and consequently, experienced a higher cost of equity capital. Moreover, my study 
contributes to resolving the mixed evidence on the association between disclosure of material 
weaknesses and cost of capital.  
To test my hypothesized relationships, I focus on four main predictions: the association 
between IC disclosure and information asymmetry, types of ICDs and information asymmetry, 
IC remediation and information asymmetry, and the effect of the loan-specific characteristics on 
the association between ICDs and information asymmetry. I based my prediction on the premise 
that the disclosure of ineffective ICs affects past, present and future financial reporting (Irving, 
2006) because the internal control system is providing information to internal managers and 
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market-wide participants for decision making for purposes such as buying and selling decisions, 
ratings by credit agencies, loan decisions, and rating firm creditworthiness. 
The descriptive statistics of firms with ICDs reveal that firms with reported ICDs are 
generally small, poorer performers, financially weaker, and with higher market risk. These 
results are documented by multiple studies (Bryan and Lilien, 2005; Ge and McVay, 2005; 
Doyle, Ge and McVay 2007 a,b; Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and Kinney, 2007, Ashbaugh-Skaife, 
Collins, Kinney, and LaFond, 2008). I also found strong evidence to support the claim that firms 
that disclose ICDs have significant positive association with IAs. The positive significant 
association between information asymmetry and ICDs suggests that the quality of accounting 
information matters in the secondary loan market. Additionally, on average, firms with ICDs are 
experiencing higher means and medians of IAs than firms with effective IC systems. In other 
words, effective IC systems serve the same function that other proxies of the quality of 
accounting information do, such as fill the role of timely loss recognition the secondary loan 
market (Moerman, 2008.) 
Theoretically, proponents of section 302 might argue that it results in incremental value 
because it discloses Internal Control Deficiencies (ICD) which includes both material 
weaknesses and significant deficiencies. Nevertheless, I argue in my hypothesis development 
section and suggest, based on the results of my statistical analyses, that disclosing significant 
deficiencies causes variability in stakeholders’ beliefs in two ways.  First, stakeholders might 
perceive a reported significant deficiency as bad news as it might become a material weakness in 
the future. Second, stakeholders might also perceive a significant deficiency as good news as it 
bears low risk and they expect the firm to take remedial actions to mitigate the deficiency in the 
near future. Therefore, in this latter case, ICD signals to the market a lower prospective risk 
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associated with investment with ICD firms. I base my prediction on prior research reporting that 
IC disclosure under section 302 increases market uncertainty (Kim and Park 2009; Beneish et al. 
2008).32  I predict that disclosure of internal control quality under SOX 302 is incomplete due to 
the nature of voluntary disclosures associated with it. Incomplete disclosure hence stimulates 
investors and creditors to search for private information in an effort to reduce perceived 
information asymmetry. Moreover, voluntary disclosure is often perceived as less credible than 
mandatory, well-regulated disclosure. I found strong support for my prediction that in the 
secondary loan market, firms with Internal Control Deficiencies reported under section 302 are 
having more significant positive association with information asymmetry than firms with 
Internal Control Deficiencies reported under section 404. 
 This latter result is partially consistent with the findings of Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, 
Kinney, and LaFond (2009) who find a positive association between the cost of capital and 
disclosure of material weaknesses under sections 302 and 404. However, it is contrary to the 
findings of Ogneva, Subramanyam, and Raghunandan (2007) who find no association under 
section 404 and Botosan (1997) who also finds no relation between disclosure and the cost of 
capital in the pre-SOX 2002 period. My results are also in line with those of Beneish, Billings 
and Hodder (2008) who find that the unaudited disclosure of material weakness causes an 
abnormal increase in the equity cost of capital and negative abnormal returns. However, I also 
found that audited disclosure of material weakness has an impact information asymmetry; unlike 
the documented results of Beneish et al. (2008), which suggest that SOX 404 audited disclosure 
does not affect the equity market. Overall, I found a negative significant association between the 
disclosure of ICDs under section 404 and information asymmetry.  
                                                          
32
 Kim and Park (2009), however, predict that some types of ICDs help reduce market uncertainty. 
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Results on the association between the severity rank of ICDs and information asymmetry 
using the presence of ICMWs as a proxy for severity of Internal Control Deficiencies fail to 
provide support to my prediction, which states that firms with ICMWs will have a statistically 
positive significant association with IAs. However, the use of Company Level internal control as 
a measure of the severity of Internal Control Deficiencies provides strong support that firms with 
Company Level (CL) Internal Control Deficiencies are experiencing on average higher 
statistically significant means and medians IAs than firms with Accounting Specific (AS) 
Internal Control Deficiencies. Additionally, firms with CL have a positive significant association 
with IAs, suggesting that the disclosure of the severity of Internal Control Deficiencies 
exacerbates conditions of information asymmetry in the secondary loan market. Finally, using a 
sub-sample of firms with only ICDs and identifying firms that took remediation actions to 
correct the Internal Control Deficiencies reveals that there is a significant negative association 
between the remediation and IAs. Furthermore, I use the unique characteristics of the secondary 
loan market such as debt covenants, credit rating and number of lenders to explain the 
hypothesized relationship between the information asymmetry and the disclosure of Internal 
Control Deficiencies.  
Possible explanations to the documented positive significant association between the 
existence of ICDs and IAs in the secondary loan market are the unique characteristics of the 
secondary loan market. To test this conjecture, I used the interaction term between three unique 
characteristics of the secondary loan market, namely, number of lenders or syndication, debt 
covenants and credit rating and ICDs as my variable of interest in a regression model that uses 
IA as the dependent variable and the interaction terms as well as other previously discussed 
control variables are independent variables. My prediction is that the existence of these unique 
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characteristics mitigates the negative impact of the disclosure of ICDs on IA. Overall, I found 
statistical negative association between the interaction term of ICDs and the number of lenders 
and IA. Same negative association is documented for the interaction term of ICDs and credit 
rating, and IA and the interaction term of ICDs and debt covenants and IA. The latter result 
proves that the secondary loan market’s unique characteristics improve the disclosure 
environment of ICDs and reduce the information asymmetry between lender and multiple 
arrangers.  
I finally examine the moderating effect of the secondary loan market’s characteristics on 
the association between information asymmetry and severity of internal control deficiencies. 
Overall, the results did not display consistent evidence on the mediating effect of loan-specific 
characteristics on IA. While syndication and CL interaction term did not show significant 
influence on IA, debt rating and CL interaction term showed positive significant association with 
IA, and debt covenants and CL interaction term documents a significant negative association 
with IA. Overall, I would conclude that loan-specific characteristics do not lessen the positive 
association between CL internal control deficiencies, as a severe type of ICD, and IA. My latter 
results are consistent with prior research (e.g., Beneish, Billings and Hodder 2008; Kim and Park 
2009), which suggests that different types of IC weaknesses result in varying degrees of 
uncertainty.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Variables Definition and Measurement 
Variable Symbol Definition & measurement 
Information Asymmetry IA Natural log of the difference between the average annual 
bid and ask spread of the traded facility.  
Internal Control Deficiencies ICDs An indicator variable equals 1 if the firm disclosed 
Internal Control Deficiencies, zero otherwise. 
Internal Control Material 
Weaknesses 
ICMWs An indicator variable = 1 if the firm disclosed ICMWs 
under section 302 or section 404, zero otherwise.  
Internal Control Material 
Weaknesses 
ICMWs_302 An indicator variable = 1 if the firm disclosed ICMWs 
under section 302, zero otherwise.  
Internal Control Material 
Weaknesses 
ICMWs_404 An indicator variable = 1 if the firm disclosed ICMWs 
under section 404, zero otherwise.  
Company Level Disclosure CL An indicator variable equal 1 if the disclosed IC 
weaknesses on the company level, zero otherwise. 
Remediation REM An indicator variable = 1 if the firm remediated part or all 
the disclosed IC weaknesses in the year t-1, zero 
otherwise. 
Return on Asset ROA Return on Asset is Income before Extraordinary items / 
lagged total assets. 
Total Assets ASSETS Natural log of total assets [Compustat data item # 6]. 
Market-to-Book ratio MTB Natural log of  the ratio of the firm’s market value to book 
value of common equity, computed as [share price times 
the number of shares outstanding [Compustat data item 
#25 * Compustat data item #199] divided by [Compustat 
data item # 60]. 
Discretionary Accruals DA We measure the discretionary accruals using the correct 
model of the Modified Jones Model as in Dechow, Sloan 
and Sweeney (2005). 
Regulated Industry REG An indicator variable = 1 if the firm is in regulated 
industry such as financial or utility industry (SIC codes 
6000-6999 and 4900-4999), zero otherwise.  
Liquidity LQ Natural log of the volume of stock traded to proxy for 
liquidity. 
Losses firms LOSS An indicator variable = 1 if the firm had losses over the 
last two years [Compustat data item # 172]. 
Auditor Dismissal  AUD_D An indicator variable = 1 if the firm dismissed the auditor, 
zero otherwise.  
Auditor Resignation  AUD_R An indicator variable = 1 if the auditor resigned, zero 
otherwise.  
Big-6 Audit Firms BIG_6 An indicator variable = 1 if the financial statements are 
audited by one of the top 6 audit firms, zero otherwise. 
Short_Revolvers S_REVOLVERS An indicator variable = 1 if it is a short term revolver loan 
such as 364-Day Facility, and 0 otherwise. 
Long_Revolvers L_REVOLVERS An indicator variable = 1 if it is a long term revolver loan 
such as Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr., and 0 otherwise. 
Bank Lenders BANK_LENDERS An indicator variable = 1 if the identity of the lender is a 
bank (Term Loan A “TLA”), and 0 otherwise. 
Institutional Lenders INSTIT_LENDERS An indicator variable = 1 if the identity of the lender is an 
institutional lender (Term Loan B, C, and D), and 0 
otherwise. 
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APPENDIX A Concluded 
 
Variables Definition and Measurement 
Variable Symbol Definition & measurement 
Capital Expenditure Loans CAP  An indicator variable = 1 if the loan purpose is to 
cover capital expenditures, and 0 otherwise. 
Corporate-Purpose Loans CORP  An indicator variable = 1 if the loan purpose is to 
cover corporate expenditures, and 0 otherwise. 
Commercial Paper Back Up Loans CP_BACKUP An indicator variable = 1 if it is a loan commitment 
with a bank “the bank will provide liquidity if the 
loan failed”, and 0 otherwise. 
Debt Repay Loans DEBT  An indicator variable = 1 if the loan purpose is to 
repay debt, and 0 otherwise. 
Takeover Loans TAKEOVER An indicator variable = 1 if the loan purpose is 
takeover, and 0 otherwise. 
Other Loans OTHER_LOANS An indicator variable = 1 if the loan purpose is any 
other reason than the ones listed above, and 0 
otherwise. 
Secured SECURED An indicator variable = 1 if the loan is secured with 
collateral, and 0 otherwise. 
Sponsored SPONSORED An indicator variable = 1 if the loan is for private 
equity related-transactions, and 0 otherwise. 
Credit Rating Categories RATING_CAT A continuous number indicating the rating 
categories. 
Syndication SYND A continuous number indicating number of lenders.  
Maturity MATURITY A continuous number indicating the maturity of a 
loan or the length of time until the loan is due.  
Loan Size LOAN_SIZE Natural log of the loan value in dollar amount.  
Debt Covenants COVEN An indicator variable = 1 if covenants exist, and 0 
otherwise. 
Sox 404 SOX 404 An indicator variable = 1 if the reporting period 
underlying SOX 404period, zero otherwise.  
Standard Industry Classification  IND Eight indicator variables to represent the different 
industries in the sample firms. The SIC two digits 
codes are used to categorize the industries. 
 
  
133 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vita 
 
Ms. Dina F. El-Mahdy was born in Dakahlia Governorate, Egypt on March 1st, 1976. She 
graduated with a B.Com. degree in Accounting with an Honor distinction in 1997 from Cairo 
University as well as a Master degree in Accounting and Finance in 2004 from the same 
institution. Ms. El-Mahdy moved to the USA in 2005 and then pursued her Ph.D. degree in 
August 2007, with a major in Accounting and a minor in Finance, from Virginia Commonwealth 
University. Ms. El-Mahdy has more than 14 years of teaching and research experience in 
accounting and scholarly research. She has published a book chapter in an edited book titled: 
Focus on Finance and Accounting Research in 2006 as well as co-authored a book on corporate 
Governance in 2010 with Prof. Carolyn Strand Norman, the book title is: Corporate Governance 
and the U.S. Firm: A Review and Directions for Future Research. Ms. El-Mahdy has an active 
research agenda and was awarded the 2010 Best PhD Candidate Paper Award from the American 
Accounting Association Southeast Regional Meeting for her paper titled: Earnings Management 
and Information Asymmetry in the Secondary Loan Market. Ms. El-Mahdy is the Units and 
Coordinator Officer in the Egyptian Student Association in North America, a not-for-profit 
registered organization in the U.S.A., and the Treasurer of the Graduate Student Association at 
Virginia Commonwealth University. Ms. El-Mahdy was awarded 2009 and 2011 Who’s Who 
Among Students in American Universities and Colleges, one of the most prestigious awards the 
academic community can bestow, in recognition of her academic excellence and outstanding 
service to community. Ms. El-Mahdy has accepted a full time position as an Assistant Professor 
of Accounting at Morgan State University to begin in August, 2011.  
